

Name: A. H. Belmont

Title: Assistant Director

EOD November 30, 1936

Grade: GS-17, at \$13,400

*INSPECTOR VAN PELT:* Although some delinquencies were found during the inspection, the over-all operations were generally satisfactory. Mr. Belmont impressed Inspector as being hard driving but well liked and having a high degree of initiative, foresight and planning ability. He seemed to be discharging his responsibilities with particular competence. He advised he has no personal problems and is available.

*RECOMMENDATION:* None . . . strictly informative.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION  
June 18, 1954  
HCVP:db

109  
JUL 1 1954

5-1  
2-11  
67-AUL REQUIRED

TO : Mr. Mohr

DATE: June 8, 1954

FROM : H. L. Edwards

SUBJECT: NATIONALIST PARTY OF PUERTO RICO (NPPR)  
INTERNAL SECURITY-N  
COMMENDATION MATTER

*Handwritten:* BELMONT

On 5-26-54, 11 subjects in the above-captioned case were apprehended by Bureau Agents as a result of indictments returned by Federal Grand Juries on 5-25-54, charging subjects with seditious conspiracy; 6 subjects were arrested in Chicago; 4 in New York and 1 in San Juan; 6 other subjects were already in custody.

SAC Chicago by letter 5-26-54 recommended AS's [redacted] (presently assigned New York City) and [redacted] be reallocated from Grade GS-10 to Grade GS-11 and afforded meritorious salary increases and that SA [redacted] be afforded a meritorious salary increase for their excellent efforts in this case. According to the SAC, SA's [redacted] and [redacted] did an outstanding job in identifying and locating individual NPPR members as well as securing valuable information concerning the organization on a nation-wide basis. These two Agents assisted in the development of three confidential informants who have been of great value to the Chicago Office in investigating activities of the NPPR. SA [redacted] also assisted in handling a fourth informant concerning this case. Both Agents have performed in an outstanding manner in developing pertinent information concerning the NPPR, in the serving of subpoenas on NPPR members and in the apprehension of the subjects in the Chicago area referred to above. They have demonstrated unusual skill in handling the above-mentioned informants and both testified in a creditable manner before the Federal Grand Jury in New York City concerning activities of the NPPR. SAC Chicago stated much of the successful coverage of the NPPR can be attributed to the interest, enthusiasm, aggressiveness, diplomacy and willingness to work long hours displayed by SA's [redacted] and [redacted]. With reference to SA [redacted] the SAC pointed out that he is the Espionage Supervisor in the Chicago Office and was responsible for the immediate supervision of surveillances of Chicago NPPR members, for the serving of subpoenas on certain members, and for the locating and apprehension of those members arrested in Chicago on 5-26-54. He stated that SA [redacted] had performed his duties in an excellent manner and had voluntarily contributed many hours of overtime in connection with the program. In addition the SAC Chicago recommended that SA [redacted] be commended by letter for his exemplary services in handling many of the administrative details concerning the serving of subpoenas on members of the NPPR in Chicago as well as the apprehension of 6 subjects. In addition the SAC recommended that a general letter of Commendation be directed to the Chicago Office commending the other Agents who participated commendably in this case.

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EJI:bak 39 JUL 8 1954  
CC: [redacted] (Sent Direct)  
Attachments (3)

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ORIGINAL FILED IN 67-342-2474

SAC New York by teletype 6-1-54, recommended that a general letter of commendation be directed to the New York Office with copies of such letters to be placed in the personnel files of those employees who participated in the investigation of the case in the New York Division.

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SAC San Juan by letter 5-26-54, recommended that SA's [redacted] and [redacted] receive letters of commendation for their splendid performance in apprehending one of the subjects of the NPPR. On 5-26-54, he pointed out that the arrest was made smoothly although it occurred in the midst of a stronghold of the Nationalist Party. All of the Agents were considered to have performed with discretion and dispatch.

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Recommendations of the Domestic Intelligence Division

In a memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman 6-3-54, it was recommended that SA's [redacted] and [redacted] of the Chicago Office be reallocated to Grade GS-11 but that they not be afforded meritorious salary increases and that SA [redacted] of the Chicago Office not receive a meritorious salary increase but that he be commended by letter instead. The other recommendations of the SAC's in Chicago, New York, and San Juan concerning letters of commendation for employees who participated in this case were concurred in. It was also recommended that letters of commendation be directed to the Special Agents in Charge of the Chicago, New York and San Juan Offices. In addition it was recommended that SA Jack C. Spencer who supervised the case at the Seat of Government be afforded a meritorious salary increase and the Clerical employees, [redacted] and [redacted] be commended by letter for their splendid services in handling this case. It was pointed out that SA Spencer has supervised the case at the Seat of Government since 3-1-54, and in that capacity assisted in preparing plans for the serving of subpoenas on NPPR members in New York and Chicago. He made a valuable suggestion concerning the preparation and use of Consent to Search Forms in connection with the serving of subpoenas. He has issued current and concise instructions to the field concerning various phases of the investigation. He assisted in conferences with members of the Department as well as in the planning preceding the actual arrests of the subjects as set out above. He supervised and coordinated the preparation of a brief on the NPPR for the possible use of the Director, in the event he should be called to testify before a Congressional Committee. He has consistently performed many hours of voluntary overtime in connection with the case. He willingly gave up annual leave which had been scheduled and approved in order to continue handling this matter. It was also pointed out that clerical employees [redacted] and [redacted] had contributed a considerable amount of voluntary overtime in insuring that the clerical and stenographic work pertaining to this case was promptly handled.

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Bureau Record of SA's [redacted] and Spencer

SA [redacted] entered on duty 2-18-52, and is presently in grade GS-10, \$5750 per annum. SA [redacted] entered on duty 3-17-52,

and is presently in Grade GS-10, \$5750 per annum. Their services have been satisfactory and no administrative action has been taken against them. They would normally be due for consideration for reallocation to Grade GS-11 on 2-18-55 and 3-17-55, respectively. SA Spencer entered on duty on 8-10-42, and is presently in Grade GS-13, \$8560, per annum. His services have been generally satisfactory, however, he was censured in 3-23-54 for a deficiency in his supervision of the case involving the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico. This deficiency involved an undue delay in disseminating information brought to the attention of the Bureau concerning an allegation that an attempt would be made on the life of a United States Senator. It will be noted that SA Spencer was recommended for a letter of commendation on April 28, 1954, as a result of his supervision of this case. However, in my memorandum to you dated May 3, 1954, it was recommended that he not be commended in view of the recent administrative action taken against him in connection with the same case. This recommendation was approved by the Director.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

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In view of the foregoing it is recommended:

(1) That SA's [ ] and [ ], be reallocated from Grade GS-10, \$5750 per annum to Grade GS-11, \$5940 per annum and that they be advised of their reallocation in the form of a commendatory letter. It is not felt that they should receive meritorious salary increases in addition to reallocation.

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(2) That SA [ ] not receive a meritorious salary increase since there is no indication that he exceeded the normal requirements of his position but, that he be commended by letter instead.

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(3) That SA [ ] be commended by letter and that



a general letter be directed to the Chicago Office commending that SAC and the other Agents who participated in this case.

(4) That a letter of commendation be directed to the New York Office commending the SAC and the other personnel of that office who participated in this case.

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(5) That SA's [redacted], Donald O. Whiting, [redacted] and [redacted] of the San Juan Office be commended by letter and that a letter be directed to the SAC of that office commending him and the office generally for the successful results accomplished in the case.

(6) That SA Jack C. Spencer not be afforded a meritorious salary increase since he was censured as recently as 3-23-54, in connection with this same case but that he be commended by letter instead.

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(7) That clerical employees Mrs. [redacted] and [redacted] be commended for the valuable assistance they rendered.

ADDENDUM: (SIZOO 6-10-54)

In spite of the letter of censure which SA Spencer received on 3-23-54, I believe a meritorious increase is warranted in view of the work he did on the brief on the NPPR, his all-round excellence in the supervision and coordination of the NPPR investigation, and the contribution of his own time (his overtime ranged from 3 hours, 37 minutes per month in April, 1954 to 5 hours, 58 minutes in March, 1954). I therefore recommend a meritorious salary increase from GS-13, \$8560, to GS-13, \$8760.

I also recommend letters of commendation to Assistant Director Belmont and Section Chief F. J. Baumgardner of the Internal Security Section in view of the effective supervision which was given NPPR matters by Belmont and Baumgardner and the close coordination which was personally given to the apprehension of the subjects on 5-26-54 by both of these men.

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PERMANENT BRIEFS OF THE PERSONNEL FILES OF SA'S   
AND SPENCER ARE ATTACHED.

February 5, 1953

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Allen M. Belmont  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Belmont:

1565 SDP/CSK  
9-25-91

I have carefully considered your explanation for the improper handling of the supervision by the Domestic Intelligence Division of the investigation of an attempted derailment of a railway train near Baltimore, Maryland, on January 26, 1952, and it is clear to me that you were at fault in this matter. It was necessary for me to call to your attention the fact that there was a discrepancy between published versions of the handling of this investigation with respect to who made the arrests and, as a result, you have now advised me that the Baltimore Division failed to furnish you with complete and accurate facts in the first instance. You completely failed completely to assess the situation and to challenge the details furnished you by our Baltimore Office until the matter was brought to your attention.

This is but another example of the lethargy and lack of alert and a grassy leadership which must be overcome if the Bureau is to maintain its hard-earned reputation and standing in the public eye. I shall expect you to be more attentive to situations of this nature in the future so that you will recognize them yourself without it becoming necessary for me to bring them to your notice.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Laughlin \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

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FEB 9 1953

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FEB 10 1953


Director

CC: Mr. Clegg  
JIC: jic

959MM - FBI  
FEB 6 1953  
MAILED 20



Best Copy Available



February 10, 1953

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Mr. Allen E. Belmont  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

For Mr. Belmont:

The deplorable manner in which contacts with Mr. Edward F. Bremer were handled by your division has been brought to my attention, and I feel that if you had been more alert in recognizing the potential problems that might arise from such contacts you would have realized that Agent Krebs required closer supervision and guidance in handling this matter. Such assistance would have left the record clear as to the Bureau's position in this matter.

I expect you to exercise better judgment and be more alert to the potentialities of such contacts in the future so that it will not be necessary to bring such matters to your attention again.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

cc: Mr. Ladd (Confidential)

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FEB 17 1953  
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE  
DIRECTOR

14639-302

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- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Laughlin \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

59 FEB 19 1953

MAILED 2  
FEB 17 1953  
FBI

Handwritten signature/initials

Handwritten signature/initials

Handwritten signature/initials

OFFICE MEMORANDUM . UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. Ladd  
FROM : A. H. Belmont

DATE: January 30, 1953

SUBJECT: ATTEMPTED DERAILMENT OF B & O TRAIN NO. 4  
UNDER B-1 BRIDGE, CURTIS BAY JUNCTION  
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND, JANUARY 24, 1953  
FEDERAL TRAIN WRECK STATUTE

SYNOPSIS:

This case first brought to the attention of Domestic Intelligence Division by Baltimore teletype 8:45 p.m., Saturday, January 24, 1953; which furnished facts and stated case under investigation. Baltimore office telephonically instructed, 10:55 a.m., Sunday, January 25, 1953, to conduct prompt thorough investigation and to keep Bureau advised of pertinent developments. Facts concerning identification of subjects furnished by Baltimore Office, by telephone at 5:15 p.m., January 27, 1953, and by teletype, same date, did not indicate that first admission by subject Freeman was obtained by B & O Railroad Police. Baltimore was called evening of January 27, when publicity credited police with confession of subject and reiterated facts previously furnished and stated press release had been issued. I should have specifically questioned Baltimore as to full facts then.

PURPOSE:

To advise you concerning the handling of this case by the Domestic Intelligence Division.

DETAILS:

By teletype at 8:45 p.m. on Saturday, January 24, 1953, the Baltimore Office advised that Baltimore and Ohio Passenger Train No. 4 struck a tie on the track under Bridge No. B-1, Curtis Bay Junction, Baltimore, Maryland, at 11:03 a.m. that date. This teletype stated that investigation was under way. At 10:55 a.m., Sunday, January 25, 1953, pursuant to my instructions, the Agent on Sunday duty in the Domestic Intelligence Division telephonically instructed the Baltimore Office that this case should be investigated thoroughly and promptly and that the Bureau should be advised of all pertinent developments.

PRB:glg

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FEB 16 1953

On the evening of January 27, 1953, SAC Alden called from Baltimore and advised the Domestic Intelligence Division that Jopseh Thomas Freeman, Lynn Bailey and Seymour Bowie had been identified as the subjects in this case, had been interviewed and that the United States Attorney had declined prosecution.

In view of the fact that Mr. Alden desired to make a press release he was referred to Mr. McGuire. In that regard Mr. Alden advised that the facts would be submitted by teletype and by airtel. A teletype from the Baltimore Office at 7:41 p.m., January 27, 1953, and an airtel on the same date furnished information to the effect that the subjects had been interviewed on January 27, 1953, by Bureau Agents and that subject Freeman had admitted placing the railroad tie on the track and had implicated the other two. A signed statement had been obtained from Freeman. The other two denied complicity. The facts were presented to the United States Attorney who declined. None of these communications furnished any information to the effect that the original admission in this case from the subject Freeman had been obtained from the B & O Railroad Police.

On the evening of January 27, 1953, I discussed this matter with Mr. McGuire since it appeared that the Baltimore Office had not issued a press release until after a press release had been issued by local authorities in Baltimore. Pursuant to this conversation Mr. McGuire again talked to Mr. Alden.

It was the duty of the Domestic Intelligence Division to get the true facts concerning this matter. I should have realized from the publicity that something was wrong with the facts furnished by Baltimore and should have immediately telephoned Baltimore to get complete details.

RECOMMENDATION:

We have previously recommended a letter of censure for the Baltimore Office for failure to push this case. In view of my failure to properly sense this situation and challenge the details furnished by Baltimore, I recommend that I receive a letter of censure.

DIRECTORS NOTATION: "OK." H.

February 26, 1953

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

C  
Mr. Alan H. Belmont  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

1565 SDP/160  
on 9-25-91

Dear Mr. Belmont:

In connection with the matter involving infiltration of the United Nations by subversive American citizens, I have noted that the Domestic Intelligence Division failed to take prompt and appropriate action with respect to the inadequate identifying data appearing in lists containing names of American employees of the United Nations which were submitted by another government agency in January and October 1952, respectively. The failure to promptly bring the attention of the agency submitting these lists to the fact that the data contained therein was inadequate for name check purposes was inexcusable and indicates that you and your subordinates were certainly not as alert in this instance as you should have been.

I will expect that the appropriate action will be taken in your division to insure that matters such as this are properly handled in the future so that there will be no necessity of my having to again call a delinquency of this nature to your attention.

Very truly yours


John Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
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Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Laughlin \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

69 MAR 4 1953

FDH:nre



RECEIPT FOR GOVERNMENT PROPERTY  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

2-18-53

I certify that I have received the following Government property for official use:  
~~returned~~

Manual of Rules and Regulations # 11  
(dated October 24, 1952)

RETURNED

Manual of Rules and Regulations # 902  
(dated June 10, 1946)

READ

6 The Government property which you hereby acknowledge is charged to you and you are responsible for taking care of it and returning it when its use has been completed. DO NOT MARK OR WRITE ON IT OR MULTILATE IT IN ANY WAY.

FILE  
W. A. R.  
FEB 2m

ORIGINAL FILED

Very truly yours,

*A. H. Belmont* 1742  
A. H. Belmont



1. Agency and branch

U. S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE - FBI

4. Slip No.  
18244

5. Employee's name (and social security account number, when appropriate)

MR. ALAN H. BELMONT

Dept.

6. Grade and salary

GS 17 \$13,000

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F.I.C.A.		NET PAY
7. Previous normal										
8. New normal										
9. Pay this period										

10. Remarks:

11. Appropriation(s)

12. Prepared by

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date

4-26-53

15. Date last equivalent increase

10-22-51

16. Old salary rate

\$13,000

17. New salary rate

\$13,200

18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.

(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following period(s):

Period(s):

3 - APR 3 - 1953

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)

☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.

☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

☒ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

JN/ff Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126-Revised  
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.  
Nov. 8, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

April 1, 1953

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Alan H. Belmont  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED  
ON 9-25-91

1565 SDP/KSR  
9-25-91

Dear Mr. Belmont:

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My attention has been called to the exceedingly reprehensible fashion in which the loyalty investigation of [redacted] appointee to the Office of Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, was handled in the field and supervised by the Domestic Intelligence Division. The initial investigation conducted in this matter was inadequate, and even so the investigative report was delayed beyond the deadline previously set. Yet, when instructions were prepared for transmittal to the New York Office concerning the additional investigation needed, one of your subordinates permitted this communication to be delayed six days by his failure to promptly review and approve it.

It is your responsibility to make certain that the supervisory personnel in your division carry out their responsibilities without delay and this was certainly not true in this case. I shall expect you to take immediate measures to prevent any further delinquencies of this nature.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

RECORDED-52

John Edgar Hoover

Director

CC: Mr. Ladd (P&C)

Tolson  
Ladd  
Nichols  
Belmont  
Clegg  
Glavin  
Harbo  
Rosen  
Tracy  
Gearty  
Mohr  
Winterrowd  
Tele. Room  
Holloman  
Sizoo  
Miss Gandy

APR - 2 1953

COMM-FBI

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FBI  
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U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE  
DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM

3/23/53

R. E. LADD

LETTER L-100, SAN  
 ANTI-COMMUNISM UNIT - NEW YORK - APPOINTMENT  
 OFFICE OF NEW YORK  
 D. J. LADD, NEW YORK, NEW YORK  
 L-100, NEW YORK, NEW YORK

REFERENCE:

By memorandum dated March 21, 1953, Mr. Ladd advised the Director as to steps taken in handling captioned investigation after receipt of letter from New York on December 14, 1952. Director desired advice as to why letter to Department did not go out until December 17, 1952. Letter was referred to Training and Inspection Division on March 10, 1953 with instructions to fix responsibility for delay in act of Government and in field.

Survey indicated first delay occurred in Records Section, Seat of Government. New York letter, December 14, 1952, reached Records Section on December 15, 1952 and was not returned to Loyalty Section until December 17, 1952. Elapsed time was 17 days, 11 of which were work days. Search slips in locate total of 11 files had to be reviewed, 17 of these became locate problems. It is not possible from available records to determine order in which files were located nor who was handling particular locates. It is indicated there was avoidable delay in Records Section. Material returned to Loyalty Section Friday, December 19, 1952, 2:15 p.m. Files reviewed and summarized to the Department dictated December 9, 1952, transcribed December 10, and cleared from December 12. No delay in this phase of the matter.

Loyalty Section dictated letter to New York on January 21, 1953, to conduct full field investigation after receipt of request from Department on January 16, 1953. Letter cleared the Bureau January 23, 1953. No avoidable delay in this phase. New York advised the Bureau February 10, 1953, deadline of February 23, 1953 would not be met, reason being "Agent to whom assigned working on captioned case." Bureau indicated all investigation contemplated by New York was

cc: Personnel file SA William Harland Thomas

Attachments

REMARKS

89 APR 13 1953

completed February 10, 1953, four days prior to Bureau deadline, that Agent was working on expedite UN case but that actual reason for delay was failure of Agent William Thomas, to whom case assigned, to indicate dictation was expedite when he requested same letter for February 20, 1953. This resulted in no further action until February 16, stenographer did not work until March 2, on govt had failed to indicate word was expedite and of or word was given preference, although instant report filed within required five-day period.

Report reached Legality Section on March 4, was released immediately and supervisor determined New York investigation was incomplete in that it had not even alleged denunciation of Kaplan and Visa - Argentino. Responsibility rests with Agent Thomas and New York - Police William Burke and other reports. Legality Section of New York Agents to effect that no direct finding was necessary. This sense of investigation because of Bureau's instruction that investigation be most discrete and further because original report of Agent investigation of Kaplan completed 1951 did not disclose denunciation considered need. Failure to complete investigation in first instance as claimed was basic cause of subsequent delay from March 4 to March 12, 1953 when final report received in Bureau. This delay was contributed to, however, by Legality Section at State Department. Air-Tel to New York directing additional investigation dictated March 6, transcribed March 9, and forwarded to supervisor in Charge Warren Kahan on March 9, 1953. Kahan was on sick leave from March 6 to March 11, 1953 during which time Charles Stanley, Chief of Legality Section, assumed responsibility for clearing mail on Kahan's desk. Stanley did not note the Air-Tel and assumed full responsibility for delay from March 6 to March 12, 1953 when Air-Tel finally came to New York.

This case was complete and copies of final report forwarded to appropriate agencies on March 26, 1953.

#### RECOMMENDATION:

1. This Special Agent William Thomas be censured and placed on probation for his failure to indicate expedite nature of dictation in Kaplan case resulting in undue delay and for his failure to conduct a complete investigation in the first instance, making it necessary for the Bureau to request additional investigation.

2. Letter of censure for Special Agent Willicha Burke of the New York Office who approved incomplete report submitted by Special Agent Thomas.

3. Letter of censure to Charles H. Stanley, Chief of Loyalty Section, who accepts responsibility for failure to note and promptly clear Air-Tel to New York requesting additional investigation.

4. Since time in the Records Section did not appear to be avoidable and responsibility could not be fixed, no action recommended.

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**DETAILS:**

By letter dated November 13, 1953, the New York Office advised the Bureau of certain un-American remarks alleged to have been made by [redacted] Assistant U. S. Attorney, New York, in 1941 or 1942. The letter was received at the Bureau on November 16, 1953, and reached the Records Section on November 18, 1953. It did not leave the Records Section until December 1, 1953, when it was returned to the Loyalty Section. The logged time was 17 days, 12 of which were work days. A review of the search slips reveals that a total of 52 files had to be reviewed and that some of these files had more than one reference. 27 of the files became locate problems. This particular letter with a common name like Louis Kaplan, coupled with the fact there was no specific identifying data such as is disclosed on the usual loyalty form, presented a difficult searching problem and accounts for the time taken by the Records Section. It is not believed there was avoidable delay in the Records Section.

The Loyalty Section received this letter with the references at 2:15 p.m., Friday, December 8, 1950. The necessary files were obtained and reviewed and on Tuesday, December 9, 1950, a memorandum to the Department was dictated. This memorandum was transcribed on December 10, 1950, and cleared the Bureau on December 10, 1950. There was no delay in this phase of the matter.

On January 10, 1951, the Loyalty Section received a Department memorandum requesting a full field investigation and on January 21, 1951, dictated a letter to New York to conduct the full field investigation. This letter cleared the Bureau on January 22, 1951. There is no evidence of any delay in this phase of the matter.

Failure to Meet Bureau Deadline of February 23, 1951

The New York Office under date of February 10, 1951, advised this case would become delinquent and that a report would reach the Bureau March 4, 1951. The reason given was "Agent to whom assigned working on expedite on case." Inquiry reveals that the agent was working on the case entitled Custody Duran, Bureau File 100-10, Loyalty of NY Employees, a case in which the Bureau had set a deadline of February 23, 1951.

The facts indicate, however, that the principal reason the report failed to reach the Bureau within the deadline was the failure of the agent to indicate his dictation was expedite. The New York Office advised that the records show Agent William Thomas signed up for dictation on February 10, 1951, and was assigned a stenographer for February 23. This assignment was cancelled due to a shortage of stenographers which made it necessary to limit dictation to expedite matters. February 23 was Friday, and the agent was assigned a stenographer for the next work day, February 24. He dictated from 2:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. and again failed to advise the stenographer his work was expedite. On February 25, 1951, stenographer typed delinquent matter on her book and on February 25 she typed 6 pages on instant case. On Friday, February 27 the stenographer was given one day compensatory leave for noon, worked on February 21 and February 22, 1951. The error caused for this compensatory leave was made at the time the stenographer volunteered to work Saturday and Sunday, February 21, 1951 and February 22, and was made so that she could attend a memorial

ness for her mother who recently passed away. Under the circumstances the stenographer is not considered culpable and responsibility rests solely with Agent Thomas because of his failure to indicate his work was expedite when requesting a stenographer and then dictating.

Responsibility for Incomplete Investigation at New York

When the report of Special Agent William Thomas was received at the Bureau on March 4, 1953, and reviewed in the Loyalty Section, it was determined that an important phase of the investigation had not been covered. The original complainant had said that during the latter part of 1949 or early 1950 [ ] had been associated with Vito Marcantonio. Had investigation concerning this allegation been completed in the first instance, it would not have been necessary to refer the case back to New York, which ultimately resulted in a delay from March 4, 1953 to March 23 in completing the case. Agent Thomas is responsible for the investigative report of March 4. This report was approved in the New York Office by William Burke, who therefore shares the responsibility. Special Agent Thomas and Supervisor Burke explain that they did not consider specific inquiry concerning the alleged association should be made because of the Bureau instruction that the investigation be discreetly made and further because the original Departmental applicant investigation of [ ] conducted in 1952 did not disclose any such connection. This explanation is considered weak.

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Responsibility for Delay at the Port of Government

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When asked for the reasons for the failure to more promptly advise the New York Office concerning the additional investigation required as a result of the review in the Loyalty Section, Supervisor [ ] advised that he remembers this matter very well. He recalls (atone verifies) that he dictated Air-Tel to New York on March 5. This Air-Tel was transcribed on March 6, 1953. (Abstract slip shows March 6, changed to March 12). [ ] forwarded to his supervisor, [ ] on March 6. He next saw the Air-Tel on March 12 when [ ] brought it to his office saying he found it in his incoming box on return from sick leave. [ ] was on sick leave from March 6 to March 11 inclusive. Air-Tel was redated March 12 and went out same day.

Loyalty Section Supervisor in Charge [redacted] said he went on sick leave March 6 to March 11, inclusive. When he returned on March 12, 1953, he found Air-Tel to New York in his incoming box. He does not know how long it had been there. He knows that on March 6, he called Mr. C. E. Stanley and told him there were some items on his desk which required handling (instant matter was of course not one of them). [redacted] assumes that Stanley assigned someone to handle the expedite matters as they were handled.

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Charles E. Stanley, Chief of the Loyalty Section, says that on March 6, [redacted] advised him that he was sick and would not be in until Monday, March 9; that he had a special coming through which required handling; Mr. Stanley did not assign anyone to handle Mr. [redacted] but elected to go through his incoming box and handle those matters requiring immediate attention himself. He says he checked this incoming box on March 6, on Monday, March 9; on March 10 and March 11, and did not note instant Air-Tel. Mr. Stanley believes it was probably attached to some other matter and was overlooked by him. He assumes full responsibility for failure to get Air-Tel off to New York.

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The final report on the full field investigation involving [redacted] which is dated March 21, 1953, was received in the Loyalty Section on March 23, 1953 and copies were forwarded to the appropriate agencies on March 24, 1953.

ATTACHED ARE PLAINTEXT BRIEFS OF THE FOLLOWING: CHARLES E. STANLEY, WILLIAM BURNS AND WILLIAM E. TROTT.



TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE 2/16/53

FROM : H. H. CLEGG

SUBJECT: INFILTRATION OF UNITED NATIONS BY SUBVERSIVE AMERICAN CITIZENS; - INTERNAL SECURITY - R

**BACKGROUND:** Survey on captioned matter, results of which are set forth in attached memo to Mr. Tolson from Mr. Clegg dated 1/28/53, revealed briefly that:

1) Espionage Section opened control file in December 1950 to follow infiltration of UN by subversive Americans. It wrote State Department on 10/11/51 to obtain list of American employees of UN in order to search same against our files. State furnished lists and other data on 1/9/52 but same was incomplete and inadequate for proper search and thus none was made. Espionage Section, however, did not advise State that the data furnished was inadequate for our purposes. Espionage Section wrote Justice Department on 4/26/52 and suggested latter obtain better lists from State. Justice Department wrote State to this end on 6/9/52. State Department answered Justice Department on 7/29/52, referred to the data it had furnished on 1/9/52 and declared FBI undertook to correlate this material. Actually, as noted, we had not used lists because they could not be properly searched.

2) In letter to Attorney General of 12/24/52 State Department advised it had furnished FBI with additional list of American employees of UN. This list was compiled of names of employees of the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). State declared it understood FBI was continuing name check operations on basis of data submitted. This UNESCO list was furnished us on 3/24/53 and in memo of transmittal State also declared that it was anticipated it might be possible to furnish in the near future an alphabetical list with identifying data. The UNESCO list was not searched by us because it was incomplete. It was initialed for file by former SA Joseph G. Fellner who resigned on 12/31/52. Espionage Section did not advise State of the inadequacy of this UNESCO list until its letter of 12/30/52.

The conclusion drawn by the above survey was that we should have advised State Department directly, in writing in both January and October that these lists were inadequate for our purposes.

**RESPONSIBILITY:** The failure to properly handle these lists on both occasions was direct responsibility of former SA Fellner. The line of responsibility in the Espionage Section runs from supervising agent to Section Chief W. A. Branigan to Inspector G. E. Hennrich to Assistant Director A. H. Belmont.

Messrs. Branigan, Hennrich and Belmont were interviewed concerning their personal knowledge of lists in question and they

21 MAR 1953

NEW YORK

2/23/53

D. E. Ladd

MEMO FOR MR. LADD  
 SUBJECT: NEW YORK - LARRY A. LADD - ATTORNEY  
 COUNSEL - OFFICE OF NEW YORK  
 D. E. LADD, 2 OF J. LADD, NEW YORK, NEW YORK  
 LARRY A. LADD - ATTORNEY

REFERENCE:

By memorandum dated March 11, 1953, Mr. Ladd advised the Director as to steps taken in handling captioned investigation after receipt of letter from New York on December 14, 1952. Director desired advice as to why letter to Department did not go out until December 17, 1952. Letter was referred to Training and Inspection Division on March 10, 1953 with instructions to fix responsibility for delay in act of Department and in field.

Survey indicated first delay occurred in Records Section, Dept of Department. New York letter, December 14, 1952, reached Records Section on December 15, 1952 and was not referred to Loyalty Section until December 1, 1953. Elapsed time was 17 days, 11 of which were work days. Search slips in index total of 31 files had to be reviewed, 17 of these became locate problems. It is not possible from available records to determine order in which files were located nor who was handling particular locate. No indication as to why was avoidable delay in Records Section. Material returned to Loyalty Section Friday, December 1, 1953, 2:10 p.m. Files reviewed and memorandum to the Department dictated December 9, 1953, transcribed December 10, and cleared Bureau December 12. No delay in this phase of the matter.

Loyalty Section dictated letter to New York on January 21, 1953, to conduct full field investigation after receipt of request from Department on January 16, 1953. Letter cleared the Bureau January 22, 1953. No avoidable delay in this phase. New York advised the Bureau February 10, 1953, deadline of February 22, 1953 would not be met, reason being "Agent to whom assigned working on a remote case." Survey indicated all investigation contemplated by New York was

cc: Personnel file SA William Harland Thomas

Attachments

LADD:WHD

89 APR 13 1953

failure to advise State Department directly in writing after receipt concerning their inadequacy. They advised in substance as follows:

1. They knew of the material received in January inasmuch as it had been routed through them prior to being sent to SA Fellner for handling. They were not cognizant at the time that State had not been advised lists were inadequate for proper search. They were not consulted by the supervisor in that regard.

2. They were not personally cognizant of receipt of the UNESCO list in October. They had not been consulted concerning it at the time by the supervisor. It is noted that the only initials appearing on the transmittal memo are those of SA Fellner.

Messrs. Branigan, Hennrich and Belmont have advised that, in the light of subsequent developments, we would have been in a better position had we timely advised State after receipt that the material furnished was unacceptable and could not be used.

RECOMMENDATION:

That letters of censure be given Messrs. Branigan, Hennrich and Belmont for the failure of the Espionage Section to handle this matter properly and for their not having followed more closely the work of former SA Fellner in this matter.

Ygs  
m/16

Jager  
2/16

Ygs

Received  
in the file for  
2/16/53  
72 H/m

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: 2/11/53

FROM : J. P. MOHR

SUBJECT: JOHN F. WACKS  
Special Agent Supervisor

*Anti Espionage*

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Reference is made to the attached memorandum dated February 4, 1953 from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Ladd in which Mr. Belmont reviews Special Agent Supervisor Wacks' contacts with Mr. [redacted] of the Department in connection with the Owen Lattimore Espionage - R and Perjury investigation. Mr. Belmont concludes that Mr. Wacks' actions in connection with his contacts with [redacted] had been correct with one exception, namely that although Wacks did record such information as [redacted] furnished in 19 memoranda, he did not make sufficient record of other matters which came up between him and [redacted] with the result that Wacks did not have a written record to fall back on at this time. Mr. Belmont pointed out that Supervisor Wacks recognized this defect as pointed out in a memorandum prepared by Wacks dated February 4, 1953. Mr. Belmont recommended a letter of censure for Supervisor Wacks for his failure to properly record his conversations with [redacted]. The Director requested that I review this entire matter and let him have a memorandum as to my recommendations for disciplinary action.

I feel that Wacks committed a grievous error in not properly recording all of his contacts and conversations with [redacted] and I think that Mr. Wacks should be disciplined for this failure. I do feel, however, that Wacks' superiors should likewise be disciplined in connection with this matter since they were aware that Wacks was dealing with [redacted] in connection with such an important investigation as the Owen Lattimore case. Mr. Wacks' immediate superior is William A. Branigan, who is in charge of the Espionage Section. Mr. C. E. Hennrich, Inspector in Charge, has overall supervision of the Espionage Section and Mr. Belmont, of course, is Assistant Director in charge of the division.

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I think that Messrs. Belmont, Hennrich and Branigan when they were aware of Wacks' contacts and associations with [redacted] in connection with the Lattimore case most certainly should have cautioned Wacks as to the proper manner of handling [redacted] and insuring that Wacks was properly briefed in maintaining the contact with [redacted] so that he would not become compromised. Obviously Wacks was primarily at fault in this instance by letting his guard down in dealing with a former Agent of the Bureau who has a tendency to ingratiate himself with other. According to the file, Wacks does have an excellent record

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JPM:DW 7 MAR 6 1953

in the Bureau's service and has been handling his work in the Espionage Section in an above average manner.

Accordingly, I make the following recommendations:

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1. I recommend that Special Agent Supervisor Wacks be censured and placed on probation for his ineptness in handling the contacts with [ ] and in a positive manner insuring that a proper record was maintained in the Bureau in order to adequately show the Bureau's relationships with [ ].

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2. I recommend that Section Chief William A. Branigan and Messrs. C. E. Hennrich and A. H. Belmont be censured for their failure to recognize and realize the type of contacts that Wacks was maintaining with [ ] and insure that Wacks was properly briefed in order to maintain the Bureau's interests during the period of this contact. I think Mr. Ladd should likewise be censured for his failure to adequately sense this situation and insure that Wacks was properly briefed and was handling the contact in a proper manner.

In the event you agree with the recommendations, the Administrative Division will prepare the necessary letters.

Tolson's notation.

I agree.  
2/12

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Director's notation.

I concur. All of those to be censured were either just outplayed by a smarter operator [ ] or they were counting on a friendship [ ] which didn't exist & should not have been assumed. Just because a man is an ex-Agt. doesn't pso facto make him dependable.

H.

April 10, 1953

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Alan H. Belmont  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED BY 1565 SDP/MSR  
ON 9-25-91

Dear Mr. Belmont:

I desire to call your attention to my dissatisfaction and extreme concern with regard to the delay on the part of the Boston Division in handling its investigative duties in the Joseph Woodrow Weinberg case. I have been advised that a Special Agent Supervisor in the Domestic Intelligence Division who was responsible for seeing to it that the investigation was completed and reported promptly failed to do so. As Assistant Director in charge of the Domestic Intelligence Division you are chargeable with the duty of adequately instructing and supervising your subordinates so that derelictions of this nature will not transpire.

The failure in this instance clearly indicates to me that you have been remiss in fulfilling your responsibilities and I shall hold you personally accountable for preventing any similar derelictions in the future.

Very truly yours,


J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

Tolson  
Ladd  
Nichols  
Belmont  
Clegg  
Glavin  
Harbo  
Rosen  
Tracy  
Gearty  
Mohr  
Winterrowd  
Tele. Room  
Holloman  
 Sizoo  
Miss Gandy

APR 10 4 11 PM '53  
FIC  
F B I  
RECEIVED - DIRECTOR  
F B I  
FIC: wjs

89 APR 15



RECEIVED  
F B I  
PR 10 3 16 PM '53

101

Handwritten signatures and initials, including a large 'B' and 'JW'.

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE**

**REPORT OF PERFORMANCE RATING**

Name of Employee: ALAN H. BELMONT

Where Assigned: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
(Division) (Section, Unit)

Payroll Title: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

Rating Period: from 3/31/52 to 3/31/53

ADJECTIVE RATING: SATISFACTORY  
Outstanding, Satisfactory, Unsatisfactory

Employee's  
Initials

AMB

Rated by:

[Signature]  
Signature

Asst. to the Dir.  
Title

4/17/53  
Date

Reviewed by:

[Signature]  
Signature

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR  
Title

Date

Rating approved by:

[Signature]  
Signature

[Signature]  
Title

APR 24 1953  
Date

**TYPE OF REPORT**

(X) Official  
(X) Annual

( ) Administrative

( ) 60-day

( ) Transfer

( ) Separation from service

( ) Special

**89 APR 27 1953**

67-94639-3060

APR 20 1953

[Signature]

# PERFORMANCE RATING GUIDE FOR INVESTIGATIVE PERSONNEL

(For use as attachment to Performance Rating Form No. FD-185)

Name of Employee ALAN H. BELMONTTitle Assistant DirectorRating Period: from 3/31/52 to 3/31/53

## RATING GUIDE AND CHECK-LIST

Note: Only those items having pertinent bearing on employee's performance should be rated. All employees in same salary grade should be compared. Rate items as follows:

- + Outstanding (exceeding excellent and deserving special commendation).  
✓ Satisfactory (ranging from good to excellent but not sufficient to rate outstanding).  
- Unsatisfactory.  
0 No opportunity to appraise performance during rating period.

Guide for determining adjective rating:

An 'Outstanding' rating cannot be justified unless all elements rated are 'plus', and in addition, of course, supporting comments must comply with the requirements as set out on the reverse of form FD-185.

So far as 'Satisfactory' and 'Unsatisfactory' ratings are concerned, it is impossible to provide a mechanical formula for computing the various 'plus', 'check', and 'minus' marks because such would presume equal weight for all elements rated. Good judgment must be exercised to insure that the adjective rating is reasonable in the light of the elements rated. All minus marks must be supported by narrative detail, and of course, all 'Unsatisfactory' ratings must comply with the requirements as set out on the reverse of form FD-185.

- + (1) Personal appearance.  
✓ (2) Personality and effectiveness of his personal contacts.  
+ (3) Attitude (including dependability, cooperativeness, loyalty, enthusiasm, amenability and willingness to equitably share work load).  
✓ (4) Physical fitness (including health, energy, stamina).  
✓ (5) Resourcefulness and ingenuity.  
+ (6) Forcefulness and aggressiveness as required.  
✓ (7) Judgment, including common sense, ability to arrive at proper conclusions; ability to define objectives.  
+ (8) Initiative and the taking of appropriate action on own responsibility.  
+ (9) Planning ability and its application to the work.  
✓ (10) Accuracy and attention to pertinent detail.  
+ (11) Industry, including energetic consistent application to duties.  
+ (12) Productivity, including amount of acceptable work produced and rate of progress on or completion of assignments. Also consider adherence to deadlines unless failure to meet is attributable to causes beyond employee's control.  
+ (13) Knowledge of duties, instructions, rules and regulations, including readiness of comprehension and 'know how' of application.  
✓ (14) Technical or mechanical skills.  
✓ (15) Investigative ability and results:  
     - (a) Internal security cases  
     - (b) Criminal or general investigative cases  
     - (c) Fugitive cases  
     - (d) Applicant cases  
     - (e) Accounting cases  
0 (16) Physical surveillance ability.

- ✓ (17) Firearms ability.  
0 (18) Development of informants and sources of information.  
+ (19) Reporting ability:  
     - (a) Investigative reports  
     - (b) Summary reports  
     + (c) Memos, letters, wires  
     (Consider: - conciseness; - clarity; - organization; - thoroughness; - accuracy; - adequacy and pertinency of leads; - administrative detail.)  
0 (20) Performance as a witness.  
✓ (21) Executive ability:  
     + (a) Leadership  
     + (b) Ability to handle personnel  
     + (c) Planning  
     + (d) Making decisions  
     + (e) Assignment of work  
     + (f) Training subordinates  
     + (g) Devising procedures  
     + (h) Emotional stability  
     + (i) Promoting high morale  
     + (j) Getting results  
0 (22) Ability on raids and dangerous assignments:  
     - (a) As leader  
     - (b) As participant.  
+ (23) Organizational interest, such as making of suggestions for improvement.  
✓ (24) Ability to work under pressure.  
- (25) Miscellaneous. Specify and rate:  
     \_\_\_\_\_  
     \_\_\_\_\_  
     \_\_\_\_\_

A. Specify general nature of assignment during most of rating period (such as security, criminal, applicant squad, or as resident Agent, supervisor, instructor, etc.): security

B. Specify employee's most noteworthy special talents (such as investigator, desk man, research, instructor, speaker): executive administrator

C. (1) Is employee available for general assignment wherever needs of service require? Yes (If answer is not 'yes', explain in narrative comments.)  
 (2) Is employee available for special assignment wherever needs of service require? Yes (If answer is not 'yes', explain in narrative comments.)

D. Has employee had any abnormal sick leave record during rating period? No (If so, explain in narrative comments.)

ADJECTIVE RATING: SATISFACTORY

Outstanding; Satisfactory, Unsatisfactory



April 15, 1953

Mr. Belmont has been Assistant Director in charge of the Domestic Intelligence Division during the period of this efficiency rating.

Mr. Belmont is a hard-working, conscientious employee, and has devoted long hours to the Bureau's work. He has good judgment, initiative, and has done a very good job of planning the work of the Domestic Intelligence Division.

During the rating period he received a number of letters of censure for the failure of the Domestic Intelligence Division to properly supervise individual cases. Belmont accepts criticism readily and endeavors to improve himself as a result of such criticism. He is well liked by the employees under his direction and spends considerable time in the direction and development of the supervisors in his Division. Altogether his services are satisfactory.

AWP

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. GLAVIN

DATE: April 6, 1953

FROM : H. L. Edwards *ja*SUBJECT: JOSEPH WOODROW WEINBERG  
INTERNAL SECURITY - R  
PERJURY*Involvement of Domestic Intelligence personnel*

Tolson	_____
Ladd	_____
Nichols	_____
Clegg	_____
Glavin	_____
Harbo	_____
Tracy	_____
Laughlin	_____
Mohr	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Rm.	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

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b7CSYNOPSIS:

The Boston Office on 3/20/53 interviewed [redacted] who stated [redacted] Communist Party meetings with Weinberg during 1940 and 1941. The lead to interview [redacted] was set out in Los Angeles report dated 1/20/53. Weinberg was tried for perjury beginning on 2/24/53 and was acquitted on 3/5/53. One count on which he was tried alleged he had lied when he denied under oath that he was a member of the Communist Party and the testimony of [redacted] would have been pertinent to this count. Bureau letter of 1/28/53 to San Francisco, with copies to other offices including Boston, instructed all outstanding investigation must be completed and reported to the Bureau by 2/10/53.

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Also, the Los Angeles Office failed to designate a copy of its report for San Francisco although a lead was set out for San Francisco. This omission was discovered at the Bureau on 3/20/53 and instructions have been issued to have San Francisco handle its lead immediately. The results of the interview of [redacted] have been given the Criminal Division.

144000-1747

Responsibility of the Domestic Intelligence Division - Supervisor James F. McMahon supervised the case in the Domestic Intelligence Division, reviewed the Los Angeles report, and entered the lead for the Boston Office on work sheets he was maintaining to assist him in following the case. He directed a letter to the field, including Boston, instructing them to cover all leads and report them by 2/10/53 but he otherwise failed to follow to insure that the Boston lead was covered. He also failed to note that Los Angeles had not designated copies of its report for San Francisco. SA McMahon offers no alibi for his oversight and expresses deep and sincere regret for any resulting embarrassment. He points out it was not caused by any lack of interest or unwillingness on his part to do a good job and throughout the entire investigation he sincerely tried to adequately supervise the

Attachment  
cc - Mr. Belmont  
JC:cmv  
jmr

*Letter of censure + probation  
to SA McMahon*

*Letter of censure to McMahon  
Brannigan, Hennrich + Belmont  
4/10/53  
JC*

REC-106

case. He pointed out that an estimated one thousand individuals were interviewed during the course of the investigation and because of its extensiveness and the pace necessary to complete it, the investigation was conducted under considerable pressure; also the Bureau had no prior indication that [redacted] was a Communist Party member or even a Communist sympathizer. Inspector Hennrich pointed out that McMahon made a genuine effort to supervise the case, working long and hard hours, and his overtime for February was 3 hours and 47 minutes and for January, 2 hours and 28 minutes a day.

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Separate memoranda are being submitted with respect to the responsibility in other divisions in this case.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

The Domestic Intelligence Division recommends that Supervisor James E. McMahon be censured and placed on probation for his failure to have followed further on the coverage of the Boston lead. The Administrative Division concurs.

*I agree 4/7*  
*I agree 4-7*  
*I agree 4/7*  
*I concur. H.*  
*I agree 4/7*

The Administrative Division further recommends that letters of censure be directed to Section Chief Branigan, Inspector Hennrich, and Assistant Director Belmont in view of their over-all responsibility for the proper supervision of this case.

*I agree 4/7*  
*I agree 4-7*  
*I agree 4/7*  
*I concur. H.*  
*I agree 4/7*  
- 2 -

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DETAILS:

The report of SA William C. Patterson dated 1/20/53 at Los Angeles set out a lead for the Boston Division to interview [redacted]. This lead was not covered by the Boston Office until 3/20/53 at which time [redacted] furnished a signed statement to the effect that [redacted] Communist Party meetings with Weinberg during 1940 and 1941. In the meantime, Weinberg had been tried in U. S. District Court at Washington, D. C., for perjury and he was acquitted on 3/5/53. One count on which Weinberg was tried alleged that he lied under oath when he denied Communist Party membership and the testimony of [redacted] would have been pertinent to this count of the indictment.

SA Patterson had also set out an investigative lead in the same report for the San Francisco Office but failed to designate copies of the report for San Francisco. This omission was first discovered by Domestic Intelligence Supervisor McMahon on 3/20/53.

On 1/28/53 Supervisor James E. McMahon of the Domestic Intelligence Division, who was supervising the Weinberg case, directed a letter to San Francisco, with copies for other interested offices, including Boston. This letter instructed that all outstanding investigation was to be completed and the reports submitted to arrive at the Bureau by 2/10/53. This letter referenced two recent reports prepared in the San Francisco and San Diego Divisions as well as the report of SA Patterson dated 1/20/53 at Los Angeles.

With the exception of the instruction fixing the deadline, the letter otherwise dealt exclusively with instructions for investigation to be conducted at the San Francisco and San Diego Divisions for the purpose of fixing the whereabouts of Weinberg during the Summer of 1941. No mention was made in the letter of the Los Angeles lead directed to the Boston Office.

RESPONSIBILITY OF THE DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION:

The Weinberg case was supervised at the Seat of Government by SA Supervisor James E. McMahon. Inasmuch as the trial was handled in Washington by an attorney of the Criminal Division together with a representative of the U. S. Attorney's Office, it was necessary to maintain close liaison with the Criminal Division and developments in the case were being closely followed at the Seat of Government.

Supervisor McMahon reviewed the report of Agent Patterson dated 1/20/53 at Los Angeles and entered the lead for the Boston Office on work sheets which he was maintaining in order to assist him in following the case. In the course of supervising the case, McMahon caused the letter of 1/28/53 to be directed to the San Francisco Office, with copies to other offices including Boston, and this letter made reference to the Los Angeles report. The letter instructed that all offices were to immediately complete all outstanding investigation and submit the results in report form to reach the Bureau no later than 2/10/53. It is also noted that along with the report of 1/20/53 the Los Angeles Office had furnished the Boston Division a copy of a prior report pertaining to this phase of the investigation and a copy of a prior Bureau letter of 12/15/52 which pointed out the necessity for immediately conducting investigation as the subject's trial was at that time scheduled to begin on 2/23/53.

While Agent McMahon was giving close attention to the supervision of this case, he did fail to note that the Boston Office had not met the deadline and subsequently did not even submit its report prior to Weinberg's trial. In addition, the failure of the Los Angeles Office to designate copies of the report for San Francisco was not detected by Supervisor McMahon until 2/20/53 after the receipt of the Boston information at which time McMahon noted the Los Angeles omission and called it to the attention of Mr. Hennrich.

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SA McMahon states that he has no desire to alibi for not further following Boston to see that the lead was covered prior to the trial. The error was an oversight and most certainly was not caused by any lack of interest or unwillingness on his part to attempt to do a good job. McMahon said he deeply and most sincerely regrets any embarrassment that may occur as a result of this failure. He mentions the fact that this case involved a most extensive investigation running from 1944 and practically every conceivable investigative technique was utilized and hundreds of leads developed as a result. In preparing the case for prosecution, McMahon estimates one thousand individuals were interviewed, including one hundred known Communist Party members. Because of the wide scope of the investigation and pace that was necessary, the investigation was conducted under considerable pressure. Throughout the entire investigation, McMahon says he sincerely tried to adequately supervise the case and discharge his responsibilities. He also says that the Bureau had no previous information that [ ] was a Communist Party member or even a Communist sympathizer.

Section Chief William A. Branigan of the Espionage Section states that throughout the entire Feinberg investigation, he was in close contact with Supervisor McMahon as to the developments and progress in the case. A regular check was made with McMahon concerning the outstanding leads and the progress which was being made for completion. Mr. Branigan states he did not, of course, see the Los Angeles report of 1/20/53 setting out the specific lead for Boston and had no knowledge of that specific lead. Branigan had impressed upon Supervisor McMahon on numerous occasions the importance of the case from the Bureau's viewpoint and he had discussed with McMahon the following of leads to insure that the field was covering them. Branigan knew that McMahon had set up a system for following the leads in order to insure that they would be covered.

C.E.V.  
A.B. Mr. Hennrich points out that the importance of this case was well recognized in the Domestic Intelligence Division and on a number of occasions particular problems were discussed in detail by Mr. Belmont, Mr. Hennrich, Mr. Branigan, and Supervisor McMahon and on other occasions Mr. Hennrich had numerous discussions with Branigan and McMahon. The Los Angeles report carrying the specific lead for Boston was not brought to Mr. Hennrich's attention or to Mr. Belmont's attention, it being the responsibility of the supervisor insofar as the Seat of Government is concerned to handle the administrative details of seeing to it that the various leads were covered. Messrs. Belmont, Hennrich, and Branigan all recognize the responsibility for the proper functioning of all phases of the work in their respective parts of the Domestic Intelligence Division.

The recommendations of the Administrative Division are set out at the conclusion of the synopsis.

PERMANENT BRIEF OF THE PERSONNEL FILE OF SA McMAHON IS ATTACHED.

## OFFICE MEMORANDUM - UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
DATE 09-22-2010

TO: MR. TOLSON

DATE: May 6, 1953

FROM: 9-25-91 H. H. CLEGG

SUBJECT: 67-94639-301 [REDACTED]  
NEWARK CONFIDENTIAL SOURCEClassified by [REDACTED]  
Declassify on OADR~~SECRET~~b6  
b7C  
b7D  
O SYNOPSIS

ALAN H. BELMONT

The Director instructed on 4/30/53 that a check be made into the system of handling Jenner Committee testimony. This was an outgrowth of the appearances of [REDACTED] before that Committee.

[REDACTED] was investigated by the Bureau in 1944 as a Security Matter-C and Selective Service Subject. He resided in [REDACTED] at the time and

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State Department dispatches made available to the Washington Field Office by the Passport Division of the State Department, reflected that on 9/21/51, [REDACTED] and requested permission to resume residence in the United States. [REDACTED] at that time, stated he joined the Communist Party in [REDACTED] and paid dues until 1945 when he went to work for [REDACTED]. A dispatch dated October 1, 1951, reports the interview of [REDACTED] with [REDACTED], in which he noted the possibility that the [REDACTED] and that higher authorities in the Communist organization desired their return to the United States to support the Communist cause in the United States.

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The [REDACTED] on 2/1/52 and were interviewed by [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] on 2/5/52, when [REDACTED] admitted joining the Communist Party - USA, his former [REDACTED] and that [REDACTED] but disillusioned as to Communist practices in [REDACTED]. Copies of the State Department dispatches mentioned above were forwarded to Newark on 11/12/51 and the results of the [REDACTED] interview were forwarded to Newark on 2/28/52.

(U)

(U)

(S)

The [REDACTED] arrived in New York City on 2/17/52 and were interviewed aboard the ship briefly by Bureau Agents. [REDACTED] took up residence in [REDACTED] [REDACTED] has been interviewed [REDACTED] being present on two occasions, by Agents of the Newark Office. The Bureau file does not indicate [REDACTED] was ever thoroughly and completely interviewed about all of his Communist activities.

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JEM:MHS

1 MAY 15 1953

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OTHERWISE

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On none of these occasions was he ever asked whether he had ever engaged in espionage. On [ ] was designated as a confidential source of the Newark Office. No contact of [ ] 2/21/52 to 10/2/52.

On [ ] before the Jenner Committee in executive session. He also appeared in executive session on March 31, 1953, and in open session before the Committee on [ ]. He testified on February 13, 1953 and April 28, 1953, that while working at the [ ] in [ ] during 1943 and 1945. [ ]

[ ] and that [ ] actions were done at the request of one [ ] was deported to [ ] and, on January 21, 1953, [ ] was convicted under the Smith Act. [ ] has subsequently admitted to Bureau Agents that this story was false. [ ] also testified that while employed by [ ] from 1941 to 1943, he gave to [ ]

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[ ] retracted 5/2/53.

A copy of the testimony was obtained from the Committee by Mr. L. L. Laughlin of the Domestic Intelligence Division on February 25, 1953. Newark had requested that this be done in an Airtel dated February 12, 1953. This request was sent to Supervisor [ ] of the Security Informant Desk in the Domestic Intelligence Division, inasmuch as he supervised the [ ] case as a confidential source. Mr. [ ] then made the request for Mr. Laughlin to obtain the testimony. The testimony was received by Mr. [ ] on either February 25 or February 26, 1953. He had photostats of this testimony prepared, reviewed the testimony to determine if any security informants had been exposed, and on March 9, 1953, he transmitted a copy of the testimony to Newark with instructions to review the testimony, be certain that none of the informants would be exposed if the testimony became public, be certain that the information contained therein had already been furnished to Newark by [ ], and that the appropriate action relative to this information be taken. This letter instructed that the results of this review should be furnished to the Bureau in the immediate future. Mr. [ ] set his tickler for May 1, 1953, and then noted on a memorandum on which a copy of the testimony was attached that a photostat of the testimony had been sent to Newark for review and appropriate action. He then routed this memorandum to Supervisor W. A. Branigan, Chief of the Espionage Section; Supervisor [ ] of the Internal Security Section, who formerly supervised the [ ] case as a Security Matter subject; and Supervisor J. F. Bland of the Internal Security Section, who handled front organizations, inasmuch as [ ]

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Supervisor S. B. Donahoe, Number 1 Man in the Espionage Section, reviewed the testimony and initialed the memorandum for Mr. Branigan. Action was not taken by Donahoe concerning the espionage allegation because he noted that Newark had already been instructed to take appropriate action. He routed the memorandum and testimony to the Front Office in the Domestic Intelligence Division so that the appropriate

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officials there could note that Newark had already been requested to take action; to Supervisor [ ] of the Espionage Section because Harisiades was mentioned in the testimony and he knew that [ ] handled [ ]; to Supervisor D. W. Kuno of the Espionage Section, who handles [ ] contained relevant information about such matters. [ ] initialed the memorandum after determining from a review of the files that [ ] had been deported to [ ] in late 1952; Kuno initialed the memorandum without taking any further action because he did not believe the facts constituted espionage. He recognized that [ ] was probably making up the testimony and he noted that instructions had already been sent to Newark to take appropriate action. [ ] initialed the memorandum because the [ ] had not been on his desk for fifteen months, the testimony related principally to espionage which would be handled by the Espionage Section, and he noted that instructions had previously been issued to Newark about the matter. Supervisor [ ] initialed the memorandum for J. F. Bland because a review of the [ ] [ ] had previously been furnished to the Bureau by the Newark Office on February 3, 1953, in which they set forth information given to that office by [ ] then saw that no action was necessary concerning this phase of the testimony.

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There was no follow-up by the Bureau to expedite the handling of the letter of March 9, 1953, or to furnish any specific instructions concerning the handling of the [ ] until Mr. Kuno's telephone call of April 28, 1953, the date of the public appearance of [ ]. On April 13, 1953, a letter was sent to [ ], instructing that [ ] not learn that his executive testimony was known outside of the Committee.

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Mr. [ ] stated he sent the testimony to Newark to alert the office to the possibility of [ ] having named an informant, confidential source, or potential informant; to permit the evaluation of the reliability of [ ] and to alert Newark to take all necessary action with respect to the information furnished. He set a 50-day tickler, as he saw no immediate urgency in the matter. He now states that he realizes it should have been followed more closely. [ ] further states that at the time he sent Newark the letter dated March 9, 1953, he was considering the matter from the confidential source standpoint and not the espionage standpoint, and he felt that by routing the testimony to the Espionage Section it would receive appropriate attention there.

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Newark received a photostat of the testimony on March 11, 1953. No action was taken concerning it until April 14, 1953, when Agent [ ] gave it to the Newark Stenographers' Pool to have copies typed. SA [ ] has advised that he read the testimony prior to sending it to the Stenographers' Pool but had not fully digested it

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and deemed it advisable not to [ ] concerning it until the testimony was fully evaluated. He further stated that in view of [ ] in replying to questions during the several interviews, [ ] was never questioned directly about any espionage, sabotage, or related activities on his part.

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Testimony of the McCarran Committee (predecessor of the Jenner Committee) was handled by a special squad in the Liaison Section of the Domestic Intelligence Division. This squad had the responsibility to see that the necessary action was taken and follow the handling of testimony. This procedure was terminated May 19, 1952. From then until May 1, 1953, testimony was sent to the

[ ]

No one at the Seat of Government was specifically given the responsibility for reviewing the [ ] testimony and it was sent to Newark for that purpose.

b7D

The Director inquired in connection with the setting of the tickler on the letter to Newark of March 9, 1953 to May 1, 1953, "Is it customary to set up follow-ups nearly 2 months later?" Ticklers on the Security Informant Desk are set from one day to six months depending on the circumstance. This particular tickler should have been set for a much shorter time than 50 days. The plans for setting of other ticklers appear to be proper.

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It is noted the Executive Session testimony of the Jenner Committee was received by the Bureau on February 25, 1953. The Bureau did not determine that part of the contents were false until May 2, 1953. [ ] appeared before Public Session of the Committee on April 28, 1953 and repeated the false story. Thus, the Bureau is in the position of not determining it was false until after the public appearance.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

1. [redacted]  
SPECIAL AGENT, NEWARK OFFICE

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*Because of the following weaknesses:*

1. *Failure to interview [redacted] generally about Espionage activity on his part from 2/17/52 until 4/28/53, during which time [redacted] was interviewed twelve times by Agent [redacted].* b6  
b7C  
b7D
2. *Failure to request Bureau authority to interview [redacted] during the period from 2/21/52 to 8/26/52 during which time Newark was supposed to be endeavoring to further develop [redacted] with the ultimate aim of qualifying him as a Security Informant. ([redacted] was on annual leave and at In-Service from 7/7/52 through 8/8/52).*

*the Training and Inspection and the Administrative Divisions recommend:*

- A. *Letter of censure*
- B. *Probation*
- C. *Suspension for fifteen days*
- D. *Removal from Security work*
- E. *Disciplinary transfer* b6  
b7C
- F. *SA [redacted] was considered for reallocation to Grade GS-11 in July 1952, but was passed over at that time in view of a letter of censure received by him in May 1951 for failure to pass an Inspector's examination. It is recommended that his reallocation to Grade GS-11 be deferred for an additional six months, at which time it should again be considered.* b6  
b7C
- G. *Inasmuch as Mr. Stein will start an inspection of the Newark Office next week, he will be instructed to give very careful attention to an analysis of all of Agent [redacted] work and submit a special summary to the Bureau with recommendations.*

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In connection with the recommended action, [ ] arrived in Pittsburgh, his first office of assignment, 9/10/50 and has been in Newark since 7/1/51. He is presently in Grade GS-10.

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As a veteran with more than one year of Bureau service, he is entitled to the advance written notices provided under the Veterans' Preference Act in the event he should be involuntarily separated, reduced in grade and salary, or suspended for more than thirty days.

2.

[ ]  
NOW ASSIGNED AT THE SEAT OF GOVERNMENT  
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
WAS SUPERVISOR OF AGENT [ ] IN NEWARK  
FROM A PERIOD BEFORE THE CASE STARTED  
UNTIL 4/19/52

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1. Because Mr. [ ] did not see to it that [ ] was thoroughly interviewed after his arrival in the United States covering Espionage and all other topics of pertinency, the Training and Inspection Division and the Administrative Division recommend:

A. Letter of censure

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B. Probation.

Because [ ] had supervision of this case for only <sup>2</sup> months at its very inception without any effort to absolve him of his responsibility, it nevertheless appears his weakness is not as great as Mr. [ ]. Mr. [ ] succeeded [ ] as Supervisor in the Newark Office.

3.

[ ]  
SUPERVISOR OF AGENT [ ]  
IN THE NEWARK OFFICE  
FROM 3/23/52 UNTIL 10/31/52  
(REMOVED FROM HIS SUPERVISORY POSITION  
AT BUREAU INSTRUCTION)

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Turner is charged with the following delinquencies:

1. Failure to see that [ ] interviewed [ ] during the period 4/19/52 until 10/2/52, the period when no contact was made with

[ ] although the Newark Office was supposed to be further developing him with the ultimate aim of making him a Security Informant.

b7D

2. Failure to see that [ ] was thoroughly interviewed as to Espionage and all other information in his possession during the above stated period.

The Training and Inspection Division and the Administrative Division recommend:

A. Letter of censure

B. Probation.

4.

[ ]  
SUPERVISOR OF THE SECURITY DESK  
IN THE NEWARK OFFICE SINCE NOVEMBER 6, 1952

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In his capacity as Supervisor of the Security Desk, [ ] is charged with:

1. Supervisory failure to see to it that Agent [ ] promptly and adequately handled the Executive Hearing testimony of the Jenner Committee which was received in the Newark Office 3/11/53 and had not been handled as of April 28, 1953, when [ ] made a public appearance before the Jenner Committee.
2. While in supervisory capacity he failed to make certain that Agent [ ].
3. Failed to see to it that a lead was set out to check with Immigration and Naturalization Service in New York concerning interview of [ ] by that agency which occurred prior to October 2, 1952 (exact date unknown).

Because of the weaknesses above, the Training and Inspection Division and the Administrative Division recommend:

A. Letter of censure

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B. Probation

C. Consideration was given to recommending that [ ] be removed as a Field Supervisor for his inadequacies; however, although

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he did not get the desired results, Agent [ ] at no time acquainted [ ] with the alleged Espionage. The case had been mishandled prior to [ ] taking it over and the record shows frequent counseling of [ ] by [ ] in an aggressive manner. Therefore, in view of the fact that Mr. Stein will start an inspection of the Newark Office next week, it is not recommended at this time that [ ] be removed. However, Inspector Stein will, if approved, conduct a most careful analysis of [ ] work and Security Squad operations and submit a special report with recommendations at the conclusion of the inspection.

5. DONALD S. HOSTETTER  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE, NEWARK

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Hostetter has been SAC at Newark since 2/19/53. Because of his responsibility for the over-all administration of the Newark Office and the necessity of him seeing to it that Supervisor [ ] of the Security Desk was performing adequately and because of weaknesses on the part of SA [ ] mentioned above, of the Newark Division during the period that Hostetter was SAC, including [ ] failure to promptly and adequately handle Jenner testimony received in Newark on 3/11/53 with instructions to immediately handle:

The Training & Inspection Division and the Administrative Division recommend:

A. Letter of censure.

B. Hostetter is currently on probation for delinquencies discovered in the inspection of the Boston Division in February 1953.

6. [ ]  
SPECIAL AGENT, DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

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1. As Supervisor of the Security Informant Desk (assigned 6/16/50) [ ] had responsibility in the [ ] case and weaknesses are attributed to him as follows:

(1) Upon receipt of Executive Committee testimony from Inspector Laughlin, 2/25-26/53, [ ] sent it to the Newark Field Division for review and handling by Newark. This is a matter of judgment; however, in the Inspector's opinion it is not believed the full burden should have been placed on Newark. He failed to give Newark a deadline for the handling of this matter although he did instruct that it be handled immediately, and he issued appropriate caution. ~~SECRET~~

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(2) Prior to dispatching the above testimony to Newark on 3/9/53, [ ] failed to consult with the Espionage Section concerning possible instructions to Newark to make inquiry into the Espionage phase of the matter, although he did route the testimony to the Espionage supervisors for their attention after the Newark letter had gone out.

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(3) Being aware that the Jenner Committee testimony of 2/13/53 had not been previously reviewed at the Seat of Government, [ ] did not initiate action which would have resulted in the fixing of responsibility for detailed review and pinpointing of the testimony.

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(4) [ ] set up a 50-day tickler to follow the Newark Office as to the review and handling of Jenner Committee testimony and his judgment is weak in that a shorter tickler should have been set because of the importance of this matter.

[ ] had responsibility for supervising [ ] as a confidential source as of 10/27/52.

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[ ] has a very satisfactory record in the Bureau. He had never before handled any Jenner Committee testimony.

The Training & Inspection Division and the Administrative Division recommend:

- A. Letter of censure.
- B. Probation

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7. [ ]  
SUPERVISOR, INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION  
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

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Mr. [ ] had supervisory responsibility over the [ ] matter from the letter of Newark dated 3/17/52 until late October 1952:

1. [ ] did not challenge the inadequacies of interviews by Agent [ ] of the Newark Office nor did he insist on a thorough [ ] by Newark.

The Training & Inspection Division and the Administrative Division recommend:

A. Letter of censure.

8. [ ]  
SUPERVISOR, INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION  
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

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[ ] initialed a memorandum of 2/25/53 prepared by Mr. Laughlin reporting receipt of the Jenner Committee testimony at the Bureau and bearing an addendum that Newark had been instructed to review and take appropriate action in connection with the testimony. This testimony was routed to him because <sup>he authorized</sup> the original interview with [ ], which was held on 2/17/52, upon [ ] return to the United States from [ ]. He took no action in regard to this testimony to see that it was handled by Newark inasmuch as this case had not been on his desk for 15 months and he had no responsibility in connection with the case, and it had already been routed through the Espionage Section.

The Training & Inspection Division and the Administrative Division recommend:

No action as to [ ].

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9. [REDACTED]  
SUPERVISOR, INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION  
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

Mr. [REDACTED] received the Jenner Committee testimony under very much the same circumstances as Mr. [REDACTED] above and upon receipt thereof, he checked the file, saw that no action was necessary and that all IWO matters, for which he has primary responsibility, were adequately handled and no further action was required on his part.

The Training & Inspection Division and the Administration Division recommend:

No action as to [REDACTED].

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10. EDWARD B. REDDY  
SUPERVISOR, INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION  
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

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The testimony was routed to Mr. Reddy inasmuch as he handled Smith Act Matters and [REDACTED], a Smith Act subject, was mentioned in the testimony. A review of the file by Reddy reflected all action had been properly taken and [REDACTED] had been convicted of a Smith Act violation.

The Training & Inspection Division and the Administrative Division recommend:

No action as to Reddy.

11. FRED J. BAUMGARDNER  
CHIEF, INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION  
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

Because of over-all responsibility of the Internal Security Section and inadequacies in supervision on the part of Special Agents

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[ ] and [ ], Mr. Baumgardner must share responsibility.

The Training & Inspection Division and the Administrative Division recommend:

A. A letter of censure.

12.

[ ]

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#1 MAN, ESPIONAGE SECTION  
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

[ ] received the Jenner Committee testimony on 3/12/53 after the letter of 3/9/53 had already been dispatched to the Newark Field Office. Attached to the testimony was Mr. Laughlin's memorandum of 2/25/53 and an addendum stating that Newark had been instructed to take appropriate action concerning the testimony. [ ] read the testimony, sent it to the Front Office of the Domestic Intelligence Division for the information of his superiors, and then routed it to certain specific supervisors of the Espionage Section for information. [ ] did not take steps to query Supervisor [ ], who had issued the initial instructions to the Newark Office for the handling of the Jenner Committee testimony, nor did he ascertain what deadline, if any, had been imposed on the Newark Office, nor did he issue any specific instructions to Espionage supervisors concerning the future handling of that portion of [ ] testimony indicating the possibility of espionage. Did not guide and direct Newark Office.

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The Training & Inspection Division and the Administrative Division recommend:

A. A letter of censure.

B. Probation

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13.

SUPERVISOR, ESPIONAGE SECTION  
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

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Inasmuch as only [ ] was mentioned in the testimony of [ ] before the Jenner Committee when Mr. [ ] received from No. 1 Man [ ] a copy of the testimony, he checked the file, found out that this [ ] and that no other action was necessary on his part.

The Training & Inspection Division and the Administrative Division recommend:

No action as to [ ]

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14. DONALD W. KUNO

SUPERVISOR, [ ]  
ESPIONAGE SECTION, DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

Kuno received the Jenner Committee testimony on routing slip from No. 1 Man [ ]. He did not follow the Newark Office because at that time he reviewed the testimony on 4/9/53, he noted an approved addendum on the cover memo stating that appropriate instructions had been sent to Newark, and feeling that the [ ] was being handled in the Internal Security Section and since the espionage matter was brought to him for information only, and further, feeling that the allegations of espionage, even if true, would not constitute espionage, and further feeling that [ ] was probably making up his sensational testimony to further his own instance, Kuno took no steps to follow the Newark Office.

1. In view of the importance of this matter, it appears Kuno should have checked with Supervisor [ ] to find out whether a deadline had been imposed on Newark and how soon a reply could be expected of Newark and whether the instructions issued met Kuno's complete satisfaction. On the other hand, the testimony did not specifically allege [ ] or other types of espionage are handled on other desks, but inasmuch as [ ] had been in [ ] for a year and there were indications in the file as to the possibility of undercover work by [ ] it is believed the best interests of the Bureau would have been served by affirmative action on Kuno's part.

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The Training & Inspection Division and the Administrative Division recommend:

A. A letter of censure.

15. WILLIAM A. BRANIGAN  
CHIEF, ESPIONAGE SECTION  
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

Inasmuch as he has over-all supervisory responsibility for the operations of the Espionage Section, Mr. Branigan must share the responsibility for the weaknesses of those Supervisors under him, as specifically set forth after each Supervisor.

The Training & Inspection Division and the Administrative Division recommends:

A. Letter of censure.

16. CARL E. HENNRICH  
INSPECTOR  
ESPIONAGE SECTION, DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

Inspector Hennrich has the responsibility for supervising the Internal Security Section and the Espionage Section. Consequently, he bears secondary responsibility for the weaknesses and errors attributed to individual Supervisors under his general command.

The Training & Inspection Division and the Administrative Division recommend:

A. Letter of censure.

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17. LEO L. LAUGHLIN  
INSPECTOR  
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Laughlin has supervisory responsibility over the Correlation and Loyalty Sections of the Domestic Intelligence Division. At the specific request of Supervisor [redacted] Laughlin [redacted]

[redacted] On occasions testimony was requested specially by some Supervisor and according to Laughlin, it did not always go through the Liaison Section. No written rules have been found as to the procedure of handling testimony requested in other than routine fashion. In providing [redacted] with the testimony Inspector Laughlin did not give him any instructions as to the review of the testimony, thus responsibility had not been fixed by Laughlin for the review of the testimony at the Seat of Government. Laughlin does not feel that he needed to issue any special instructions to [redacted] but in the absence of existing regulations, the Inspector feels Laughlin was derelict in not fixing responsibility. Laughlin prepared a memo dated 2/25/53 showing [redacted] and stating, "This volume will be reviewed and appropriate action taken after which it will be returned to the Committee," but this memo does not show who was to have the responsibility for the review of the testimony. [redacted] obtained the testimony in order to comply with the request of the Newark Office for a copy and to see if any FBI informants were compromised. [redacted] had no intention of assuming responsibility for the complete review of such testimony at the Seat of Government and received no such instructions. If Laughlin had sent the testimony to the Liaison Section, responsibility would have been fixed or if Laughlin had given specific instructions to [redacted] responsibility would have been fixed. New regulations have now been issued for the handling of Jenner Committee testimony. It was the responsibility of Laughlin to see that such regulations existed all along. The Training & Inspection Division and the Administrative Division recommend:

- A. Letter of censure.
- B. Probation.

~~SECRET~~

18. ALAN H. BELMONT  
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR  
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

~~SECRET~~

Because of his position requiring that he assure adequate handling of all Domestic Intelligence matters and his over-all responsibility for the setting up of adequate procedures within his Division, there being loopholes in the instances under discussion, the Training & Inspection Division and the Administrative Division recommend:

A. Letter of Censure.

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DETAILS OF INQUIRY INTO THE HANDLING OF  
BY NEWARK FIELD DIVISION AND  
SEAT OF GOVERNMENT INCLUDING TESTIMONY BEFORE JENNER COMMITTEE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Synopsis		1
Recommendations		5
Details		16
Predication	b7D	16
Background of [REDACTED]		16
FBI Relations with [REDACTED]		17
First Interview (Cleveland 8/17/44)		17
Second Interview (Newark 2/17/52)		17
Third Interview		17
Fourth Interview		18
Fifth Interview		19
Other Interviews		20
• Explanation of Newark:		21
As to Failure to Question [REDACTED]		21
Explanation of [REDACTED]		21
Explanation of [REDACTED]	b6	21
Explanation of [REDACTED]	b7C	21
Explanation of [REDACTED]	b7D	21
Inadequate Interviews. Newark Letter 3/17/52		22
Explanation of [REDACTED]		22
Explanation of [REDACTED]		22
Failure to Contact [REDACTED] 2/1/52 to 10/2/52	b6	22
Explanation of [REDACTED]	b7C	22
Explanation of [REDACTED]	b7D	23
Explanation of [REDACTED]		23
Inadequacy in Handling Jenner Committee Testimony		23
Explanation of [REDACTED]		23
Inadequate Supervision of Jenner Committee Testimony at Newark		24
Explanation of [REDACTED]		24
Failure to Contact I&NS 10/2/52 to 5/1/53	b6	24
Explanation of [REDACTED]	b7C	24
Explanation of [REDACTED]	b7D	24
Explanation of [REDACTED]		25
Supervisory Responsibility in Newark Office		25
Seat of Government Handling of Interviews With [REDACTED]		25
by [REDACTED]		25
Evaluation		25

b6  
b7C  
b7D

*Procedure in Handling Jenner Committee Testimony Relating to*   26

*By L. L. Laughlin* 26  
*By*  27  
*By*  27  
*Evaluation* 27  
*By Donald W. Kuno* 28  
*Evaluation* 28  
*By*  28  
*Evaluation* 29  
*By Edward B. Reddy* 29  
*Evaluation* 29  
*By*  29  
*Evaluation* 30  
*By*  30  
*Evaluation* 30

*Study of Handling Jenner Committee Testimony Generally* 31  
*at Seat of Government*  
*Old Procedure* b6 31  
*New Procedure* b7C 31  
*Evaluation* b7D 31

(U)

31  
32  
33  
33  
33  
33  
33  
33  
33  
34  
34  
34  
34  
34  
34

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May 13, 1953

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Alan H. Belmont  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

b7D

Dear Mr. Belmont:

I have reviewed the results of the recent survey made into the handling by the Domestic Intelligence Division of the [redacted], and I want to express to you my dissatisfaction over the weaknesses found to exist within your division in supervising this most important case.

b7D

It was your responsibility to have made certain that clear-cut and adequate procedures had been set up and were in effect for the complete and thorough consideration and supervision of all aspects of this matter. It has been definitely determined that this was not the case and, in fact, there was no active supervision or investigation into the alleged espionage activities of [redacted] until it was learned that he was about to repeat his statements at a public hearing of a committee. I am holding you personally accountable for the prompt correction of these deplorable weaknesses, and I expect that there will be no further instances of such failures in your division.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

JIC:fab

CC: Mr. Ladd (Personal and Confidential)

85 MAY 20 1953

MAILED 13  
MAY 14 1953  
COMM. DIV.

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Laughlin \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
and \_\_\_\_\_

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308

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE CHIEF CLERK

DATE: May 22, 1953

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT:

WITHHOLDING AMOUNT FROM SALARY -  
ALAN H. BELMONT

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Laughlin \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Effective immediately it is desired that  
an additional ten dollars be deducted from each pay check  
for the purpose of application to my withholding tax.

RECORDED-10

tlc

67-94639-309	
Searched .....	Numbered ..... 10/
12 MAY 25 1953	
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION	

*Noted by payroll  
agm*

32  
82 MAY 27 1953

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. LADD

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT:

DATE:

May 14, 1953

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_

Ladd \_\_\_\_\_

Clegg \_\_\_\_\_

Glavin \_\_\_\_\_

Nichols \_\_\_\_\_

Rosen \_\_\_\_\_

Tracy \_\_\_\_\_

Harbo \_\_\_\_\_

Belmont \_\_\_\_\_

Mohr \_\_\_\_\_

Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_

Nease \_\_\_\_\_

Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

In celebration of my 15th wedding anniversary, I would like to take leave for half a day, starting at 1 p.m. today. Please advise if this is agreeable.

AHB:CSH

OK  
OK. no leave slip  
necessary.

JUN 9 11 42 AM '53  
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE  
RECEIVED

RECORDED - 45

67-94639-310	
Searched .....	Numbered 59
12 JUN 9 1953	
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION	

14  
JUN 12 1953



Prepared by: *h*  
Checked by: *h*  
Filed by: *h*

The Administrative Assistant  
Attorney General

June 22, 1953

Director, FBI

Superior Accomplishment Award for  
Alan H. Belmont, Assistant Director

There is attached a justification to support a meritorious salary increase for Mr. Alan H. Belmont, Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Although Mr. Belmont's position is not under the Classification Act, the justification to support a meritorious salary increase for him is being submitted consistent with the manner in which such justifications are submitted in connection with the positions covered by the Act.

Attachment *g*

JW/bs 676

67-94629 - <i>3115T</i>	
Searched	<i>h</i>
Numbered	<i>112</i>
12 JUN 24 1953	
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION	



- Tolson
- Ladd
- Nichols
- Belmont
- Clegg
- Glavin
- Harbo
- Rosen
- Tracy
- Gearty
- Mohr
- Winterrowd
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Sizoo
- Miss Gandy

MAILED 16  
JUN 23 1953  
COMM-FBI



89 JUN 26 1953

Department of Justice  
RECOMMENDATION FOR SUPERIOR ACCOMPLISHMENT AWARD

Date June 23, 1953

To: The Administrative Assistant Attorney General  
Attention: Efficiency Awards Committee

From: Domestic Bureau of Investigation  
(Division, Bureau or Office)

Subject: Superior Accomplishment Award  
Title VII Classification Act of 1949

The following recommendation is presented for your consideration:

Name: Alan H. Belmont

Division: Domestic Intelligence

Position title: Assistant Director

Grade: GS 17

Salary: \$13,200

Last salary increase: promoted from \$13,000  
per annum to \$13,200 per annum in GS 17

Date: 4-26-53

Amount: \$200

Last superior accomplishment award: promoted

Date: 10-30-49

Amount: \$200

from \$9200 per annum to \$5300 per annum in GS 11  
Description of superior accomplishment. Include following information:

(a) What the standards are for this employee's type of work or what is normally expected in the position; (b) What this employee did; (c) How the work he did exceeded the standards, or how the idea or method or device is expected to improve service, or how the special act or service exceeds the normal requirements of his job.

It is recommended Mr. Belmont be afforded an advancement from \$13,200 per annum to \$13,400 per annum in Grade GS 17, in view of his outstanding performance in connection with the over-all supervision of the Espionage case involving Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. This case, in which both subjects were sentenced to death for divulging atomic secrets, attracted world-wide attention and is considered to be one of the most important cases ever handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Mr. Belmont personally followed the developments of this case closely.

RECORDED-53

J. Edgar Hoover	
946-357-312	
Head of Division or Bureau	SEARCHED
Numbered	INDEXED
12 JUN 24 1953	
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION	

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Ladd Recommended: \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Clegg Efficiency Awards Committee \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Rosen Admin. Assistant Attorney General \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Laughlin \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Recommended:

Efficiency Awards Committee

Date

Admin. Assistant Attorney General

Date

SUPERIOR ACCOMPLISHMENT AWARD

JUN 23 1953

COMM - FBI

JUN 26 1953

*ST*  
*guf*



Prepared by: *L. S.*  
 Checked by: *G. L.*  
 Filed by: *G. L.*

Best Copy Available

June 23, 1953

Mr. Alan H. Belmont  
 Federal Bureau of Investigation  
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Belmont:

I am most pleased with your administrative handling of the Espionage case involving Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, and particularly with the extremely capable manner in which you personally took charge of the latter phases of this case. The arrangements which you made at the prison prior to the execution of the subjects, in order that they might have the opportunity to furnish any information they desired, were well planned and complete. I was also much impressed with your alertness in making certain that the Bureau was immediately advised of all developments in this important case, and the conclusion of this matter without the occurrence of any untoward incident is certainly evidence of the thorough fashion in which your plans were laid and carried out.

In view of your outstanding work in this instance I have recommended a within-grade increase for you from \$13,200 per annum to \$13,400 per annum in Grade GS 17, as an award for superior accomplishment. This promotion will become effective the first pay date following approval by the Committee on Superior Achievement Awards concerning which you will be advised later. It has given me great pleasure to recommend this increase for you, and I wish to express my sincere personal appreciation and commendation for your valuable services.

*Director personally*  
 Sincerely yours,

WST:JW:bts

cc-Miss Usilton  
 Movement Section

SENT FROM D. O.  
 TIME 10:30  
 DATE 6-23-53

The above information concerning Mr. Belmont's performance was furnished by Mr. Ladd. The action which has been taken to afford Mr. Belmont a promotion in connection with this matter is based upon instructions issued by Mr. Tolson.

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Gearty \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

80

Department of Justice  
RECOMMENDATION FOR SUPERIOR ACCOMPLISHMENT AWARD

Date June 22, 1953

To: The Administrative Assistant Attorney General  
Attention: Efficiency Awards Committee

From: Federal Bureau of Investigation  
(Division, Bureau or Office)

Subject: Superior Accomplishment Award  
Title VII Classification Act of 1949

The following recommendation is presented for your consideration:

Name: Alan H. Belmont

Division: Domestic Intelligence

Position title: Assistant Director

Grade: GS 17

Salary: \$13,200

Last salary increase: promoted from \$13,000 per annum to \$13,200 per annum in GS 17 Date: 4-26-53 Amount: \$200

Last superior accomplishment award: promoted from \$9200 per annum to \$9400 per annum in GS 14 Date: 10-30-49 Amount: \$200

Description of superior accomplishment. Include following information:

(a) What the standards are for this employee's type of work or what is normally expected in the position; (b) What this employee did; (c) How the work he did exceeded the standards, or how the idea or method or device is expected to improve service, or how the special act or service exceeds the normal requirements of his job.

It is recommended Mr. Belmont be afforded an advancement from \$13,200 per annum to \$13,400 per annum in Grade GS 17, in view of his outstanding performance in connection with the over-all supervision of the Espionage case involving Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. This case, in which both subjects were sentenced to death for divulging atomic secrets, attracted world-wide attention and is considered to be one of the most important cases ever handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Mr. Belmont personally followed the developments of this case closely

Recommended:

Efficiency Awards Committee

Admin. Assistant Attorney General

Date

Date

RECORDED - 94

Approved:

Deputy

Attorney General

67-94629-384

Searched \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

Numbered \_\_\_\_\_

12 JUL 8 1953

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Let. to Belmont  
Adv. to Belmont  
148 Tarnoff  
6-2-53  
AW/ent

TO: The Administrative Assistant Attorney General  
Attention: Efficiency Awards Committee

from its inception in 1950 and has consistently directed its difficult aspects. Many situations arose which required immediate and far reaching decisions which he rendered promptly and, which subsequent events have established, were based on sound judgment. He was not content to face the numerous problems as they arose but instead he continually demonstrated outstanding planning ability in foreseeing such problems and in working out appropriate solutions prior to the time the actual problems were faced. As a result such problems, when they did arise, were handled smoothly and efficiently and did not work to the detriment of the case. He continually demonstrated outstanding leadership and set an inspiring example to the other employees who assisted in the many ramifications which had to be dealt with in connection with this lengthy investigation.

Mr. Belmont particularly demonstrated advanced planning ability and unusual foresight throughout the numerous appeals that took place following the initial trial. He was constantly alert to the various legal aspects of the case and his handling of the entire matter during the time the appeals were being considered was exemplary.

Mr. Belmont personally went to Sing Sing Prison, where the subjects were incarcerated, during the latter stages of the case and perfected detailed arrangements for interviewing the subjects if they decided to furnish any information even at the last minute prior to their execution. He kept the Bureau promptly advised of all on-the-scene developments and otherwise handled the arrangements at the prison in an outstanding manner. No untoward incident occurred which could have proved embarrassing to the government.

During the entire period covered by this case, Mr. Belmont has exhibited unusual initiative, planning ability, foresight and judgment. He has spent many long hours over and beyond the regular work day without regard for his personal convenience. The quality of his performance in connection with this case has been so remarkable that he is definitely considered to have exceeded the normal requirements of his position to such extent that he is deserving of special recognition in the form of a superior accomplishment award. He has undoubtedly rendered a great public service.

148



July 7, 1953

Mr. Alan H. Belmont  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Belmont:

With reference to the Bureau's letter of June 22, 1953, advising you were being recommended for promotion from \$13,200 per annum to \$13,400 per annum in Grade GS 17, I am writing to advise you that this promotion became effective July 5, 1953.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover  
Director



b6

CC: Miss

Movement Section

JW:djj  
67-

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Gearty \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_



Mr. Alan H. Belmont  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

I have been advised of the excellence of the Special Conference for Field Security Supervisors which you conducted on July 20 and 21. I want you to know that I am indeed pleased to receive such a good report. The success of the Conference was due to both the careful preparation made by you and the Supervisors in your Division and the wholehearted and enthusiastic participation by all concerned. I want you to convey my congratulations to the Supervisors who participated in the program.

**J. Edgar Hoover**

Tolson ✓  
Ladd ✓  
Nichols ✓  
Belmont ✓  
Clegg ✓  
Glavin ✓  
Harbo ✓  
Rosen ✓  
Tracy ✓  
Gearty ✓  
Mohr ✓  
Winterrowd ✓  
Tele. Room ✓  
Holloman ✓  
Sizoo ✓  
Miss Gandy ✓

COMM - FBI

JUL 23 1953

MAILED 31

67-74-376  
Searched  
Numbered  
14 JUL 26 1967  
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

~~REVISED~~ **PRECISION**

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Clegg *WAC*  
 FROM : Mr. Watson *WAC*  
 SUBJECT: SPECIAL SECURITY CONFERENCE  
 July 20 and 21

DATE: July 22, 1953

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
 Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
 Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

I attended captioned conference throughout each session. Sessions began at 9:00 a.m. and adjourned at 7:45 p.m. on July 20 and 5:45 p.m. on July 21.

Program was exceptionally well organized and efficiently conducted; response was enthusiastic; results appeared to be fruitful and should be reflected in increasingly productive achievements in field.

*Alan H. O.*  
 Assistant Director Belmont personally conducted entire meeting. Success of conference, in my opinion, was due to Mr. Belmont's outstanding leadership. Attitude throughout was one of teamwork, good fellowship, and an urgent desire to meet Bureau's obligations in security field. In closing statement Mr. Belmont urged conference to anticipate problems, set up programs in advance to meet these problems.

RECOMMENDATION: That attached letter of commendation be sent.

Attachment  
 NAW:jep

RECORDED - 45

67-94639-317

Searched	.....
Numbered	.....
14 JUL 27 1953	
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION	

*WAC*  
*WAC*

144  
 17 JUL 28 1953

Prepared by  
Checked by  
Filed by

August 3, 1953

United States Civil Service Commission  
Personnel Classification Division  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Sirs:

In accordance with Departmental Circular 540, issued pursuant to Public Law 100, 73rd Congress, there are transmitted herewith records for July, 1953, referring to the following employees in the Federal Bureau of Investigation who received additional within-grade advancement as a reward for superior accomplishment:

Mr. Alan H. Belmont

Miss

Mr. Robert J. Bengen

Mr.

Mr. W. Willis Fisher

Mr.

Mr.

Mr.

Mr.

Mr.

Mr.

Mrs.

Mr. Joseph A. Verica

Sincerely yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Gearty \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

File No. 67-94639  
JW: fkb

COMM - FBI

AUG 4 1953

MAILED 25

RECEIVED  
378  
13 AUG 6 1953  
FBI

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.  
August 3, 1953

Prepared by: FKB 3-185  
Checked by:  
Filed by: *JW/ckf*  
REPORT NO. 18

Name: *Mr. Alan H. Belmont*

Nature of Action: Superior Accomplishment Step Increase

Effective date: *July 5, 1953*

CIVIL SERVICE  
OR OTHER LEGAL  
AUTHORITY

Part 25, Sec. 25.16

	From	To	Appropriation
Position	<i>Assistant Director</i>	<i>Same</i>	REGULAR
Grade and Salary	<i>GS 17, \$13,200 per annum</i>	<i>GS 17, \$13,400 per annum</i>	Date of Birth
Bureau or Other Unit			<i>1-22-07</i>
Headquarters			
Departmental or Field	<i>Field</i>	<i>Same</i>	


Approved by the Attorney General: *June 30, 1953*

Last salary increase: *UPA from \$13,000 per annum to \$13,200 per annum in Grade GS 17, effective 4-26-53.*

Last superior accomplishment: *October 30, 1949.*

Attachment: Justification for Civil Service Commission

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_ File No. 67-94639  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_ JW: fkb  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Laughlin \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_



Sincerely yours,

*J. Edgar Hoover*  
John Edgar Hoover  
Director

*Forse* *He*

REPORT TO U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION  
ENCLOSURE

Agency and organizational designations

2. Pay roll period

3. Block No.

4. Slip No.

**U. S. Dept. of Justice, FBI**

**575 577**

Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)

6. Grade and salary

**MR. ALAN H. BELMONT**

**Det. GS 17 \$13,200**

**PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA**

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.		NET PAY
7. Previous normal										
8. New normal										
9. Pay this period										
10. Remarks:							11. Appropriation(s)		12. Prepared by	
									13. Audited by	

☐ Periodic step-increase

☐ Pay adjustment

☒ Other step-increase

**SUPERIOR ACCOMPLISHMENT**

14. Effective date

15. Date last equivalent increase

16. Old salary rate

17. New salary rate

18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.

**7-5-53**

**4-26-53**

**\$13,200**

**\$13,400**

(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):  
Period(s):

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)

☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.

☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

☒ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

**JL-mal** Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised  
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.  
Nov. 8, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

**23 JUL 22 1953**

**PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPIED-12**

**67-NOT RECORDED-12**

Copy 79

Office Memorandum United States Government

TO : MR. D. H. LADD  
FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: June 22, 1953

SUBJECT: JULIUS AND ETHEL ROSENBERG  
ESPIONAGE R

Warden Wilfred L. Donno of Sing Sing Prison was most cooperative with the Bureau in connection with the Rosenberg matter. He had his feet on the ground and approached the various problems which arose in a sensible, logical manner. Any request we made of him was readily granted even during the barrage of questions and problems facing him during the day of the execution and immediately prior thereto. At our request he kept the Bureau entirely out of the publicity, which was most difficult in view of the intense coverage afforded the prison by the press. Indeed, not even the guards at the prison knew of the fact that Agents were present at Sing Sing. He handled all contacts with the Bureau Agents personally and made all arrangements personally.

RECOMMENDATION:

I recommend a letter from the Director to the Warden, and a proposed letter is attached for the Director's approval.

I also recommend letters of commendation to Special Agents Thomas J. McAndrews, John A. Harrington, [redacted] and [redacted], and to the two stenographers [redacted] and [redacted].

While the questioning of the Rosenbergs did not take place, these Agents did make all the arrangements with Warden Donno which worked out successfully and handled the entire matter very discreetly. On Thursday, July 18, and Friday, July 19, a great deal of time was spent going over and over the plans for questioning the Rosenbergs and I feel confident that, had it occurred, it would have been handled in a highly competent manner. In addition, the various problems which were arising very rapidly throughout those two days were promptly and discreetly handled. The two stenographers likewise handled themselves very well and discreetly during the time they were at Sing Sing under conditions of considerable tension. It was a rather trying situation for clerical employees and I feel that these two employees acquitted themselves very creditably and were fully prepared to handle any assignment given to them.

AHB: mor  
Attachment  
cc: Mr. Glavin

ORIGINAL FILED IN 65-5823-1114

For the above reasons, I feel that letters of commendation to these employees are fully justified.

DIRECTOR'S NOTATION: "APPROVED. BELMONT DID AN OUTSTANDING JOB FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CASE UNTIL ITS END. A THREE YEARS GRIND. HE IS TO BE COMMENDED AND RECOMMENDED FOR A TERRITORIOUS INCREASE." H.



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Belmont *ABg*

DATE: June 20, 1953

FROM : Mr. Martin

SUBJECT: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR A. H. BELMONT *D*

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
 Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
 Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gearty \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

b6

For record purposes, SA [ ] New York Office, called at 10:25 p.m. and advised that you had left Sing Sing Prison at 9:25 p.m., June 19, 1953, enroute to New York and that you would take the 11:05 p.m. plane, June 19, 1953, from New York and would arrive in Washington, D. C., 12:55 a.m.

~~1~~  
 23 JUN 25 1953

NOT RECORDED

ESP SEC

RECEIVED  
*LHM*

LHM:mar  
 82 JUL 1 1953

August 31, 1953

Mr. Alan H. Belmont  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Belmont:

The skill and efficiency with which Bureau agents located and apprehended I. O. Fugitives Robert George Thompson and Sidney Steinberg, Smith Act subjects, and four other members of the Communist Party underground apparatus have been extremely gratifying to me, and I feel that you are certainly deserving of the highest praise for your supervision and coordination of the matter.

I am aware that you made numerous constructive suggestions and issued instructions which greatly aided the progress of the investigation, and I want you to know how much I appreciate the splendid results accomplished through the efforts of you and the many agents who worked on the case.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

Salutation per Reading Room.

SENT FROM D. C.	
TIME	1:15 P.M.
DATE	9/1/53
BY	[Signature]

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Gearty \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

39 SEP 4 1953

RECEIVED READING ROOM  
AUG 31 10 11 AM '53  
F. B. I.  
U. S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE  
100-101111-319  
JAN. C

September 1, 1953

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Alan H. Belmont  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Belmont:

The Bureau is in receipt of the report of the physical examination afforded you at the United States Naval Hospital, Bethesda, Maryland, on August 18, 1953.

This report reflects that you have a deviated nasal septum to the left and xanthoma on the upper eyelids which the examiner did not consider to be disqualifying.

The electrocardiogram afforded you in this connection was within normal limits.

The Board of Examining Physicians of the United States Naval Hospital reports that you are capable of strenuous physical exertion and have no physical defects that would interfere with your participation in raids or other work involving the practical use of firearms.

Sincerely yours,



J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

CC- Mr. Ladd

WBH:pja

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Laughlin \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_



89 SEP 4 1953

# REPORT OF MEDICAL EXAMINATION

1. LAST NAME—FIRST NAME—MIDDLE NAME BELMONT, ALAN H.		2. GRADE AND COMPONENT OR POSITION	3. IDENTIFICATION NO.
4. HOME ADDRESS (Number, street or RFD, city or town, zone and State)		5. PURPOSE OF EXAMINATION Annual	6. DATE OF EXAMINATION 8/18/53
7. SEX M	8. RACE W	9. TOTAL YRS. GOVT. SERVICE MILITARY CIVILIAN	10. DEPARTMENT, AGENCY, OR SERVICE
11. ORGANIZATION UNIT		12. DATE OF BIRTH 1-22-07	
13. PLACE OF BIRTH N.Y.C.		14. NAME, RELATIONSHIP, AND ADDRESS OF NEXT OF KIN	
15. EXAMINING FACILITY OR EXAMINER'S ADDRESS NNMC- Bethesda		16. OTHER INFORMATION	

17. RATING OR SPECIALTY	TIME IN THIS CAPACITY: TOTAL	LAST SIX MONTHS
-------------------------	------------------------------	-----------------

CLINICAL EVALUATION		NOTES.—Describe every abnormality in detail. (Enter pertinent item number before each comment; continue in item 73 and use additional sheets if necessary.)
NORMAL	ABNOR- MAL	(Check each item in appropriate col- umn; enter "N. E." if not evaluated)
X		18. HEAD, FACE, NECK, AND SCALP
	X	19. NOSE
X		20. SINUSES
X		21. MOUTH AND THROAT
X		22. EARS—GENERAL (Int. & ext. canals) (Auditory acuity under items 70 and 71)
X		23. DRUMS (Perforation)
X		24. EYES—GENERAL (Visual acuity and refraction under items 69, 60, and 61)
NE		25. OPHTHALMOSCOPIC
X		26. PUPILS (Equality and reaction)
X		27. OCULAR MOTILITY (Associated parallel move- ments, nystagmus)
X		28. LUNGS AND CHEST (Include breasts)
X		29. HEART (Thrust, size, rhythm, sounds)
X		30. VASCULAR SYSTEM (Varicosities, etc.)
X		31. ABDOMEN AND VISCERA (Include hernia)
X		32. ANUS AND RECTUM (Hemorrhoids, fistulae (Prostate if indicated))
X		33. ENDOCRINE SYSTEM
X		34. G-U SYSTEM
X		35. UPPER EXTREMITIES (Strength, range of motion)
X		36. FEET
X		37. LOWER EXTREMITIES (Except feet) (Strength, range of motion)
X		38. SPINE, OTHER MUSCULOSKELETAL
X		39. IDENTIFYING BODY MARKS, SCARS, TATTOOS
	X	40. SKIN, LYMPHATICS
X		41. NEUROLOGIC (Equilibrium tests under item 72)
X		42. PSYCHIATRIC (Specify any personality deviation)
Females only. (Check how done)		
	43. PELVIC	<input type="checkbox"/> VAGINAL <input type="checkbox"/> RECTAL

44. DENTAL (Place appropriate symbols above or below number of upper and lower teeth, respectively)		REMARKS AND ADDITIONAL DENTAL DEFECTS AND DISEASES
X—Restorable teeth X—Nonrestorable teeth X—Missing teeth XXX—Replaced by dentures (6 X 8)—Fixed bridge, brackets to include abutments		Type III Class I DPMAX
R I G H T	32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17	L E F T

45. URINALYSIS: SP. GR. 1.022		46. CHEST X-RAY (Place, date, film number, result)	47. SEROLOGY (Specify test used and result)
ALBUMIN N	SUGAR N	MICROSCOPIC N	Neg.
48. EKG Normal		49. BLOOD TYPE AND RH FACTOR "A1" POS	50. OTHER TESTS

89 SEP 4 1953

SEP 3 1953

MEASUREMENTS AND OTHER FINDINGS											
51. HEIGHT 70"		52. WEIGHT 190		53. COLOR HAIR Dk. Brown		54. COLOR EYES Lt. Blue		55. BUILD: SLENDER <input type="checkbox"/> MEDIUM <input type="checkbox"/> HEAVY <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OBESE <input type="checkbox"/>		56. TEMP. N	
57. BLOOD PRESSURE (Arm at heart level)						58. PULSE (Arm at heart level)					
SITTING SYS. 116 DIAS. 68		RECUM- BENT SYS. DIAS.		STANDING (5 min.) SYS. DIAS.		SITTING* 64		AFTER EXERCISE		2 MIN. AFTER	
										RECUMBENT	
										AFTER STANDING 3 MIN.	
59. DISTANT VISION				60. REFRACTION				61. NEAR VISION			
RIGHT 20/20		CORR. TO 20/		BY S.		CX		CORR. TO		BY	
LEFT 20/20		CORR. TO 20/		BY S.		CX		CORR. TO		BY	
62. HETEROPHORIA: (Specify distance) ES° EX° R. H. L. H. PRISM DIV. PRISM CONV. SEP 2 9 39 AM '53											
63. ACCOMMODATION RIGHT LEFT				64. COLOR VISION (Test used and result) AOC-1940-Normal				65. DEPTH PERCEPTION (Test used and score) UNCORRECTED CORRECTED			
66. FIELD OF VISION				67. NIGHT VISION (Test used and score)				68. RED LENS		69. INTRAOCULAR TENSION	
70. HEARING		71. AUDIOMETER						72. PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOMOTOR (Tests used and score)			
RIGHT WV 15/15 SV /15		250 500 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 250 512 1024 2048 3072 4096 5120									
LEFT WV 15/15 SV /15		RIGHT LEFT									

## 73. NOTES (Continued) AND SIGNIFICANT OR INTERVAL HISTORY

Usual childhood diseases  
Kidney stone 1949

(Use additional sheets of plain paper if necessary)

## 74. SUMMARY OF DEFECTS AND DIAGNOSES (List diagnoses with item numbers)

19- Deviated nasal septum N. C. D.  
40- Xanthoma, eyelids N. C. D.

## 75. RECOMMENDATIONS—FURTHER SPECIALIST EXAMINATIONS INDICATED (Specify)

b6

## 76. PHYSICAL PROFILE

P	U	L	H	E	S

## 77. EXAMINEE (Check)

☒ IS QUALIFIED FOR strenuous physical exertion & use of fire arms.  
☐ IS NOT

## 78. IF NOT QUALIFIED, LIST DISQUALIFYING DEFECTS BY ITEM NUMBER

## 79. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME OF PHYSICIAN

SIGNATURE

## 80. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME OF PHYSICIAN

SIGNATURE

## 81. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME OF DENTIST OR PHYSICIAN (Indicate which)

SIGNATURE

## 82. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICER OR APPROVING AUTHORITY

SIGNATURE

NUMBER OF AT-  
TACHED SHEETS

ATTACHMENT TO STANDARD FORM 88  
(Revised July 21, 1952)

Report of Medical Examination

FOR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE OF MEDICAL EXAMINER:

The following portions of the attached examination report form need not be completed:

2	67
3	68
11	69
14	71 (unless other
17	examination indi-
62	cates desirable)
65	72

Item 48, the electrocardiogram, is not required unless the examinee is over 35 years of age or unless other examination indicates such is desirable.

If the examinee is an applicant, the Chest X ray and blood type and Rh factor (Items 46 and 49) are not necessary unless the facilities for affording same are readily available to the examiner.

FOR ALL EXAMINEES, WHETHER CLERICAL OR SPECIAL AGENT APPLICANTS OR EMPLOYEES:

The medical examiner should answer the following question:

Examinee is qualified for strenuous physical  
(is or is not)  
exertion. (Designate which)

FOR ALL MALE EMPLOYEES OR APPLICANTS:

The medical examiner is requested to answer the following:

Does examinee have any defects restricting or prohibiting his participation in defensive tactics and dangerous assignments which might entail the practical use of firearms?

no  
If answer is "yes" please specify.

IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT ALL STATEMENTS IN ITEMS 59, 61, 64 AND 70 PERTAINING TO VISUAL ACUITY, COLOR VISION AND BE COMPLETED IN DETAIL.

[Signature]  
(Date)

ENCLOSURE

67-94639-321

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. LADD

DATE: 9/8/53

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: SCHEDULED ANNUAL LEAVE - A. H. BELMONT

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
 Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
 Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
 Laughlin \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

I am scheduled for annual leave for three weeks starting September 14 and running through October 2, 1953. The case involving Joseph Katz, Espionage - R, may be coming to a head in the next week or so, depending on when and if Katz enters the American Occupied Zone of Germany. If this happens before September 14, I would like to hold off taking any leave. If it happens during my leave, I would like to come back on duty, as I consider the case highly important. I do not have plans perfected to leave Washington.

If it is agreeable, I will go ahead and start leave on September 14.

RECORDED

67- 94639-3221

Searched \_\_\_\_\_

Numbered \_\_\_\_\_

13 SEP 11 1953

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CC - Mr. Holloman

AHB:cic

89 SEP 15 1953

PX

TO: MR. D. M. LADD  
 FROM: MR. A. W. BELMONT  
 SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA  
 UNDERGROUND OPERATIONS ( SAN FRANCISCO )  
 INTERNAL SECURITY (C)

August 28, 1953

At 1:05 pm, Pacific Daylight Saving Time, on August 27, 1953, Communist fugitives Robert George Thompson, IO #2432, and Sidney Steinberg, IO #2436, were apprehended by Special Agents of the San Francisco Division. Also apprehended with these 2 fugitives as harboring subjects were: Carl Edwin Tasi, formerly a Communist functionary of Minnesota whose whereabouts has been unknown since June of 1951; Shirley Kremen, who has been operating extensively in the Communist underground under the alias of Lee Ma Lan; and Samuel Coleman, a national Communist functionary from New York City whose whereabouts has been unknown since August of 1951. Another harboring subject, Patricia Blau, was also apprehended by San Francisco Agent later in the day on August 27 near Stockton, California.

The San Francisco Office located these fugitives only after a long, involved, and highly delicate investigation which led to the penetration of the Communist underground in San Francisco.

FIELD DIVISION EMPLOYEES  
SAN FRANCISCO

There is attached a teletype from the San Francisco Office which recommends meritorious increases in salary and letter of commendations for the Bureau employees who conducted the investigation and made the apprehensions. The Security Division concurs in the recommendations made by Special Agent in Charge Whalen of the San Francisco Office.

NEW YORK

In connection with the investigation which led to the identification of Sidney Steinberg, 2 special employees of the New York Office on August 25, 1953, positively identified the voice of Steinberg on a recording which was made available to the New York Office by San Francisco. These special employees were [redacted] and [redacted]. These special employees had become familiar with the voice of Steinberg as a result of investigation conducted by the New York Office prior to his disappearance in 1951.

It is recommended that these 2 special employees receive letter of commendation for the alert and earnest effort they made in listening to the many voices which appeared on the recording made available by the San Francisco Office and selecting and positively identifying the voice of Steinberg.

Attachment

AW:mn

SEP 16 1953

67-94639-323
SEARCHED
INDEXED
SERIALIZED
FILED
12 SEP 14 1953
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b6



~~W.M.~~  
SAC WHELAN - SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

Although SAC Whelan has been assigned to the San Francisco Division for only a short period of time and the investigation which led to the penetration of the Communist underground in the San Francisco Division was well under way at the time of his arrival, he was directly in charge of the apprehensions. He was personally present at the scene at the time the apprehensions were made and he exercised excellent judgment and initiative in organizing the over-all plan which culminated in the successful apprehension of the fugitives and the individuals who were with them. Mr. Whelan worked day and night on this case and demonstrated unusual devotion to duty and leadership in analyzing the situation and perfecting plans for the apprehensions.

SAC Whelan carried through this assignment in an outstanding manner and it is recommended that he be afforded a letter of commendation for his efforts in this regard.

STATE OF GOVERNMENT

Supervisor E. F. Dooley

The supervision of the fugitive case involving Sidney Steinberg is assigned to Supervisor E. F. Dooley of the Internal Security Section. When the San Francisco Office reported that an unknown individual identified only as "Josh" who attended a meeting in the San Francisco Division might possibly be identical with Steinberg or William Norman Marron, another IO fugitive, Mr. Dooley worked untiringly in an effort to definitely establish whether the unknown "Josh" was identical with one of these fugitives. Mr. Dooley and Supervisor L. J. Reddy made the suggestion that Special Agents of the New York Office who could positively identify by sight Marron and Steinberg be sent to the San Francisco Division for the purpose of assisting in the identification. Two New York Agents were immediately flown to San Francisco and one of these Agents did positively identify Steinberg at the hideout prior to the time the apprehension was made. The New York Agents positively identified Samuel Coleman who was at the hideout at the time of the arrest.

In view of the alert and intelligent manner in which Mr. Edwin F. Dooley handled this assignment, it is recommended that he be afforded a letter of commendation.

Supervisor L. B. Reddy

Supervisor Edward B. Reddy of the Internal Security Section worked with Mr. F. Dooley in reviewing a 286-page log covering a meeting at which the unknown "Josh", among others, was present, which intensive review, Mr. Reddy and Mr. Dooley came up with the recommendation that Agents from the New York Office who could positively identify Steinberg and William Norman Marron, another IO fugitive, be immediately sent to the San Francisco Division in an effort to assist in the identification of the unknown "Josh." as a result of this suggestion, the 2 Agents from the New York Office were sent to the San Francisco Division and one of these Agents did positively identify fugitive Steinberg prior to the time of the apprehension.

In view of the alert and intelligent contribution Mr. Reddy made in connection with the suggestions to send the New York Agents to San Francisco in connection with this case, it is recommended that he be afforded a letter of commendation.

Fred J. Baumgardner - Chief, Internal Security Section

Mr. Baumgardner has the over-all responsibility for the investigation of the Communist underground which was carried on by the San Francisco Office which led to the apprehensions of fugitives Steinberg and Thompson. Instructions which were forwarded to the San Francisco Division in connection with this underground operation were closely supervised and correlated by Section Chief Baumgardner. In addition when the San Francisco Division advised of the possibility that the unknown "Josh" might possibly be identical with the fugitives Steinberg or Marron, Mr. Baumgardner worked unceasingly to establish whether in fact one of the fugitives was present in the area of the San Francisco Division. His untiring efforts were responsible in no small measure for the successful apprehension of fugitives Steinberg and Thompson. In view of the intelligent manner in which he guided and correlated the over-all investigation in this matter, it is recommended that he be afforded a letter of commendation.

I also recommend that a letter of commendation be sent to Ass't. Director A. H. Belmont who closely coordinated and issued numerous suggestion and instructions during the entire period.

DWL.

ACTION:

In the event you concur it is suggested that this memorandum be forwarded to the Administrative Division for appropriate consideration.

September 14, 1953

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Alan H. Belmont  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.


DECLASSIFIED BY 1565 SDP/MSR  
ON 9-25-91

Dear Mr. Belmont:

I want to express my extreme displeasure with the gross mishandling of the investigation regarding suspected espionage at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, and at the Federal Telecommunications Laboratories, Nutley, New Jersey. This investigation required a project of photostating a large number of dossiers of individuals connected with the installations at Fort Monmouth and Nutley, New Jersey, and the submission of summary reports on the information contained in these dossiers. This project has dragged on for over three months and it is still not completed, and due to the inept supervision afforded this case by the Domestic Intelligence Division it has been necessary to practically paralyze the Newark Division by assigning thirty-five agents to the project for over three weeks. When it became apparent that the Army was failing in its obligation to photostat a portion of these dossiers you should have insisted on the Newark Division's demanding of the Army immediate action in photostating the material or promptly making other arrangements so that this project could have been completed within a reasonable time.

As Assistant Director in charge of the Domestic Intelligence Division, it is your responsibility to see that such matters are properly handled and receive appropriate attention so as to prevent any undue delay. You are expected to take immediate steps to insure that there is no recurrence on the part of personnel under your supervision in failing to afford close and adequate supervision to any assignment for which they are responsible.

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Gearty \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_



SEP 22 1953

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

RECEIVED - DIRECTOR  
SEP 14 6 29 PM '53  
RECEIVED READING ROOM  
FBI  
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

## OFFICE MEMORANDUM . UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: September 9, 1953

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: SUSPECTED ESPIONAGE,  
 FT. MONMOUTH, NEW HERSEY, and  
 FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LABORATORIES,  
 NUTLEY, NEW JERSEY

There is attached a memorandum dated September 9, 1953 setting forth answers to the Director's inquiries concerning the handling of the investigation of this matter.

The investigation of this case was supervised in Newark by Supervisor [ ] and SAC Hostetter. At the Bureau, the case was supervised by [ ].

b6

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) It is recommended that a letter of censure be directed to SAC Hostetter for his failure in supervising this matter in the Newark Office and particularly for his failure to insure that the Army promptly handle the Photostating work which they agreed to do and, failing in this, to more promptly have made arrangements for part or all of the work to be handled by our New York Office. It is not recommended that administrative action be taken against Supervisor [ ] of the Newark Office in view of the fact that he kept the SAC advised of the status of this matter, consulted with the SAC, and the SAC passed on and concurred in the action taken by [ ].

b6

"I agree" 9-9, Tolson "I agree" F. H. 9-9 DIRECTORS NOTATION: "OK." H.

(2) It is recommended that a letter of censure be directed to Supervisor [ ], to Section Chief William A. Branigan, to Inspector C. E. Hennrich, and to myself. In the supervision of this matter at the Seat of Government, we should have realized that this project would have to be completed and would require the expenditure of a certain amount of manpower and that the faster the Newark Office got on to this project, the less chance there would be of a prolonged delinquency in the handling of the case. We should have insisted on Newark's demanding of the Army immediate action in Photostating the material or that we make other arrangements to have it done, in spite of the economies involved, so that the project could have been completed.

b6

"I agree" Tolson. "I agree" F.H. 9-9. DIRECTORS NOTATION: "IT IS CERTAINLY REGRETTABLE THAT I HAVE TO GO TO SUCH EXTREMES AS TO GET RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION WHEN THERE HAVE BEEN SUCH GLARING IMPETNESS & MISHANDLING OF A PROJECT." H.

b6

"Cen let to Mr. Hostetter, [ ], Branigan, Hennrich, Belmont. DCM:ggs  
 9-14-53

AHE:LL SEP 29 1953 157  
 Attachment

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-710-1798

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE:

September 9, 1953

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: SUSPECTED ESPIONAGE,  
 FT. MONMOUTH, NEW JERSEY, and  
 FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LABORATORIES,  
 NUTLEY, NEW JERSEY

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
 Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
 Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gearty \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

In your memorandum to the Director dated September 4, 1953, outlining the manner in which the investigation of the above matter has been handled, it was pointed out that SAC D. S. Hostetter, Newark Office, has stated that on August 21, 1953, when the first copies of Photostated dossiers were obtained from the Army, he assigned five Agents to reviewing them. Hostetter said he felt that not more than five could be assigned, due to the fact over 50 per cent of the Agents on security work had been engaged in the Philadelphia Smith Act surveillances for six to eight weeks prior to July 31, 1953, and upon their return, most of the work was badly in need of immediate attention. The Director inquired: "Why didn't he call it to our attention then and why didn't Intelligence Division follow up on it?"

Concerning the handling of this matter generally, the Director commented: "This has been grossly mishandled here and at Newark and now - 3 months later after you are caught off first base you practically have to paralyze Newark Office by assigning 35 Agents to it for over 3 weeks. I want to know identities of Supervisors here and in Newark for this coasting."

This case is supervised at the Seat of Government by Supervisor [redacted]. At the Newark Office the case has been supervised by Supervisor [redacted] and SAC Hostetter.

RECORDED-24

SAC Hostetter, Newark, states he has personally folded the supervision of this case in the Newark Office in accordance with the original instructions to Newark in Bumemo dated June 9, 1953. He states he approved the action of Supervisor [redacted] in advising the Bureau on June 22 of the scope of the investigation necessary and the estimate it would require approximately two months after the copies of the dossiers are obtained to complete the project as outlined in Bumemo, and an additional three weeks if Federal Telecommunications Laboratories (FTL) files were to be reviewed. This memorandum also proposed that the New York Office be required to Photostat eight to ten thousand pages. Hostetter states that following instructions in Bumemo dated July 8, 1953, that an effort should be made to have the Army furnish the Bureau with Photostats of the material in its possession, the Newark

AHB:lw

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 3 Jan

Memo to Mr. Ladd

Office promptly entered into negotiations with the Army and notified the Bureau on July 15 that arrangements for Photostating had been made and that two Agents were being assigned to review files and mark serials for Photostating. There followed delays in obtaining Photostating service from the Army, as a result of which no Photostated dossiers were received until August 21, when five men were assigned by Hostetter to reviewing these dossiers. Hostetter states he did not notify the Bureau he felt that no more than five Agents could be assigned, due to the fact he knew the Bureau was aware of a shortage of personnel situation which he has in the Newark Office which he said was called to the Bureau's attention in the Newark Office inspection in May and later in connection with office delinquencies. He said the Bureau had informed him no additional Agents would be assigned to Newark, and that in connection with this particular case he felt it was his job to assign as many people as he thought he could to the project and for that reason he had not specifically called it to the attention of the Bureau.

b6  
Hostetter stated he feels that the delay in handling this matter by Newark is not primarily the responsibility of Supervisor [redacted] but his (Hostetter's) own responsibility, since he personally was aware of the action being taken and concurred in the action. He said he did this because it was a large project which was being completed in order to insure that the previous review of this material, which review had resulted in the conclusion that no action should be taken, was correct, and that the project was, in fact, a protective step on the part of the Bureau. He states he realized that in view of the time elapsed in handling this matter, it should have been handled sooner.

The Domestic Intelligence Division prepared the Bureau's instructions to the Newark Office dated June 9, 1953, to obtain the Army dossiers, search their files and furnish summary memoranda to the Bureau as a protective measure for the Bureau. We had previously reviewed at the Bureau two summaries prepared by the Army and had concluded that no investigation was warranted. In addition, we had had the Newark Office review the dossiers in the possession of the Army, and they had concluded that no espionage investigation was warranted. In a review of the Federal Telecommunications Laboratories dossiers they obtained information resulting in the opening of fourteen individual Security Matter - C cases.

Memo to Mr. Ladd

In analyzing the situation, we felt that the Army was requesting the Bureau to conduct a general espionage investigation for its own protection, and we concluded that for our protection we should obtain copies of the dossiers which Newark had reviewed in order that the Army could not at some future time claim there was material in the files of which the Bureau was not cognizant. As a further protection in this matter, we felt the files of the field office should be thoroughly searched so that the whole matter could be finally resolved. The Newark Office was instructed on June 9, 1953, that this matter was to receive continuous and prompt attention and that sufficient personnel be assigned in order that it could be completed at the earliest possible date. It was also instructed that the SAC give the matter his personal attention. Upon receiving advice from Newark dated June 22, which was received in the Espionage Section on June 26, that the obtaining of copies of the dossiers involved the Photostating of between eight and ten thousand pages, because of the magnitude of the project and the fact we were doing this work primarily because of the action of the Army, for economy we concluded that the Newark Office should ask the Army to do the Photostating work, and we so instructed the Newark Office on July 8. Bureau memo of July 8 was in response to Newark memorandum of June 22, in which Newark had also estimated it would take two months to complete the Ft. Monmouth dossiers and three weeks to complete the Federal Telecommunications Laboratories dossiers after they were Photostated. We did not specifically object to this estimate by the Newark Office. We did point out in our memorandum of July 8 that in order that this review may be completed at the earliest possible date, the Newark Office should not wait until all memoranda are prepared, but that they should be submitted in small groups on a continuing basis until the entire project is completed. Newark thereafter advised us on July 15 and August 7 of their progress, and on August 7 posed certain questions regarding the administrative handling of the memoranda. Bureau memo of August 18 concurred with Newark's recommendations and instructed that the Newark and New York Offices expedite the matter in order that the entire question of the existence of an espionage ring at Ft. Monmouth and the Federal Telecommunications Laboratories may be resolved. On September 1 the Bureau followed with Newark, instructing that the completion of the project be expedited.

The Domestic Intelligence Division did not consider this case in the category of a "special" and, while it was followed with the Newark Office urging that it be completed promptly, we did not set specific deadlines since we had hoped

Memo to Mr. Ladd

that the project could be absorbed and handled without upsetting the other work being handled by the Newark Office. We should have insisted on more prompt handling by Newark and, particularly, we should have insisted that they, in turn, demand that the Army authorities promptly handle the Photostating work which was assigned to them. Had the Army complied, the project would have been substantially completed by now.

I do want the Director to know that our failure to list pertinent dates in prior memoranda submitted on this matter was inadvertent. We most certainly had no intent to mislead the Director or to keep facts from him. We will watch this closely to avoid such errors in the future.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) It is recommended that a letter of censure be directed to SAC Hostetter for his failure in supervising this matter in the Newark Office and particularly for his failure to insure that the Army promptly handle the Photostating work which they agreed to do and, failing in this, to more promptly have made arrangements for part or all of the work to be handled by our New York Office. It is not recommended that administrative action be taken against Supervisor [ ] of the Newark Office in view of the fact that he kept the SAC advised of the status of this matter, consulted with the SAC, and the SAC passed on and concurred in the action taken by [ ].

b6

A. H. Belmont

b6

(2) It is recommended that a letter of censure be directed to Supervisor [ ], to Section Chief William A. Branigan, to Inspector C. E. Henrich, and to myself. In the supervision of this matter at the Seat of Government, we should have realized that this project would have to be completed and would require the expenditure of a certain amount of manpower and that the faster the Newark Office got on to this project, the less chance there would be of a prolonged delinquency in the handling of the case. We should have insisted on Newark's demanding of the Army immediate action in Photostating the material or that we make other arrangements to have it done, in spite of the economies involved, so that the project could have been completed.



TO: W. R. GLAVIN  
FROM: H. L. EDWARDS  
SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY USA  
UNDERGROUND OPERATIONS (SAN FRANCISCO)  
INTERNAL SECURITY (C)  
COMMENDATION MATTER

August 31, 1953

SYNOPSIS:

A. H. BELMONT

62-465076-29  
SAC San Francisco by teletype August 28, 1953, set out information concerning the performance of employees in the San Francisco office, as well as two employees of the New York office in connection with the apprehension of Robert George Thompson and Sidney Steinberg, top Communist fugitives, and four other members of the Communist underground apparatus on August 27, 1953. The SAC recommended that the following Special Agents receive meritorious salary increases for their outstanding participation in the investigation and apprehensions:

b6  
b7C

[redacted]  
Richard G. Fletcher, Jr.

[redacted]  
Roy L. Erickson

Robert L. Hamilton

[redacted]  
[redacted] - Assigned NY  
Frank J. Smith - Assigned NY

b6

TH  
According to the SAC the above named Agents assigned to the San Francisco Division demonstrated exceptional ingenuity, initiative, foresight and sincere devotion to duty in developing highly confidential sources of information, in following through on infinitesimal leads in the face of severe hardships, and in finally locating the hideout of Thompson and Steinberg.

b6

TH  
This investigation required the utmost tact and diplomacy as well as the strictest security measures in order to prevent the subjects from learning the Bureau had discovered their hideout. The SAC stated that Special Agents [redacted] and Smith, who are assigned to the New York office, demonstrated unusual alertness and initiative in identifying subjects Thompson and Steinberg and another member of the Communist underground apparatus prior to and after the apprehensions were made. According to the SAC all of these Agents have gone far beyond the normal requirements of their positions; they have given freely of their own time without regard for personal convenience, and the exceptional quality of their performance has been reflected in the highly successful results accomplished.

EJE JW: jks

CC: MR. BELMONT  
ATTACHMENTS (39) 129

17 SEP 30 1953

MEMO W. R. GLAVIN

In addition to the above, the SAC at San Francisco recommended that the following employees be commended by letter for their participation in this operation:

Francis E. Gallagher

b6

Clarence W. Dunker

According to the SAC these Agents demonstrated excellent judgment and intelligence in handling their various assignments and all are deserving of special recognition as the result of the high caliber of their services. The SAC pointed out that Special Agent [redacted] has supervised the entire investigation and that his services have been outstanding. He was not recommended for a meritorious salary increase apparently because he is at the top of Grade 13 and is therefore ineligible to receive a meritorious increase at this time.

b6

Further, the SAC at San Francisco recommended that letters of commendation be directed to [redacted] a photographer in the San Francisco office, and [redacted] stenographer, both of whom materially aided in the outcome of the case. Mrs. [redacted] acted as matron for one of the female subjects. The SAC also recommended that ASAC Ralph W. Bachman be commended for his coordination of the various phases of the apprehension from the San Francisco office in the absence of the SAC who participated in the raid on the subject's cabin.

b6

The SAC suggested that the Bureau desire to commend SAC Abbaticchio of the Philadelphia office and SAC D. K. Brown of the Albany office since the operation which led to the apprehensions was originally approved and set up under SAC Abbaticchio and other parts of it were started and approved by SAC Brown while they were assigned to the San Francisco office.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

Mr. Belmont in a memorandum to Mr. Ladd, dated August 28, 1953, concurred in the recommendations of the SAC and further recommended that Special Employees Robert E. Broderick and [redacted] of the New York Office be commended for their identification of the voice of subject Steinberg from a recording made available by the San Francisco office. In addition, Mr. Belmont recommended that letters of commendation be directed to SAC Whelan of the San Francisco office, to Section Chief Fred J. Baumgardner of the Internal Security Section at the Seat of Government and to Seat of Government Supervisors

b6

MEMO to W. R. GLAVIN

E. F. Dooley and Edward P. Reddy for their excellent supervision and handling of this complex matter.

Mr. Ladd concurred in the recommendations of the SAC and Mr. Belmont and also recommended that Mr. Belmont be recommended by letter in view of his able supervision and coordination of the entire operation at the Seat of Government.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

A review of the Personnel Files of those Agents recommended to receive meritorious salary increases has reflected that the services of all have been generally satisfactory and that they are eligible to receive such increases with the following exceptions: Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] received meritorious salary increases effective March 1, 1953, and are therefore prohibited by law from receiving another such award during their present waiting periods. Special Agent Roy L. Erickson entered on duty with the Bureau on November 25, 1940, as a Student Fingerprint Classifier and has been a Special Agent since July 14, 1943. He is presently in Grade GS 12, \$7840 per annum and a meritorious salary increase at this time would place him at the top of his present grade. It is noted that he was considered for reallocation to Grade GS 13 on July 10, 1953, but was passed over to be reconsidered at a later date in view of administrative action which had been taken against him on December 31, 1943, June 28, 1944, and March 9, 1945. He was censured and placed on probation on December 31, 1943, for an erroneous identification in an impersonation case while assigned to the FBI Laboratory. On June 28, 1944, he was censured for the carelessness he displayed in connection with an examination which he made of a fraudulent check while assigned to the FBI Laboratory. On March 9, 1945, he was censured and placed on probation for the poor judgment he displayed in making an erroneous identification in connection with another impersonation case while assigned to the FBI Laboratory. It should be noted that he was transferred from the FBI Laboratory to his assignment in the Field on November 15, 1946, and has been assigned to the Field since that time. b6

In view of the foregoing it is recommended:

1. That Special Agents [redacted] Robert L. Hamilton, Richard G. Fletcher, Jr., [redacted] and Joseph A. Calligan of the San Francisco office and Special Agents [redacted] and Frank J. Smith of the New York office receive meritorious salary increases for their outstanding performance in connection with this case since it is felt that their services have b6

MEMO to W. R. GLAVIN

met one of standards for a meritorious salary increase which provides as follows:

"(d) A special act or service in the public interest, related to official employment, over and above normal position requirements, of an unusual or distinctive character, where its recognition as a basis for an additional advancement would serve as a definite incentive for others."

I agree  
JPM 8/31

TOLSON

OK  
H.

I agree.  
F. H.  
8/31

b6

2. That Special Agents [ ] and [ ]  
[ ] be commended by Letter in view of their ineligibility to receive meritorious salary increases at this time.

I agree.  
JPM 8/31 Tolson H.

OK

I agree.  
FH  
8/31

3. That Special Agent Roy L. Erickson be reallocated from Grade GS 12 to Grade GS 13 in lieu of a meritorious salary increase.

I agree.  
JPM 8/31

Tolson

OK  
H.

I agree.  
FH  
8/31

MEMO to W. R. GLAVIN

4. That letters of commendation be directed to the other employees named above in the San Francisco and New York offices and at the Seat of Government who have been recommended by the SAC at San Francisco and the Domestic Intelligence Division to receive such letters.

I also recommend letter of  
commendation to Mr. Ladd.

FH  
8/31

I agree.

JPM

8/31

TOLSON

Yes and also Belmont.

H.

OK  
H.

Letter to Mr. Ladd 9/2/53.

If the above recommendations are approved, the appropriate letters are attached.

#### DETAILS

All pertinent information has been set out in the synopsis and is not being repeated in the details.

b6

PERMANENT BRIEFS OF THE PERSONNEL FILES OF SPECIAL AGENTS

[REDACTED] HAMILTON, FLETCHER, [REDACTED] ERICKSON,  
[REDACTED] AND SMITH ARE ATTACHED.

October 2, 1953

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. A. H. Belmont  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington 25, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED BY 1565 SDP/KSL

ON 9-25-91

Dear Mr. Belmont:

I want you to take immediate steps to arrange for the more expeditious passage of memoranda and correspondence through the Domestic Intelligence Division.

I have in mind the recent occurrence where a memorandum from you to Mr. Ladd dated September 18, 1953, and entitled "Proposed Action To Assist In Double Agent Operations Abroad; U. S. Evaluation Board (USEB)" was held in the Espionage Section from September 18 to September 28. Despite Mr. Whitson's explanation that he had more pressing matters to handle first, it is still felt the delay was excessive.

You must immediately examine the procedures in the Domestic Intelligence Division to assure that mail is handled promptly so as to avoid a recurrence of such delays.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

67-748-325  
OCT 6 1953  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

cc: Mr. Glavin

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

OCT 2 1953  
OCT 13 1953

U. S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

9

October 7, 1953

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Alan H. Belmont  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

1565-SDP/1680  
9-25-91

Dear Mr. Belmont:

b6


I have given careful consideration to the delay which occurred in handling the matter of the dereliction of Special Agent [ ] of the New York Division in the Security Matter case involving Tess Sverdlow and it is apparent that the Domestic Intelligence Division should have submitted its memorandum on this matter more promptly. Although the letter containing the pertinent details was received in the Bureau on September 17, 1953, and in the Domestic Intelligence Division on the following day, the memorandum recommending action against Agent [ ] was not prepared until September 23, 1953.

Matters of this nature should receive prompt and vigorous attention and the preparation of memoranda or other necessary action should not be delayed. Therefore, I desire that you instruct the agent supervisors in your division that such items must be given expeditious attention as I do not intend to tolerate such delays in the future.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Gearty \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_



HC  
VIC: pbc

67-7463-320

Searched \_\_\_\_\_  
Number \_\_\_\_\_

OCT 9 1953

20 OCT 13 1953

OFFICE MEMORANDUM UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson  
FROM : H. H. Clegg  
SUBJECT: TESS SWERDLOW  
SECURITY MATTER - C  
Bureau File 100-369069

DATE: 10-2-53

*(A. H. Belmont)*

With Regard to the letter from the New York Division dated September 15, 1953, which dealt with the erroneous identification of the above-captioned subject by Special Agent [redacted] of the New York Division, and which was received by the Internal Security Section of the Domestic Intelligence Division under date of September 23, 1953, recommending a letter of censure for SA [redacted]. A letter of censure and probation was prepared by the Administrative Action Unit of the Administrative Division under date of September 30, 1953. The Director's office has requested that the apparent delay in the preparation of the memorandum by the Internal Security Section and the letter of censure and probation to SA [redacted] by the Administrative Action Unit be looked into.

b6

The above letter from the New York Division was received in the Director's office at 10:39 a. m. on 9-17-53; was received by Mr. Tolson's Office at 2:05 p. m. and by Mr. Ladd's Office at 3:06 p.m. on the same date. This letter was forwarded to the Administrative Action Unit for review and recommendation for appropriate administrative action on 9-18-53. However, since background information and recommendations of Domestic Intelligence Division were needed, it was forwarded to the Internal Security Section where it was received at 5:03 p.m., Friday, 9-18-53. It was assigned for handling to Supervisor [redacted] who received it on Monday morning, 9-21-53. [redacted] was involved in an extensive analysis of the testimony of former Confidential Informant [redacted] before the House Committee on Un-American Activities on 9-21-53 and was engaged in a lecture from 9:00 to 11:00 a. m. on 9-22-53. He was therefore unable to dictate on the Swerdlow matter until 9-22-53. The memorandum was typed and sent through under date of 9-23-53. This memorandum was received by Mr. Belmont's Office at 11:26 a. m., 9-23-53, and by Mr. Ladd's Office at 3:07 p.m. on the same date. It was then forwarded to the Administrative Action Unit and received in the early morning of 9-24-53. A personnel brief and a recommendation for a letter of censure to SA [redacted] was

b6  
b7D

Letter to Belmont & Glavin 10-7-53

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-369069-17

CE:smw

17 OCT 26 1953



appended. The memorandum and personnel brief were submitted to Mr. H. L. Edwards, Personnel Office, and were approved on Friday, 9-25-53 by Mr. Glavin, who also recommended that SA [ ] be placed on probation. This action was approved by Mr. Mohr for Mr. Tolson and returned to Mr. Glavin at 4:51 P. M. on 9-25-53. It was received in the mail room of the Personnel Office at 5:18 P. M. on 9-25-53 and was thereafter delivered to the Administrative Action Unit on the morning of 9-28-53. The memorandum was assigned to Agent Supervisor [ ] for the preparation of a letter of censure and probation to SA [ ], SA [ ] who is a comparatively new supervisor in the Administrative Division dictated the letter to Agent [ ] on 9-28-53 but certain changes were suggested by the Unit Chief, [ ] necessitating a revision by the stenographer who was unable to complete the transcription immediately because she was taking dictation on other matters of an urgent and expedite nature. The letter was sent through in final form on September 29, 1953, dated form September 30, 1953.

RECOMMENDATION:

From the foregoing, it is noted that the week end of 9/18-21/53 intervened while matter was in the Domestic Intelligence Division for consideration, and the week end of 9/25-28/53 intervened while memorandum was in the Administrative Division for preparation of letter. There was some delay in the internal Security Section in the preparation of the memorandum in that it was received by Supervisor on the morning of 9-21-53 and was not handled until the following day. However, the Supervisor was tied upon a previous special and was unable to devote him attention to this matter on the first day. There was also some delay in the preparation of the letter of censure and probation, but in this case the letter was prepared by a comparatively new employee in that unit and certain corrections were suggested by the Unit Chief, necessitating a revision in the typing of the letter. No further action is recommended in this matter.

I do not agree with Clegg. It is obvious this matter was not promptly handled but was "bandied about". I recommend letters to Belmont and Glavin instructing that such correspondence be more promptly handled.

10-4- Tolson

DIRECTOR'S NOTATION: " I CERTAINLY AGREE" H.

October 23, 1953

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Alan H. Belmont  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Belmont:

I have given careful consideration to the findings of the inquiry recently made into the handling by the Domestic Intelligence Division of information to the effect that certain confidential items emanating from United States defense installations had been observed in the Soviet Zone of Germany and I am greatly concerned over the failure of the Espionage Section of your division to issue instructions that the individual furnishing this information be interviewed by a Bureau representative.

It is your responsibility as Assistant Director to make certain that all matters of this kind are given thorough consideration and no investigative possibilities overlooked. There was a definite failure in this regard in this instance and I shall expect you to take appropriate measures to prevent any repetition.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

CC: Mr. Ladd  
(Personal and Confidential)

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Gearty \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

COMM - FBI  
OCT 25 1953  
MAILED 31

RECORDED - 67

67-946-1-327	
Searched	Numbered
OCT 27 1953	
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION	

158  
OCT 27 1953

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : C. A. Tolson *Wm*

DATE: October 20, 1953

FROM : H. H. Clegg *MAC*SUBJECT: UNKNOWN SUBJECTS; THEFTS OF BLUEPRINTS  
FROM EVANS SIGNAL LABORATORY, FT. MONMOUTH, N.J.  
ESPIONAGE - RSUSPECTED ESPIONAGE, FT. MONMOUTH, N.J.  
AND FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LABORATORIES,  
NUTLEY, N.J.SYNOPSIS:

NEWARK

The Director instructed that the espionage case involving the Evans Signal Laboratory be reviewed to make sure that it had been handled with proper regard for the Bureau's interest. In reviewing that case, it was determined that Senator McCarthy's hearings apparently covered this case and the case entitled, "Suspected Espionage, Ft. Monmouth, N.J., and Federal Telecommunications Laboratories, Nutley, N.J.," therefore both cases were reviewed.

Unknown Subjects; Thefts of Blueprints  
From Evans Signal Laboratory, Ft. Monmouth, N.J.  
Espionage - R

As a result of data furnished by G-2 at Fort Monmouth to the Newark Office on 12-12-52, which was furnished to the Bureau in air-tel of 12-16-52, the Bureau secured on 12-22-52, an Air Intelligence Information Report dated 6-5-52, received at G-2 Headquarters on 12-1-52.

This report stated that an unidentified 21-year-old laboratory assistant who had defected in the East Zone of Germany had advised the Air Force that he was employed in a Russian laboratory at Pirna, near Dresden, from June, 1949, to September, 1950. He claimed that while employed there, he saw microfilm copies of blueprints from the Evans Signal Laboratory at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, pertaining to equipment under development by the United States. He stated that any information desired from Evans Signal Laboratory could be obtained and, during a visit to Krakow in the Eastern Zone, he saw an eight

cc - 1 - Mr. Ladd  
1 - Mr. Belmont  
1 - Mr. Glavin (Attention: H. L. Edwards)

FHS:JEN:rmq:mc

Tolson  
Ladd  
Nichols  
Belmont  
Clegg  
Glavin  
Harbo  
Rosen  
Tracy  
Mohr  
Winterrowd  
Tele. Room  
Holloman  
Sizoo  
Miss Gandy

*Coyle*  
*H. H. Clegg*  
*Glavin*  
*W. J. ...*

67-790-1805  
11  
24/10/53  
JEN

millimeter silent film about the Atomic Energy installation at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, which included shots of the diffusion rooms, pumping units, a cyclotron, geiger counter with amplifier, oscilloscope, loud-speaker and computer. He further stated that the movie showed people actually at work in various laboratories and contained technical construction data for the building shown in the film. The Air Intelligence Information Report stated that some of the information the defector gave was not considered feasible. No details were given concerning that conclusion. It was determined by the Liaison Section that, prior to the receipt of this information by the Bureau, G-2 had already instructed First Army to arrange to have the defector reinterviewed.

On 1-15-53, Newark was furnished a Photostat of the Air Intelligence Information Report of 6-5-52, and instructed to immediately institute an investigation. A report was submitted on 3-6-53, which revealed that the radar equipment referred to by the defector in connection with the blueprints was similar to several U.S. radar sets, one of which is classified Confidential and the others Restricted or Unclassified. It was also determined that similar radar sets were released to Russia during World War II and that Evans Signal Laboratory blueprints bore their title only during 1940-1945, and that none of the statements of the defector was pertinent to laboratory projects since 1946. As a result of the leads set forth in Newark report of 3-6-53, and the Washington Field Office letter of 3-16-53, the Knoxville Office submitted a report, 4-15-53, stating that the information concerning a film about Oak Ridge is too indefinite to identify and that the Atomic Energy Commission had many films, both classified and unclassified. It was also determined that some of the nonclassified films may have been sent abroad for commercial purposes; that cyclotrons are not themselves classified, but the only classified material about a cyclotron is the use to which it is placed at Oak Ridge; that there are no areas at Oak Ridge which are called diffusion rooms; geiger counters, oscilloscopes, loud-speakers and computers may be obtained commercially in this country and there is nothing of a classified nature concerning them.

Based on information furnished by the Newark Office on 4-8-53, which was received from G-2 at Fort Monmouth, the Bureau obtained a copy of an Air Intelligence Information Report dated 12-3-52, which stated that the defector had been reinterviewed by the Air Force and stated he fabricated the majority, if not all, of the information reported originally and that all

electronics information previously furnished by the defector should be discounted. The Bureau also obtained an Air Intelligence Disposition Form dated 3-17-53, and addressed to G-2, which recommended that any investigation be dropped and the case closed.

The Bureau advised Newark on 5-6-53 to discontinue the investigation. Newark submitted a closing report dated 6-4-53, which stated the Director of Research at Fort Monmouth had advised that the equipment which the defector originally reported he saw was similar to U.S. equipment but not identical to Evans Signal Laboratory developments subsequent to World War II.

The defector has never been interviewed by the Bureau. The press has reported that a representative of the McCarthy Committee has gone to Europe to interview a defector, not further identified.

Suspected Espionage, Ft. Monmouth, N.J.  
and Federal Telecommunications Laboratories,  
Nutley, N.J.

The First Army (through G-2), after correlating information available from employees' applications, FBI reports, Navy Department files and Air Force files, advised the Bureau on 12-12-52, that in its opinion, the possibility existed that an espionage ring was operating at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. On 1-16-53, Bureau advised G-2 no additional investigation would be undertaken in absence of more specific allegations. Matter again called to Bureau's attention by G-2 on 4-14-53, when it advised that the American Legion Post at Belmar, New Jersey, had informed Senator McCarthy that a number of undesirables were being kept on the rolls at Fort Monmouth despite the charges preferred by local officials reflecting on them as security risks. The American Legion blamed Army higher-ups for this situation. G-2 suggested the Bureau might desire to reconsider its position in light of the additional information. On 4-21-53, Bureau issued instructions to Newark to review First Army Headquarters files relating to these allegations. On 5-1-53, Newark advised that the files consisted of dossiers on 550 people, review of which was under way but that because of magnitude of task, they could not meet Bureau deadline of April 30, which was set in Bureau communication of 4-21-53. This letter also gave the Bureau detailed description of the problem involved by setting forth a complete description of the contents of a typical dossier.

On 5-21-53, Newark advised the Bureau it had completed the review of 484 dossiers on personnel at Fort Monmouth (102 then employed, 269 formerly employed, 93 never employed). Of the 484 dossiers, Newark found it already had investigative files

on 205 of them and that its files on these people contained all information that was available in the dossiers. This letter further advised review of the dossiers on those persons on whom they did not have an investigative file did not reveal information which would warrant investigation under the Espionage or Loyalty of Government Employees Program.

Newark further advised that on 5-19-53, CIC had made available files on 117 persons employed at the Federal Telecommunications Center and that review of these files would be completed by 5-28-53. On 5-27-53, Newark advised review of all files completed and that on basis of review of 117 files relating to persons employed at Federal Telecommunications Center, it was opening 14 cases. On 6-9-53, the Bureau instructed Newark to photostat all pertinent derogatory information in CIC files and to forward summaries to the Bureau together with recommendations as to whether further investigation should be undertaken. This letter broadened the scope of Newark's inquiry. The original instructions set forth in Bureau letter of 4-21-53, required only that Newark review First Army files to determine whether there was any basis for further investigation of any individual under the Loyalty Program or the Espionage Statutes; whereas, instructions of 6-9-53 required a summary memo on each individual reflecting all derogatory information and specifically mentioning the Bureau's responsibility under the Espionage, Internal Security and Security of Government Employees Programs. Because of the short deadline set in the Bureau's letter of 4-21-53 and because of the limitations mentioned above, Newark, in original review of these dossiers, did not record references, relatives and associates of these people and did not search them through its indices. This lack of detailed instructions resulted in some duplication of effort when the instructions of June 9, 1953, were issued. Newark advises 48 Agent days expended in review of files during April and May but that only a portion of this represents efforts subsequently duplicated. Exact number of Agent days wasted cannot be determined but, apparently, much of waste could have been prevented if Bureau had promptly issued detailed instructions following receipt of Newark letter of May 1. Bureau, in issuing instructions of 4-21-53, should have alerted Newark to responsibilities under Internal Security Program as well as Espionage and Loyalty of Government Employees Programs.

The Newark Office opened or reopened 26 Security of Government Employees cases and 11 Security Matter - C cases based on review of references, relatives and associates following Bureau instructions of 6-9-53.

Inspector Hennrich and Assistant Director Belmont explained instructions of 6-9-53 issued after re-evaluation of entire situation following receipt of letter from Newark, 5-21-53, explaining insufficient evidence found in review of CIC files to warrant further investigation. They both felt that in the interest of being ultraconservative and to fully protect the Bureau from subsequent shenanigans of Army brass, copies of all derogatory information in possession of CIC should be contained in FBI files.

A file review and Photostat work ordered in Bureau letter of 6-9-53 did not progress as directed and on 9-4-53, Director noted delay in handling case and said that case had been grossly mishandled at Newark and at Seat of Government; also wanted to know the identities of Supervisors at Newark and Seat of Government who were responsible for this "coasting." Director's questions answered by memo of 9-9-53, as a result of which disciplinary action was taken as to personnel at Newark and the Bureau, for failure to have project completed more promptly, failure to be certain sufficient manpower was assigned and for failure to ~~assist~~ on Newark's demanding immediate action by the Army in photostating necessary material. Since specific interest of Director expressed by inquiries on 9-4-53, case has been afforded hour-by-hour supervision, and there appears to have been no delinquencies since that date. Case to date has not been one of investigation but one of reviewing files of the Army to determine whether further investigation should be made. Review, briefing and photostating have been completed by Newark and all material has been forwarded to the Bureau. Newark has opened or reopened 66 Loyalty of Government Employees cases, 65 Security Matter - C cases, 3 Internal Security - C cases, 2 Internal Security - R cases and 4 Espionage - R cases, for a total of 140 investigative matters. These cases are presently receiving attention.

# OBSERVATIONS

1. The above cases were supervised at the Seat of Government by SA [redacted] of the Espionage Section, Chief of which is W. A. Branigan. The Inspector in Charge of the Espionage Section is Carl E. Hennrich, and his immediate Supervisor is Assistant Director A. H. Belmont. All of the above individuals and SAC D.S. Hostetter of Newark were censured on 9/14/53, as set forth above, for the delay and other delinquencies in the case entitled "Suspected Espionage, Ft. Monmouth, New Jersey, and Federal Telecommunications Laboratories, Nutley, New Jersey; Espionage - R." ASAC Kenneth Commons has the over-all supervision of security matters in the Newark Office.

2. The defector who furnished to the Air Force the original information in the case entitled "Unknown Subjects, Theft of Blueprints from Evans Signal Laboratory, Ft. Monmouth, New Jersey; Espionage - R" never has been interviewed by a Bureau representative. He was interviewed twice by the Air Force in Germany. The Domestic Intelligence Division stated instructions never were issued to have the defector interviewed by our Liaison Representative at Heidelberg for the following reasons:

The Bureau was informed on 12/29/52 that G-2 was attempting to locate and interview the defector in Europe, G-2 would have jurisdiction in Europe to handle such an interview, our Liaison Representative does not normally conduct any active investigations, and in view of G-2's statement they were attempting to have the informant interviewed that was deemed adequate at that time. The Domestic Intelligence Division advised instructions were not issued to have the defector interviewed subsequent to the receipt of the Air Force's report of 12/3/52, which stated that the defector had informed that the majority, if not all, of the information originally reported was a fabrication because the Bureau's investigation failed to substantiate that any of the material described in the original interview had been stolen from Evans Signal Laboratory, the motion picture data he mentioned was too vague to identify, all the specific data which he mentioned concerning this film was determined to have been unclassified, and the Air Force report of 12/3/52, which stated the defector had fabricated the majority if not all of his original information, stated specifically that all electronics information contained in the report of the previous interview should be discounted.

It is the view of the Training & Inspection Division that full protection of the Bureau's interests should have dictated efforts be made to have a Bureau representative interview the original informant.



Messrs. Ladd and Belmont point out that the defector's story was thrice discounted. They agree informant should have been interviewed and instructions are being issued to interview him.

*← Pretty late decision. ← I certainly concur. H.*

3. Forty-eight Agent days were spent during April and May, 1953, in a preliminary review of the First Army files. On 5/1/53, Newark furnished the Bureau complete details regarding the problem involved but the Bureau did not issue specific instructions to Newark until 6/9/53. At that time the Bureau ordered each dossier be photostated and a summary be sent to the Bureau. All of the 48 Agent days were not wasted as during the preliminary review a general understanding was obtained of the type of data available in the Army files, the names of all of the subjects of the Army cases were searched through the Newark files but some duplication exists which could have been avoided if detailed instructions had been issued immediately after receipt of Newark communication of 5/1/53.

Messrs. Ladd and Belmont point out Espionage Section did not receive Newark memo of 5/1/53 until 5/12/53 and that they felt Bureau was not in position to issue additional instructions to Newark until after preliminary review by Newark completed.

*why not?*  
4. As a result of the expanded program called for by Bureau letter of 6/9/53, Newark has opened or reopened 65 Security Matter-C cases, 66 Security of Government Employee cases, 2 Internal Security - R cases, 4 Espionage-R cases, and 3 Internal Security - C cases, a total of 140 files.

Messrs. Ladd and Belmont observed that a total of 136 files of the above-mentioned 140 were authorized by the Bureau to be opened or reopened by Newark, that they are submitting a separate memorandum to the Director setting forth the various reasons why these files were opened or reopened. They point out 66 additional dossiers were made available by the Army, that cases were opened on associations and remote allegations which would not ordinarily be the basis for Bureau investigation; that some cases were opened as a result of a complete check of the New York and Bureau files and checks of references, relatives and associates through the Newark files. Some additional cases were based on information not in the Army dossiers when they were reviewed in May and that in their opinion there are a very limited number of cases which should have been opened as a result of the May 1953 review by Newark. They say they may have been overly zealous in opening cases in their desire to protect the Bureau; however, they believe their reasoning was sound.

*4  
Newark Security Matter-C cases  
opened or reopened 10/22/53.*

5. Despite the fact that Army authority advised on 4/14/53 of their opinion that there was a possibility an espionage ring existed at Ft. Monmouth, the Bureau does not know if the Army's suspicions are well-founded. The Bureau is, however, in possession of all information on which the Army based its suppositions and has conducted investigation on many of the individuals involved and is now conducting either new or additional investigation involving 140 cases as detailed above.

Messrs. Belmont and Ladd point out the above is a very broad statement; that the allegations of the Army have been carefully analyzed and appropriate investigation launched. They felt this reference by the Army to the Bureau of alleged espionage ring had all the earmarks of an attempt to foist an administrative and disciplinary problem off on the Bureau. They point out the Army allegation and possible espionage was based largely on information the FBI had furnished the Army and that the Bureau had conducted espionage investigations of individuals at Ft. Monmouth, was still conducting investigations of individuals under that category, principally as a result of associates or friends of persons in the Rosenberg case.

6. The Newark Office was obviously not aware of security matters within its Division which required attention because after the Bureau instructed a review of Army files be made it was necessary to open or reopen the cases mentioned above.

Messrs. Belmont and Ladd point out that in their opinion in only a few cases does it appear that Newark should have opened these cases previously and that they are following Newark on them.

7. Regardless of whether it is eventually established that an espionage ring exists at Ft. Monmouth, or whether significant information is developed through the investigation of the individual cases as mentioned above, it is apparent that the Bureau's interests have not been adequately protected because of the manner in which these cases have been directed and handled.

Messrs. Belmont and Ladd believe that an analysis of the entire procedure followed in the Ft. Monmouth situation will reflect their primary aim has been to protect the Bureau's interests and that they have gone far beyond the normal in their effort to do this. They state there was a delay and point out they have already been censured for it.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. No recommendation is being made at this time concerning Supervisor [redacted] inasmuch as he is on emergency annual leave because of the recent death of his mother. Recommendation as to [redacted] will be made when he returns to duty. Messrs. Belmont and Ladd agree.

OK [signature] 10/21

ESPIONAGE  
SECTION

2. That Section Chief William A. Branigan be censured and placed on probation for (1) his failure to assure ~~that~~ that proper effort had been made to have the defector interviewed by a Bureau representative, and (2) for his failure to assure ~~that~~ that proper instructions had been issued to the Newark Office regarding the review of the First Army files after the receipt of Newark communication of 5/1/53 which detailed the problem involved.

Messrs. Belmont and Ladd agree censure is warranted but only for the failure to issue instructions to have the defector interviewed. They do not agree that administrative action is warranted in connection with instructions issued on the basis of Newark's letter of 5/1/53.

I agree 10/21  
I recommend  
letter of censure  
10/21

Letter of censure to  
Mr. Branigan, 10/23/53  
HC

3. That Inspector Carl E. Hennrich be censured and placed on probation for (1) his failure to assure ~~that~~ that proper effort had been made to have the defector interviewed by a Bureau representative, and (2) for his failure to assure ~~that~~ that proper instructions had been issued to the Newark Office regarding the review of the First Army files after the receipt of Newark communication of 5/1/53 which detailed the problem involved.

Messrs. Belmont and Ladd agree censure is warranted but only for the failure to issue instructions to have the defector interviewed. They do not agree that administrative action is warranted in connection with instructions issued on the basis of Newark's letter of 5/1/53.

I agree 10/21  
I recommend  
letter of censure  
10/21  
Letter of censure to  
Mr. Hennrich, 10/23/53  
HC

4. That Assistant Director A. H. Belmont be censured for the lax manner in which these cases were supervised, as detailed above.

Messrs. Belmont and Ladd agree to the extent that a letter of censure is warranted for the failure to issue instructions to have the defector interviewed.

I agree 10/21  
Letter of censure to Mr.  
Belmont, 10/23/53 VJC

I agree 10/21

5. That ASAC Kenneth Commons of the Newark Office, who had supervision of security matters, be censured for his failure to be aware of security matters within the Newark Division which required attention.

Messrs. Belmont and Ladd felt that they should obtain detailed explanations from Newark as to why certain cases involved in this file review were not previously opened in May and that any action should be deferred pending receipt of this explanation.

Sague 10/21

Sague 10/21

Being handled by Div. II 10/22/53

Sague

6. That <sup>DSY</sup>SA Hostetter, of the Newark Office, be censured for his failure to be aware of security matters within the Newark Division which required attention. ON PROBATION

Messrs. Belmont and Ladd felt that they should obtain detailed explanations from Newark as to why certain cases involved in this file review were not previously opened in May and that any action should be deferred pending receipt of this explanation.

Sague 10/21

Sague 10/21

Being handled by Div. II 10/22/53

Sague

2 Yes.

7. The Domestic Intelligence Division should obtain and promptly review the findings of the McCarthy Committee with a view to determining whether any information not previously known to the Bureau regarding matters within its jurisdiction has been developed by this Committee. The details should be promptly brought to the attention of the Director and in the event it appears this Committee has obtained such information an explanation should be given as to why the Bureau did not know about it.

Messrs. Belmont and Ladd point out Domestic Intelligence Division has already reviewed Joseph Levitsky's testimony of 10/13/53 and that they are presently reviewing the testimony of witnesses who appeared on 10/16-17/53, and that, if so instructed, they will secure and review all the testimony which this Committee has heard.

Belmont, 10/22/53  
CEH

8. Unless the Director instructs to the contrary, the Training and Inspection Division will not undertake to review the 667 dossiers, photostatic copies of which have been obtained by Newark. It is noted the Domestic Intelligence Division is currently reviewing summaries of this material and determining whether it is in agreement with the recommendations submitted by Newark as a result of its review of these dossiers.

Messrs. Belmont and Ladd point out that the Domestic Intelligence Division has completed its review of the 667 cases and has agreed with Newark that 136 cases should be opened or reopened as compared with Newark's recommendation that 140 cases should be opened or reopened.

It seems obvious  
that we have  
not been on  
top of this matter  
either at Newark  
or at the Seat  
of Government

1072  
I certainly agree. It  
is disheartening to note  
that Ladd & Belmont  
were not on top of this  
matter from the inception  
but now indicate  
that they can see no  
detriment of consequence  
in the situation.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO , MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: October 21,  
1953

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

**SUBJECT:** UNKNOWN SUBJECTS; THEFTS OF BLUEPRINTS  
FROM EVANS SIGNAL LABORATORY, FT. MONMOUTH, N. J.  
ESPIONAGE - R

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Gearty \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

SUSPECTED ESPIONAGE, FT. MONMOUTH, N. J.,  
AND FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LABORATORIES,  
NUTLEY, N. J.

NEWARK

Rememo October 20, 1953, to Mr. Tolson from Mr.

*Clegg.*

Concerning Observation No. 2 on page 6, which pertains to the case entitled, "Unknown Subjects; Thefts of Blueprints from Evans Signal Laboratory, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; Espionage - R," it should be borne in mind that the defector's story was thrice discounted: first, in the original report from the Air Force, when the Air Force stated that some of the information furnished by the defector was not feasible; second, by our investigation at Fort Monmouth and Oak Ridge; and third, by the Air Force reinterview and resultant statement that the defector had fabricated the information, and the Air Force recommendation that any investigation be dropped. However, I agree that a further precautionary step would have been to have had our Liaison Representative interview the defector. In view of the strong indication at the time that the information was fabricated, such an interview did not appear logical then. We are instructing our Liaison Representative to interview him now.

RECORDED--97.

67-720-177

Regarding Item 3 on page 7 under "Observations," the Inspector points out a duplication of effort which could have been avoided if detailed instructions had been issued immediately to Newark upon receipt of Newark memorandum dated May 1, 1953. The May 1 memorandum from Newark was not in the file at the time the Inspector examined it. It has now been located. This memorandum was first received in the Espionage Section on May 12, 1953. This is an 8-page memorandum with about 200 pages of attachments. On

AHB:LL

cc - MR. H. H. CLEGG

*[Handwritten signatures and initials]*

the same day (May 12), received in Espionage Section on May 13, Newark, in response to Bureau air-tel of May 11, 1953, reported that the results of the preliminary survey of material had been submitted by memorandum dated May 1 and that the detailed review of the files was being conducted and the results would be submitted by May 15, 1953. It will thus be seen that the Bureau was not in a position to issue additional instructions to Newark, based on the May 1 memorandum, prior to the completion of the review by Newark.

Regarding Item 4 on page 7, we are submitting a separate memorandum showing an analysis of the files opened or reopened by Newark as a result of the review program. These cases were activated, as a result of the September review, primarily because of the following factors:

1. Sixty-six additional dossiers were made available by the Army.
2. Cases were opened on associations and remote allegations which would not ordinarily be the basis for Bureau investigation; however, both Newark and the Bureau felt we should check any individual on whom any possible question existed. In none of the cases opened as a result of this review was there a specific allegation of espionage. The cases were opened as a precautionary measure in many instances.
3. The September review included checks of the New York and Bureau files, in addition to Newark files, and checks of references, relatives, and associates of the subjects through Newark files. Again, this was an unusual step, going beyond even the precautions taken in the Loyalty Program. However, the Bureau felt it was necessary. This resulted in information warranting the opening or reopening of cases, particularly under the broader standards being applied in this matter as mentioned above.
4. Cases where additional information had accumulated in the Army dossiers or was made available by the Army following the May review.

5. There are a very limited number of cases in which it appears to us that the case should have been opened as a result of the May, 1953, review by Newark. We are getting explanations on these from the Newark Office. I should like to stress that the great majority of cases were opened or reopened not on substantial allegations but, rather, on allegations which would not ordinarily warrant Bureau investigation. We may have been overly zealous in opening cases in our desire to protect the Bureau; however, I think we are sound in our reasoning.

Relative to Observation No. 5 that the Bureau does not know if the Army's suspicions of espionage are well-founded, this is, of course, a broad statement. The allegations by the Army in each instance when received in the Bureau have been most carefully analyzed and appropriate investigation launched. It should be borne in mind that the reference of the over-all situation by the Army to the Bureau as an espionage ring bore all the earmarks of attempts by the Army to foist an administrative and disciplinary problem off on the Bureau and that the Army allegations were most carefully sifted. In fact, our reviews in May, and again in September, were launched despite the fact that we had already conducted investigations of hundreds of Fort Monmouth employees and ex-employees. In fact, the Army's allegation of possible espionage was based largely on information we had furnished the Army as a result of our investigations, and we had conducted espionage investigations of individuals at Fort Monmouth and are still conducting investigations of individuals under that category, principally as a result of associates or friends of persons in the Rosenberg case.

Relative to Observation No. 6, as noted above the Newark Office opened or reopened a large number of cases based on the factors set forth under Observation No. 4. In only a few cases does it appear that Newark should have opened these cases previously, and we are following Newark on these.



Concerning Observation No. 7, an analysis of the entire procedure we followed in this Fort Monmouth situation will reflect that our primary aim has been to protect the Bureau's interests and that we have gone far beyond the normal in our effort to do this. There has been a delay, for which we have already been censured; however, our goal throughout in this matter has been to protect the Bureau's interests.

Concerning the Inspector's recommendations, I agree with No. 1.

I do not agree with No. 2 and No. 3. I feel that a letter of censure is warranted to Mr. Branigan and Mr. Hennrich, inasmuch as it now appears that it would have been more desirable to have our Liaison Representative interview the defector. The instructions to Newark, based on Newark memorandum of May 1, 1953, were handled properly, as I have explained above. I do not feel that probation is warranted in either of these cases.

I agree that I should receive a letter of censure on the same basis of failure to interview the defector.

As to Recommendations Nos. 5 and 6, I think we should pin down the Newark Office as to the responsibilities for failure to open certain cases in May which are now being opened, and thereafter consider administrative action.

As to Recommendation No. 7, the Domestic Intelligence Division has already reviewed  testimony of October 13 and is presently reviewing the testimony of witnesses before the Committee on October 16 and 17, 1953. We have not secured the testimony of other witnesses before the Committee. There have been numerous witnesses. If it is desired that we review this testimony, we will do so.

b6  
b7C  
b7D

As to Recommendation No. 8, the Domestic Intelligence Division has completed its review of the 667 cases and as a result 136 cases have been opened or reopened.

Jayne  
sent.

November 9, 1953

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Alan H. Belmont  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

1565 SDP/WSR  
9-25-91

Dear Mr. Belmont:

I want you to take immediate steps to prevent any recurrence in the Domestic Intelligence Division of delays or administrative weaknesses such as those which occurred in the handling of the letter from Congressman Carroll Reece which was dated October 16, 1953. The Bureau has carefully gone into this matter and despite the fact that a number of files had to be reviewed there were administrative delays and weaknesses which certainly could have been avoided if proper supervisory attention had been given to this matter.

Although you advised a representative of the Training and Inspection Division that you instructed Mr. Victor Keady to reiterate existing instructions and Mr. Keay has contacted appropriate employees of the Division Section, I do not want you to lose touch with this matter personally. You should forthwith take steps to see that all employees of the Domestic Intelligence Division are cognizant of the importance of properly handling mail received in the Bureau and appropriate attention should, of course, be given to correspondence from members of Congress. You should further look into the matter of supervision of stenographic assignments in order that important mail will be handled with the greatest possible dispatch.

Very truly, yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Gearty \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

cc: Mr. Glavin

EDM:js  
20 NOV 18 1953

RECORDED 24

MAILED 9  
NOV 9 - 1953  
COMM-FBI

746 59-328

NOV 9 1953

RECEIVED

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

NOV 12 1953



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

For inclusion in the fund to be paid to the designated beneficiary of any Special Agent, of the FBI who has previously contributed to this fund and who dies from any cause except self-destruction while employed as a Special Agent. I am forwarding herewith (by CHECK - MONEY ORDER) the sum of \$10, payable to the Assistant Director, Administrative Division, FBI, to be included in said fund. Payment will be made for death by self-destruction after the Agent has been a member of the fund for a continuous period of two years. It is understood and agreed that the sum tendered herewith is a voluntary, gratuitous contribution to said fund which I understand is to be administered in the following manner. The liability of the fund shall not under any circumstances exceed the amount of monies in the fund at the time any liability shall occur.

The Director of the FBI will appoint a committee which shall consider all matters pertaining to the acquisition, safe keeping and expending of said fund, which committee will recommend appropriate action to the Director in pertinent matters. The Assistant Director of the Administrative Division of the FBI shall receive all contributions and account for same to the Director. Upon the death of any Special Agent who is a member of said fund the appointed committee will consider the case and submit a recommendation to the Director as to its conclusions. Appropriate instructions will then be issued to the Assistant Director of the Administrative Division, directing him to pay to the designated beneficiary the sum of \$10,000. The following person is designated as my beneficiary for FBI Agents' Insurance Fund:

Name MES. LORETTA D. BELMONT Relationship WIFE Date 11/4/53  
Address 2711 N. YUCATAN ST., ARLINGTON, VA.

The following person is designated as my beneficiary under the Chas. S. Ross Fund providing \$1500 death benefit to beneficiary of agents killed in line of duty.

NAME MRS. LORETTA D. BELMONT Relationship WIFE Date 11/4/53  
Address 2711 N. YUCATAN ST., ARLINGTON, VA.

Very truly yours,

ALAN H. BELMONT  
Special Agent

NOV 9 1953

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: November 16,  
1953

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT:

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
 Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
 Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
 Egan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_  
 Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Relative to the Director's inquiry as to why I was not at the office during early Sunday afternoon, November 15, the following is submitted:

When I left the office at 10:30 p.m. Saturday, arrangements had been made to handle all outstanding requests in the White case. I planned to come in shortly after noon on Sunday; however, my wife asked if we could not go to see friends who had just moved, pointing out she had been able to leave the house only once in six weeks, due to illness of the children and herself and the fact I had been working last week end and Armistice Day.

I had checked with the office in the morning and again at 2:00 p.m. just as I left home, and found matters progressing satisfactorily. I knew it would be a long haul over Sunday night because of the size of the brief on White which we were preparing, and until the material was ready for checking, I could not read it.

I reached the office at 5:10 p.m. and worked all night on the brief and related inquiries.

Mr. Hennrich had checked with me on Sunday morning and advised me his water heater had burst on Sunday morning, requiring installation of a new one on an emergency basis. As matters were progressing satisfactorily at the office, he took care of this and then reported to the office at 3:50 p.m.

I am indeed sorry if the Director had any impression of lack of interest on my part. For the Director's information, I was in the office on

Saturday, November 7  
 Sunday, November 8  
 Armistice Day, November 11  
 Saturday, November 14  
 Sunday, November 15

RECORDED-94 67-94639-329  
 Numbered 157  

From	To
12:45 p.m.	6:10 p.m.
2:30 p.m.	1:50 a.m. (11/9)
9:30 a.m.	FEDERAL 2:40 p.m.
11:05 a.m.	10:30 p.m.
5:10 p.m.	All night

AHB:LL

NOV 20 1953

November 18, 1953

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Alan H. Belmont  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Belmont:

A review has been made of the handling of cases involving the loss of classified documents at the Syracuse and Schenectady Plants of the General Electric Company and this survey has disclosed that summaries of the various cases had been prepared by the Domestic Intelligence Division for my information. Certain administrative weaknesses in the handling of these cases were not set out in the summaries submitted by your Division and I have been advised that your reason for not showing such delinquencies was because you felt that the purpose of the summary memoranda was to make available the facts concerning the cases in question. Obviously, facts are not complete unless delays and other weaknesses in handling are shown and when you present the facts to me I want to have the complete picture at all times.

I shall expect you to take immediate steps to insure that in the future no similar omissions occur in summary memoranda submitted to me from the Domestic Intelligence Division.


Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Numbered




UIC:AO

CC - Mr. Ladd (Personal & Confidential)

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Gearty \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

20 NOV 25 1953

NOV 18 3 26 PM '53  
RECEIVED READING ROOM



November 30, 1953

PERSONAL

Mr. Alan H. Belmont  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.


Dear Belmont:

I want to take this means of  
extending to you my congratulations upon  
your Seventeenth Anniversary with the Bureau.  
I only hope that your services have proved as  
rewarding to you as they have to the Bureau  
and I want you to know that I personally am  
very grateful for the many contributions  
which you have made toward the Bureau's  
growth.

Sincerely,

J. Edgar Hoover

EH  
JEH:mpd



Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
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Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

17  
DEC 4 1953

67- 331  
Searched \_\_\_\_\_  
Numbered \_\_\_\_\_  
13 DEC 1 1953  
[Signature]


November 27, 1953

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

0  
Mr. Alan H. Belmont  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED BY 1565 SDP/165R  
ON 9-25-91

Dear Mr. Belmont:



As Assistant Director of the Domestic Intelligence Division it was your responsibility to see to it that your division was so organized that [redacted] would be promptly interviewed. I shall expect you to take immediate corrective measures to prevent the repetition of such procrastination on the part of supervisors in the Domestic Intelligence Division.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

12 DEC 1 1953

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
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Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

NOV 27 1953

COMM-FBI

DCM:adu

30 DEC 3 1953

NOV 27 3 57 PM '53  
RECEIVED - DIRECTOR  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
NOV 27 4 40 PM '53

RECEIVED - DIRECTOR



# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson

DATE: 11/20/53

FROM : ~~SECRET~~ H. H. Clegg

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE

SUBJECT: b6  
b7C  
b7D

HANDLING OF INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM -  
[redacted] was., ESPIONAGE - R

SYNOPSIS Domestic Intelligence

Tolson  
Ladd  
Nichols  
Belmont  
Clegg  
Glavin  
Harbo  
Rosen  
Tracy  
Gandy  
Tele. Room  
Holloman  
Sizoo  
Miss Gandy

b6  
b7C  
b7D

(U)

[redacted] was next interviewed by FBI 9/23/53. He has since been interviewed several times and more interviews will be held.

b1  
b6  
b7C  
b7D

On 10/29/53, [redacted] testified before the Jenner Committee. The Director has inquired as to:

1. Had we received initially all the information which [redacted] gave Jenner Committee?

Answer: "No. He testified as to two things we did not know about:

1. In our 1948 interview we did not ask [redacted] about the [redacted] On 10/29/53 [redacted] told Jenner Committee the [redacted]

been [redacted] 1941.

Classified by 1565 SDP/10/15/01  
Declassify on OADR

BRIDGEMAN on pgs. 1, 4, 5, 8 (TP2), 10, 11, 12

REMAINS CLASSIFIED

PER ANOTHER GOV'T AGENCY

9-7-93

ALL OTHERS  
DECLASSIFIED  
RDD/KSR RECEIVED

9-24-93

Attachment

~~SECRET~~

2.

The Director inquired whether [redacted]  
Committee:

Jenner

(S)(U)

Answer: No. Situation same as FBI.

~~SECRET~~

3.

The Director inquired as to the investigative steps we took in 1947.

Answer:

[redacted]

X (U)

b6  
b7C  
b7D

4.

Director inquired as to whether we are in the clear in the [redacted].

Answer: In addition to certain investigative aspects for which explanations are now being obtained we regard the following as weaknesses:

A.

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
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B.

[redacted]

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
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- C. Neither Coyne's memorandum nor the Executives Conference addendum (9/4/47) mentioned the G-2 inquiry had been received 4/10/47.

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D.


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Gregg did not:

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


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(U)  
E.

[redacted]  
[redacted] and was not interviewed by Bureau Agents until 9/23/53. SA [redacted] to whom case has been assigned since [redacted] return to U. S.. is of opinion [redacted]

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(U)

[redacted] Mr. Belmont states that although there were no particular questions for [redacted] after his arrival in U. S. and the field was advised in July 1953 that [redacted] was an available source of information, [redacted] should have been interviewed as a precautionary measure. We feel he should have been promptly and thoroughly interviewed.

F.



we may regard as Internal Security or Security Matter - C type investigations, or vice versa. Mr. Belmont points out current Bureau instructions require the utmost exploitation of an informant's knowledge, and that all interviews should be carefully prepared. Intense supervision of this phase of bureau work is necessary.

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G.

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(U)

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Mr. D. M. Ladd - censure . . . for his responsibility as official in charge of investigations and for the weaknesses previously cited in this memorandum. Mr. Belmont analyzed this situation and felt that Mr. Ladd's instructions to Agent Gregg were adequate. Mr. Belmont feels Mr. Ladd took the necessary steps to see that everything pertinent was covered in the interview by Gregg with [redacted] in 1948.

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2. SA Emory M. Gregg - censure . . . because he did not [redacted] and fully protect the Bureau with a synopsis of negative findings on all broad topics. Brief attached. Mr. Belmont objects to censuring Gregg because he believes Gregg adequately interviewed [redacted] (see attached memo)

3. (U) SA [redacted] - censure . . . for not having arranged for prompt FBI interview of [redacted] [redacted] was interviewed by FBI 9/23/53. Brief attached. Belmont agrees.

4. Mr. A. H. Belmont - censure . . . as head of Domestic Intelligence Division he should have had things organized so that [redacted] would be promptly interviewed. Belmont agrees.

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DETAILS

BACKGROUND

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[REDACTED]

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(U) In view of [REDACTED] the Director has raised the following questions:  
whether we had interviewed [REDACTED] and had gotten all the information he had [REDACTED]

The [REDACTED] Director also inquired as to what investigative steps the Bureau [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

BUREAU INTERVIEWS WITH [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

1. It would be worth while to bring [REDACTED] to the United States.
2. Would the Bureau be responsible for him.
3. Should he be permitted to remain after his exploitation.

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

All topics discussed negatively by SA Gregg with [REDACTED] were not covered in the memoranda which SA Gregg prepared on his return. SA Gregg did record negative information in those instances wherein [REDACTED]

of individuals shown to him by SA Gregg. Mr. Belmont does not think that the Bureau should require that all negative information be incorporated in interviews. He states the only logical way to do this is by means of a question and answer method, which is not best suited to the Bureau's needs. Using the [REDACTED] as an example, Mr. Belmont points out that if we had listed all the questions resulting in negative replies, we would have voluminous and worthless information in [REDACTED] file. It is Mr. Belmont's feeling that to report such negative information merely for protection purposes does not appear to be worth while. It is his view that where a question is significant and a negative reply is significant, it should be recorded as is the present policy. [REDACTED] differs from that of Mr. Belmont in that [REDACTED] feels:

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1. [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED]

3. We have to protect the record because of intense interest of Congressional Committees in security topics, their frequent reinterviews with defectors, and the fact that defectors sometimes change their stories. We have this very situation in the [REDACTED]

(U)

[REDACTED]

He was next interviewed by Bureau Agents 9-23-53. He should have been interviewed earlier and Mr. Belmont agrees this should have been done as a precautionary measure.

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Best Copy Available

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In addition to the 1-4-53 interview, [redacted] was interviewed by Bureau Agents 9-23-53, 10/9, 23, 24, 31, 28/53 in Washington; 10-20-53 in New York; 11-5-53 and 11-17-53 in Washington. The Bureau now has a copy of the manuscript of [redacted] is writing. Future interviews will also bring out the source of the information [redacted] gave the former committee.

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In [redacted] 10-29-53 he specifically mentioned, among other things, two items which are not reflected in the version which he previously furnished to SA Gregg:

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(U) of the [redacted] the first informant in relation to [redacted] knowledge letter from [redacted] the Bureau in a [redacted]

[redacted]azine [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

Mr. Belman points out [redacted] with only one year of intelligence work; the interview by Gregg was concerned mainly with espionage; [redacted] Gregg that he was not versed in Communist ideology; [redacted] did not mention the Institute of Pacific Relations. It is our belief that [redacted] should have been asked about the [redacted] and his reply, even though negative, should have been reduced to writing in the Bureau's files.

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(U) [redacted] had previously furnished information [redacted] that Gregg [redacted] technical intelligence from the U.S. through the Soviet Union was in the United States serving as [redacted] [redacted] had further pointed out to both the Bureau and [redacted] that various blueprints, photographs and technical data had been [redacted]

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[Redacted]

ARE WE CLEAR IN THIS MATTER

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[Redacted] information has been disseminated into a minimum of 29 Bureau files wherein investigation has been or is being conducted. These files are being reviewed, and the results thereof will be submitted in a separate memorandum.

[Redacted] (U) [Redacted]

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[Redacted] (U) [Redacted]

As Mr. Belmont

(U) On the other hand, [Redacted]

5. Mr. Belmont should see that   is thoroughly and completely interviewed as to all matters of Bureau interest. Belmont agrees.

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6. Negative findings as to broad topics relating to persons and organizations should be synopsisized and grouped for future use in the Bureau files following interviews with defectors. The FBI handbook permits synopsisizing negative findings. Mr. Belmont agrees that negative replies should be recorded when significant.

7. Mr. Belmont should see to it that all aspects of the security field are covered in interviews with defectors, espionage agents and highly placed Communists. This line of thinking should be present in all security investigations so that no aspect will be overlooked. Mr. Belmont agrees and states this has been stressed to the field in a series of SAC Letters, four of which were dated in 1953.

8. Former SA William K. Harvey - recommend a copy of this memorandum be placed in his personnel file.

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(Recommendations continued on next page.)

9. Former SA Joseph Patrick ~~Coyne~~ - recommend a  
copy of this memorandum be placed in his personnel file.

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OK.  
K.

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~~SECRET~~

[redacted] The Institute (S) of Pacific Relations was an internal security case (not Espionage) at the time of the 1948 interview. It subsequently developed (about 1950) into an Espionage matter. Gregg did not interview [redacted]

2. It is very difficult to expect an individual to recall from the recesses of memory every point that would be of interest to an interviewer unless specific organizations and persons are named in order to help jog his memory. This technique should be used only in those instances where we have reason to believe the defector is not a double agent and is reliable. [redacted]

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(U)

3. [redacted]

[redacted] He (S) was not interviewed by the Bureau until 9-23-53. He had not been interviewed by an agent of the FBI since November, 1948. The FBI should have interviewed him earlier in an effort to elaborate on information previously given and to attempt to get first-hand information on cases which had been developed since 1948. The [redacted] has been assigned to SA [redacted] since the return of [redacted] to the U. S. [redacted] is of the opinion that all necessary information was being adequately elicited by [redacted] as a result of liaison between the Bureau and [redacted] Inspector (S) feels there is no substitute for first-hand handling by the FBI. [redacted]

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
Mr. Belmont states that although there were no particular questions to ask [redacted] in the U. S. and the field was informed July, 1953, of the availability of [redacted] Mr. Belmont agrees that as a precautionary [redacted] should have been interviewed.

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4. During the course of SA Gregg's interview of



It is Mr. Belmont's position that since [redacted] has changed his story from that which he gave Agent Gregg in 1948 and even now does not provide any specifics which can be traced; therefore, we should place more reliance in the original statement of [redacted] than in his most recent statement.

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It is our position that Gregg did not adequately protect the Bureau's interest by preparing a memorandum as to the [redacted]

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~~SECRET~~

There is now no way of determining whether [redacted] memory was faulty at the time of SA Gregg's interview and has been since refreshed or whether the latest information he has given regarding [redacted] is fact or fiction. It may be concluded, however, that the Bureau was not aware that the data mentioned in 1948 came from [redacted] until five years later and that the Bureau's position was not protected in the meantime by appropriate memoranda for the file following SA Gregg's interview as to these specific points.

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5. Any [redacted] as to [redacted] should be all-inclusive. What one of these individuals regards as espionage we in the FBI may regard as internal security-type investigations or security matter - C investigations, or vice versa. Mr. Belmont states his division has recognized the problem and continually stressed it to the field. Mr. Belmont points out that Bureau Bulletin - 48 dated 11-23-51, requires the utmost exploitation of an informant's knowledge and the conducting of interviews over an extended period of time after careful preparation and with appropriate channeling of information to individual case files. Supervision of this should be intensified, inasmuch as there appears to have been a gap in this instance.

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6. [redacted] We declined 9-16-47. It might appear that this decision took undue time. Responsibility: former SA William K. Harvey. Section Chief was former SA Joseph Patrick Coyne.

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7. [redacted]  
[redacted]  
Responsibility: former SA William K. Harvey, whose file reflects Mr. Ladd regarded him as a known procrastinator. Coyne was Section Chief.

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8. Information received through G-2 (4-18-47) from [redacted] was not sent to FBI field until 10-17-47.

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File #  
Checked by  
Filed by

Mr. A. H. Belmont

November 25, 1953

b6

Director, FBI

Mrs. [redacted]

PERSONAL ATTENTION

b6

This is to advise you that Mrs. [redacted] a Stenographer in your Division, is being transferred to the Identification Division and allocated to the position of Clerk-Typist. She should be instructed to report to Mr. Tracy's Office for assignment at 8:00 A. M. on November 30, 1953.

It is desired that you submit an explanation as to how Mrs. [redacted] was rated "Satisfactory" in ability to work under pressure in her 1953 annual performance rating report, dated September 30, 1953, when it had previously been reported by memorandum dated August 4, 1953, by Mrs. [redacted] that it made her very nervous to work on special assignments and that she would like to be assigned to more or less routine dictation.

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b6

CC: Mr. [redacted]  
JIC/JW: fkb

NOV 25 8 02 PM '53  
RECEIVED RECORDED  
FBI

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

MAILED 8  
NOV 27 1953  
COMM-FBI

475282-4  
RECORDED  
NOV 27 1953  
RECEIVED  
NOV 27 1953



Mr. Tolson

11/12/53

H. H. Clegg

RA  
UNKNOWN SUBJECTS: THEFTS OF BLUEPRINTS  
FROM EVANS SIGNAL LABORATORY, FT. MONMOUTH, N.J.  
ESPIONAGE - R

SUSPECTED ESPIONAGE, FT. MONMOUTH, N.J.  
AND FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LABORATORIES,  
NUTLEY, N.J.

*Sanon tel*

In accordance with the Director's instructions a survey of the above-captioned cases was conducted by the Training and Inspection Division and a memorandum setting forth the findings was submitted on 10/20/53. Recommendations for administrative action were made and the Director authorized that a letter of censure be sent to the following: W. A. Branigan, Chief of the Espionage Section; Inspector Carl E. Hennrich; and Assistant Director A. H. Belmont. Such letters were sent under date of 10/23/53.

This completed administrative action except for Supervisor [redacted] of the Espionage Section who was at the time of the survey, and still is, on emergency annual leave. His comments will be obtained when he returns to duty and recommendations for administrative action will be made.

b6

RECOMMENDATION:

None... This is for your information.

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Gearty \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

30 DEC 1 1953

FHS:cnb

NOT RECORDED

128 NOV 17 1953

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-2-1171

December 4, 1953

PERSONAL

Mr. Alan H. Belmont  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Belmont:

I wanted to write this personal note to tell you and, through you, my associates in the Liaison Section, how much I enjoyed the get-together which they arranged at the Army Navy Country Club last evening. It was a most delightful gathering and I am quite confident that the good will which was manifested on all sides will redound to even more effective work of the Liaison Section.

The interest manifested by the members of the Liaison Section in making this affair a success is certainly most gratifying.

Sincerely,

J. Edgar Hoover

JEH:mpd

67-111-333

Searched	.....
Numbered	.....
11 DEC 8 1953	
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION	

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
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Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

DEC 14 1953

SHRT FROM D. O.

TIME	6:55 PM
DATE	12-4-53
BY	JEH

January 5, 1954

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Alan H. Belmont  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

RECEIVED BY 1565 SDP/HSR  
ON 9-25-91

Dear Mr. Belmont:

I have carefully considered the facts relating to the dilatory handling of the Espionage matter involving Paul P. Stoutenburgh, and it is obvious that you have failed to impress upon the personnel under your supervision the necessity for promptly and efficiently handling such important matters. I am aware of the abnormal work situation in the Espionage Section during this period; nevertheless, this matter was received in the Domestic Intelligence Division on November 5, 1953, and was not completed until December 11, 1953, which is certainly an unwarranted delay.

I shall expect you to take proper steps immediately to insure that the work in the Domestic Intelligence Division is expeditiously handled in the future.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

RECORDED-14

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Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
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Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

NEUCD:mj

COMM - FBI

JAN 6 1954

MAILED 31

81956

January 6, 1954

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Alan H. Belmont  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Belmont:

As a result of the recent inspection of the New York Division and the analysis made by the Training and Inspection Division of the handling at the Seat of Government of information received from [redacted] Intelligence, certain delinquencies in Espionage and Internal Security cases under your over-all supervision have come to my attention. In connection with your assignment as Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the New York Division you were charged with the over-all responsibility for delays of five months and more than one month in the opening of two Espionage cases and for delays in the submission of initial and subsequent reports for periods ranging from three and one-half months to more than four months. Another Espionage case was closed with only minimum investigation and there was a delay of over two weeks in reopening the case and of almost one year in submitting a report. In another instance a case was opened in January, 1948, and no investigative report was submitted until April 26, 1949.

While you have been assigned as Assistant Director of the Domestic Intelligence Division I have observed that an Espionage case was closed without having eight individuals interviewed who might have had information pertaining to the investigation. In an Internal Security case there was a delay in opening the investigation from August 30, 1950, to October 4, 1950, and in an Espionage case original information came to the Bureau's attention in March, 1948, and an individual case was not opened on this matter until June, 1953. In another case there was a delay of approximately six weeks in transmitting to another Governmental agency the request of a field division to have [redacted] and in four other cases there were delays of more than two months in opening investigations after the receipt of the information on which these cases were based.

Tolson  
Ladd  
Nichols  
Belmont  
Clegg  
Glavin  
Harbo  
Rosen  
Tracy  
Gearty  
Mohr  
Winterrowd  
Tele. Room  
Holloman  
Miss Gandy

As Assistant Director of the Domestic Intelligence Division it is your responsibility to see to it that all investigative matters are handled efficiently and promptly by those serving under

COMM - FBI

JAN 7

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11 JAN 1954

your supervision. I shall expect you to take immediate steps to insure that your subordinates carry out their assignments with thoroughness and dispatch in order that the Bureau can properly discharge its responsibilities in matters pertaining to the national security.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: 12/18/53

FROM : H. H. CLEGG

b6  
b7C  
b7DSUBJECT: ~~DELINQUENCIES OBSERVED IN THE HANDLING  
AND SUPERVISION OF INVESTIGATION GROWING  
OUT OF INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM [REDACTED]~~

ADD/KSP  
9-24-93  
ALL INFO REMAINS  
CLASS PER [REDACTED]  
9-25-91  
1565-SDP  
04CR  
b6  
b7C  
b7D  
Ladd  
Nichols  
Belmont  
Clegg  
Glavin  
Harbo  
Rosen  
Tracy  
Gearty  
Mohr  
Winterrowd  
Tele. Room  
Holloman  
Gandy

An analysis of the files at the Seat of Government relating to information received from [REDACTED] and an analysis of New York files by Inspector Brown has brought forth the following delinquencies, which are chargeable to Mr. A. H. Belmont during his period of duty as ASAC at New York, (7/8/44 - 2/27/50), and since his assuming charge of the Domestic Intelligence Division, 2/27/50.

The following delinquencies occurred while Mr. Belmont was ASAC at New York:

- (1) "[REDACTED], was.  
ESPIONAGE - R"

b6  
b7C  
b7DDelinquency:

Delay in opening of investigation in New York from 12/31/48 to 5/31/49; four months before first report submitted; three additional months before submission of second report.

Explanation:

Mr. Belmont advised he has no personal recollection of this case and the three which follow. He cites a shortage of personnel and numerous specials during the pertinent period at New York.

- (2) "UNKNOWN SUBJECT, was. [REDACTED]  
ESPIONAGE - R"

b6  
b7C  
b7DDelinquency:

Delay in opening case in New York from 1/7/48 to 2/16/48.  
Delay in submission of reports 2/16/48 to 6/2/49 and 6/2/49 to 10/28/49.

Explanation:b6  
b7C

See #1 above.

67-94639-3360

SEARCHED  
SERIALIZED  
INDEXED  
JAN 11 1954  
FBI - NEW YORK

SECRET

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- (3) "UNKNOWN SUBJECT, was. [REDACTED]  
ESPIONAGE - R"

Delinquency:

Case closed 4/10/48 in New York with only minimum investigation that office. Delay in re-opening case 4/20/48 to 5/5/48. Delay in submitting report until 4/27/49.

Explanation:

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See #1 above.

- (4) "UNKNOWN SUBJECT, was. [REDACTED]  
ESPIONAGE - R"

Delinquency:

Case was opened 1/8/48 in New York and reports submitted 4/26/49, 10/5/49 and 12/30/49.

Explanation:

See #1 above.

The following delinquencies occurred while Mr. Belmont was in charge of the Domestic Intelligence Division at the Seat of Government:

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- (5) "UNKNOWN SUBJECTS, was. [REDACTED]  
ESPIONAGE - R"

Delinquency:

Case closed 11/24/52 without interviewing [REDACTED]  
previously [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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Explanation:

Mr. Belmont is of the opinion it is not logical to expect positive results from the [REDACTED] in question. However, he states that since we should "clear the record" whenever possible, these individuals should be interviewed.

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(6) "UNKNOWN SUBJECT. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED], INTERNAL SECURITY - R"

Delinquency:

Delay in opening case from 8/30/50 to 10/4/50. Use of informant's name in title of case.

Explanation:

Mr. Belmont's comments: Information from [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] These facts do not indicate urgent handling and case did not take precedence of many others being handled by the supervisor at the time. Informant's name appeared in title of case to forestall confusion in handling correspondence.

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(7) "UNKNOWN SUBJECT. [REDACTED] ESPIONAGE - R"

Delinquency:

Original information came to Bureau's attention in March 6) 1948. Individual case not opened until 8/13/53. Why was New York not followed more closely between 8/13/53 and 10/20/53 when report received, and why wasn't case opened in March 1948?

Explanation:

Mr. Belmont comments: Better procedure would have been to open case on information originally received in 1948; however, information was being given attention in [REDACTED]. As to following New York, an O-1 form was sent 10/1/53. This is only two days beyond normal forty-five day period, and a report was received 10/20/53.

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(8) "UNKNOWN SUBJECT. was. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Delinquency:

(U) Delay from 5/3/51 to 6/18/51 in transmitting to [REDACTED] request by New York to have [REDACTED] reinterview [REDACTED] re subject. (S)

~~SECRET~~



Explanation:

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Belmont comments: This occurred during a crisis in the [redacted] being a less urgent matter was not handled on a priority basis.

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(9)

[redacted] INTERNAL SECURITY - S"

Delinquency:

Delay 5/22/53 to 8/7/53 in opening case.

(U) Explanation:

Mr. Belmont comments: [redacted]

However, it had to be reviewed for items of interest to the Bureau. It was not of an urgent nature and should properly have been handled by the supervisor as he could fit it into his other work on a "project" basis.

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(10)

" [redacted] INTERNAL SECURITY - R"

Delinquency:

Delay in opening 5/22/53 to 8/3/53.

Explanation:

See #9 above.

(11)

" [redacted] INTERNAL SECURITY - R"

b6  
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b7D

Delinquency:

Delay in opening 5/22/53 to 8/11/53.

Explanation:

See #9 above.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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b7D

(12) "   
INTERNAL SECURITY - R"

Delinquency:

Delay in opening 5/22/53 to 8/6/53.

Explanation:

See #9 above.

b6  
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Recommendation:

Mr. Belmont received administrative action in connection with the handling of  however, it is recommended that a further letter be sent to Mr. Belmont calling his attention to the delinquencies set out above and reminding him of the necessity of the prompt and thorough handling of all espionage cases.

~~SECRET~~

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UNKNOWN SUBJECT: was:

ESPIONAGE - R

~~SECRET~~

New York File 65-14743  
Bureau File 65-57859

Inspector Brown: This is a pending case, New York origin,  
and was opened in the New York Office on  
January 2, 1948, on the basis of Bureau  
letter dated December 30, 1947.

Background of Case

Investigation was predicated on the receipt  
of information in 1947 by the Bureau

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Investigation to date has been directed  
at the identification of [redacted] and has been centered  
mainly on the activities of one [redacted]  
presently the principal suspect, who departed from the  
United States in December, 1950, and whose present where-  
abouts are unknown. Efforts are being made to locate [redacted]  
to identify or eliminate [redacted] to develop  
any evidence that [redacted] has at any time engaged in espionage  
activities; and to determine whether any of the individuals  
formerly employed by him are identical with the subjects  
of other related cases originating on the basis of information  
obtained from [redacted], mainly: Unsub, wa: [redacted] New York  
file 65-14741, Bureau file 65-57862; Unsub: wa: [redacted]  
New York file 65-14742, Bureau file 65-57876; Unsubs:  
[redacted] New York file  
65-16059, Bureau file 65-60953.

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New York Inspection  
11/25/53  
TJS:MMR  
4B

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE

memorandum  
w/ dir to Mr. Tolson  
with recommendations  
12/18/53/gm.

Classified by 1565 SDP/KSN  
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

67-94639-336

3-9 Jan

Administrative Handling

~~SECRET~~

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This case, when originally opened on January 2, 1948, was assigned to SA H. V. Kennedy, since resigned. An indices check was made by the New York and Los Angeles Offices and an interview was conducted by the Washington Field Office with one [redacted] who, it had been learned through coverage of the [redacted], had conferred on July 7, 1944, with one [redacted] (phonetic). [redacted] on interview in 1948, was unable to recall [redacted]. The case was then closed by letter to the Bureau dated April 10, 1948.

(U)  
(S)

Additional background information regarding this subject and other unknown subjects received from [redacted] was furnished to the New York Office by Bureau letter dated April 20, 1948, and was followed by Bureau teletype of April 24, 1948, advising that the information in Bureau letter of April 20, 1948, was to be thoroughly reviewed and that investigation based thereon was to be conducted in a most expedite manner. This case was reopened on May 5, 1948, and assigned to SA [redacted]. The first report submitted by the New York Office was the report of SA [redacted] dated April 27, 1949. On June 25, 1951, the case was reassigned to SA [redacted]. Bureau letter dated January 22, 1952, pointed out that the most logical suspect developed to date was [redacted] and instructed the New York Office to immediately institute investigation to locate him and to develop any available evidence proving he had ever been engaged in espionage activities. The New York Office was further instructed to afford this investigation close and careful supervision and to assign sufficient agent personnel thereto to bring it to a logical conclusion at an early date. All offices were instructed to submit a report in this matter within 14 days after receipt of Bureau letter of January 22, 1952, and every 14 days thereafter until advised to the contrary by the Bureau.

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On April 18, 1952, this case was reassigned to SA [redacted]. The first report submitted by him was dated May 15, 1952. Subsequent reports were submitted by SA [redacted] on the following dates: June 12, 1952; August 6, 1952; September 29, 1952; November 6, 1952; December 31, 1952; February 20, 1953; April 29, 1953; June 8, 1953; July 23, 1953; September 17, 1953; and November 6, 1953. In each instance, the number of days elapsing between reports was in excess of 14 days.

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Delinquencies

As noted above, after assignment of the case on May 5, 1948, to SA [redacted], no report was submitted by him until April 27, 1949, reflecting a delay of almost one year and an explanation for this delay is requested.

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Also as noted above, SA [redacted] has failed to comply with Bureau instructions contained in Bureau letter of January 22, 1952, requiring the submission of a report within 14 days after the receipt of Bureau letter and every 14 days thereafter. An explanation is requested.

During the course of the file review in this case, extensive notes have been prepared correlating information in the file and pointing up certain leads upon which emphasis should be placed. These notes have been made available to the office. Every effort should be made to bring this case to a logical conclusion.

Supervisory and Agent Responsibility

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Explanations are requested from the personnel still on the Bureau's roles for the previously noted delinquencies occurring during the periods noted after their names:

Agents

[redacted]

[redacted]

Period of Responsibility for this Case

May 5, 1948 - June 25, 1951

April 18, 1952 - date

Supervisors

R. R. Granville

January 2, 1948 - April 14, 1952 (resigned)

T. J. McAndrews

April 14, 1952 - date

ASAC

A. H. Belmont

January 2, 1948 - February 24, 1950 (Assistant Director)

~~SECRET~~

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William M. Whelan

February 27, 1950 - July 7,  
1953 (now SAC, San Francisco)

A. J. Marchessault

July 9, 1953 - date

SAC

Edward Scheidt

January 2, 1948 - August 25,  
1952 (retired)

L. V. Boardman

August 25, 1952 - date

~~SECRET~~

December 16, 1953

Fr. Whelan:

Re: Unknown Subject, was.

[REDACTED]  
Espionage - R

Unknown Subject, was.

[REDACTED]  
Espionage - R

Unknown Subject, was.

[REDACTED]  
Espionage - R

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I have no independent recollection of the situation pertaining to this particular case at this time. The Agents to whom this case was assigned are capable men well grounded in espionage investigations. The two Supervisors charged with supervision of this case I consider to be very capable and conscientious men. There were delays in the investigation and reporting of some of these cases because of the pressure of other cases we considered more important and due to the volume of work for the men available.

The Korean war and the incident change in Bureau policy on security cases and the volume of other types of work such as applicant, Selective Service and deserter cases substantially increased the work of the New York Office. It was not possible for the Bureau to furnish more men for many months. In the Espionage Section of the office we had to place increased emphasis on the Russian National Program and handle many major cases that required the attention of practically all men available. Included in such cases was the Gold case, the Erdtman case, the Rosenberg case, the Ponger case, the Lattimore case, the McCabe and many others.

It is not possible now to detail what happened in each case that had to be slighted. During part of this time we were working a 6-day week and during all of this time the men were averaging a substantial amount of voluntary overtime. I wish we could had done more.

This case did receive very considerable investigative attention. I trust that with additional attention it might be solved. I regret that it could not have received more attention sooner.

December 8, 1953

Mr. Belmont:

Re: [redacted] Subjects, with aliases;

    Espionage - R

    [redacted] Subject, with aliases;

    Espionage - R

    [redacted] Subject, with aliases;

    Espionage - R

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These three cases were outgrowths of information furnished by [redacted]. I am questioned concerning the delays in handling the cases from their inception until February, 1953. I do not have a personal recollection of any of these cases. I do know that during the pertinent period we had a shortage of personnel in the New York Office and we were trying desperately to handle the most urgent matters first. During this period we had such specials as the Kiss case, the Judith Coplon case, the Intorg case, and others, and the Agents on the Espionage Squad were overassigned. I recall that we held periodic and frequent conferences in an attempt to devise means of speeding up our investigations and reports in espionage cases. I felt then and I still feel that it would have been most desirable to handle all espionage cases on a "special" basis but we simply could not do so.



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[redacted] Was  
ESPIONAGE ~ R  
BUREAU FILE 65-58363  
NEW YORK FILE 65-15037

INSPECTOR BROWN: This is a closed case in which  
New York was Office of Origin.

Background of Case

Investigation in this matter was  
based upon information received from [redacted]

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Investigation subsequently conducted

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NEW YORK INSPECTION  
November 25, 1953  
CHD:PJM  
4B

*memorandum  
my copy from Tolson  
with recommendations  
11/18/53/jm.*

65-58363-334  
ENCLOSURE  
ENCLOSURE

Administrative Handling

The New York Office opened this case on May 31, 1949 on the basis of Bureau letter to New York dated December 30, 1948, which was received at New York on December 31, 1948, and case was assigned to SA Francis X. Plant. This case was re-assigned to SA Robert W. Coholan on or about May 5, 1950. This case was closed by New York letter to the Bureau dated September 25, 1951. The case was subsequently re-opened on November 14, 1951 and assigned to SA Robert W. Coholan on the basis of Bureau letter to New York dated October 27, 1951. The case was subsequently closed by New York letter to the Bureau dated March 3, 1952.

Delinquencies--Delays

This case was opened in the New York Office on May 31, 1949 on the basis of Bureau letter to New York dated December 30, 1948, which was received at New York on December 31, 1948. Explanation is requested regarding the delay of five months in opening this case in the New York Office.

This case was assigned to SA Francis X. Plant, on May 31, 1949; and pending reports, written by SA Plant, were submitted subsequently under dates of October 5, 1949 (4 months interval); January 4, 1950 (3 months interval); and April 6, 1950 (3 months interval).

Case was re-assigned to SA R. W. Coholan on or about May 5, 1950, and pending reports were subsequently submitted by SA Coholan under dates of September 5, 1950 (5 months interval); November 13, 1950 (2 months interval); February 7, 1951 (about 3 months interval); and May 10, 1951 (3 months interval). Case was closed by New York letter to Bureau dated September 25, 1951 (4½ months interval). Explanations for the aforementioned delays in reporting are requested.

This case was re-opened and re-assigned to SA Robert W. Coholan November 14, 1951 on the basis of Bureau letter to New York dated October 27, 1951, which was received at New York on October 30, 1951, which reflects a delay of fourteen days in re-opening this case. Explanation is requested for this delay in reopening the case.

Responsibilities for Delinquencies

Explanations are requested from the personnel still on the Bureau's rolls for the investigative and supervisory handling of this case for the periods noted after their names:

Agents

Period of Responsibility

Francis X. Plant  
Robert W. Coholan

5/31/49 - - 5/5/50 (Resigned)  
5/5/50 - - 3/3/52

Supervisors

R. R. Granville (Resigned) 12/31/48 - 3/3/52

ASAC

A. H. Belmont (Asst. Director) 12/31/48 - 2/24/50  
William M. Whelan (SAC, San Francisco) 2/27/50 - 3/3/52

SAC

Edward Scheidt (Retired) 12/31/48 - 3/3/52.

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December 16, 1953

Mr. Whelan:

Re:

[REDACTED]  
Espionage - R

was.

I don't have any independent recollection of Plant's and Coholan's other assignments at that time. This case was reported and investigated continuously over a long period of time. There were many other cases handled too that were very important. I regret that we didn't do more sooner.

December 8, 1953

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Mr. Belmont:

Re:

[REDACTED]

with aliases

Espionage - R

The Inspector desires an explanation for the delay in opening and handling this case from December 31, 1948 to February, 1950.

I do not have a personal recollection of this case. However, I do know that during the pertinent period we had a shortage of personnel in the New York Office and we were trying desperately to handle the most urgent matters first. During this period, we had such specials as the Hiss case, the Judith Coplon case, the Antorg case and others, and the Agents on the Espionage Squad were overassigned. I recall that we held periodic and frequent conferences in an attempt to devise means of speeding up our investigations and reports in espionage cases. I felt then and I still feel that it would have been most desirable to handle all espionage cases on a "special" basis but we simply could not do so.

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

was;

ESPIONAGE - R  
(Bureau file 65-58363)  
(New York file 65-15037)

**TRAINING AND INSPECTION DIVISION:** By letter dated 12/30/48,  
the Bureau advised the  
New York Office of the  
information in possession of the Bureau concerning the above-  
captioned individual.

Under date of 10/5/49, the New York Office submitted a  
report of SA Francis X. Plant, which was the first report submitted  
in the case. The earliest date in the investigative period is  
5/23/49, and the last date was 9/28/49. SA Plant has resigned  
since that date. There is no indication in the files that the  
Bureau followed New York between the periods 12/30/48 and 10/5/49.

Under date of 1/6/50, New York Office submitted a report  
of SA Plant which sets forth leads for several offices including  
New York. On 8/8/50, the Bureau requested New York to advise  
when a report would be submitted. Under date of 9/5/50, New York  
Office submitted a report of SA Robert W. Coholan, which was the  
first report submitted by the New York Office since 1/6/50. The  
case was supervised by SA Emory H. Gregg.

1. The explanation of the New York Office is requested  
as to why the initial report on this case was not submitted before  
10/5/49.
2. The comments of SA Gregg are requested as to why this  
case was not followed with New York during the period from 12/30/48  
to 10/5/49.
3. The comments of SA Robert W. Coholan of the New York  
Office are requested as to why there was a delay of nearly five  
months in submitting an investigative report.

9-25-91

~~1565 SDP/KSR~~

*memorandum  
on 11/13/53  
re: New York  
recommendations*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FHS:dmb  
11/13/53

cc: Inspector H.C. Brown

DECLASSIFIED

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SPECIAL AGENT E. H. GREGG:

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On April 20, 1948, the Bureau sent to the New York and other offices a Photostat of the report setting forth the results of the reinterview of [ ] conducted at the request of the FBI which had been received from the Intelligence Division of the U. S. Army on April 6, 1948. It was noted that further comment and the results of a more complete check of Bureau references concerning the various individuals mentioned in the attached report (including [ ]) could be forwarded to the interested offices. In the meantime, it was requested that the information be carefully reviewed and that pertinent comment regarding the possible identity of the individuals therein mentioned be submitted to the Bureau. This matter was followed in the [ ] case and by letter dated May 17, 1948, the New York Office advised that the New York files were being reviewed concerning [ ] and others involved in the [ ]

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(U) A complete review of Bureau files was made and by memorandum dated December 30, 1948, a correlated review of all available information identifiable with [ ] was forwarded to the New York Office for its information. (65-58863-1) Copies of this summary were also disseminated to other agencies, [ ]

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as official records indicated that [ ] had departed the United States on March 3, 1939. [ ] inasmuch (S)

Pending completion of the many file reviews relating to the [ ] by the New York Office and submission by that office of a summary of information concerning [ ] which would identify him with the [ ] and serve as basis for investigation, a report summarizing information in 144 files concerning [ ] as well as that made available thru review of Bureau files, was submitted by the New York Office, on the basis of which a separate investigative case on [ ] was opened.

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ASSISTANT DIRECTOR A. H. BELMONT

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The handling of this matter by New York was primarily a research problem. The subject had returned to Russia in 1939 or 1940. Mr. Gregg points out a case was not opened until receipt of the October 5, 1949, report from New York, which sets out leads for further checking. Since this file was not opened until receipt of the October report, New York was not followed in this case. It appears that no administrative action is indicated.

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RE: UNKNOWN SUBJECT. was.

ESPIONAGE - R  
(Bufile 65-57862)  
(New York file 65-14741)

TRAINING AND INSPECTION DIVISION:

Bureau letter to New York  
6-9-50, furnished New York  
information received from

[redacted] New York  
had deferred further action pending receipt of this information. A letter was thereafter received by the Bureau from New York dated 6-19-50, advising report would be delayed, that the agent [redacted] to whom case was assigned, was engaged in the investigation of another espionage subject, Joseph Barnes. Bulet to New York 8-8-50, followed the New York Office. A reply received 8-11 from New York indicated there would be a further delay because agent to whom case assigned was investigating Vivian Glassman, principal subject in Rosenberg and Gold espionage ring. The Bureau again followed on 9-15, and a reply received from New York 9-18 advised that a report would be submitted on 10-6-50. A further letter was received from New York on 10-10-50, advising a report was being mimeographed. A report was submitted by New York dated 10-16-50, by SA [redacted]

It is noted that a 1½ page report dated 11-4-52, at New York, which was submitted by SA [redacted] (A), was received by the Espionage Section at the SOG on 11-10-52, and returned to New York on 11-17-52, for corrections, among which were (a) Report stated "photographs of possible suspects who arrived in West Coast ports during period 5-20-41 to 1951, etc." should have reflected the period as being from "5-1-41 to 6-15-41." (b) Name of informant, [redacted] was misspelled in report as [redacted] was reflected in report as head of the [redacted] Report should have said head of [redacted]"

It is noted from the above that it took over four months for New York to submit a report. SA [redacted] of the New York Office, as well as the supervisory personnel of the New York Office, appear to be responsible. It further appears SA [redacted] (A), New York, as well as the field supervisor, was responsible for not catching the inaccuracies reflected in the report of 11-4-52. It is recommended this matter be furnished to Inspector B. C. Brown for his consideration in connection with the current inspection of the New York Office.

JEE:jaw  
11-13-53  
cc Inspector B.C. Brown at New York

Declassify on OADR

9-25-91 1565 SDP/105E  
memorandum  
Mr. [redacted] to Mr. Tolson  
12/18/88 - Jm  
with recommendations  
2-8  
3-9-88  
1-14-89

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DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)  
DATE 09-22-2010

~~SECRET~~

Best Copy Available

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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FILED IN [REDACTED] - 12  
(Profile 100-22151)

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(U)

[REDACTED] was not furnished to [REDACTED] with instructions to investigate until August 6, 1953. (Supervisor [REDACTED] cc New York to check indices and the records. You are requested to advise why it is of approximate 24 months before instituting a field investigation in this matter. You are also requested to submit your recommendation for administrative action.

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SUPERVISOR [REDACTED]

(U)

1565 SDP/11/SP  
9-25-91

It was started into the Espionage Section on May 20, 1953.

(U)

[REDACTED] was initiated by Supervisor [REDACTED]. It appeared from this initial review that the interrogation report was a restatement of information already in possession of the Bureau. There was no indication for the necessity of other than normal handling.

However, in order to be certain that the report did not contain any information not previously reported to the Bureau concerning intelligence operations in the United States and elsewhere in which the Bureau had an interest, a systematic, thorough, detailed and exhaustive review was undertaken.

(U)

In cross-checking the voluminous information appearing in the [REDACTED] against Bureau files it was necessary to obtain search slips on numerous names mentioned, resulting in many files having to be called and reviewed. It was also necessary to Photostat pertinent pages of the report which were furnished to the field, all of which obviously took considerable time.

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JEE:jaw  
11/13/53

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SUPERVISOR [ ] (continued):

- (U) It should be noted that instant case was not the only one to be opened or on which action had to be taken as a result of this review. Correspondence was had with [ ] and cases were opened in June and July as the review progressed.

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Furthermore, during this period of time a normal flow of work on the desk of Supervisor [ ] was being handled, as well as any special items that arose.

It should be further noted that Supervisor [ ] went on regularly-scheduled annual leave on July 6, 1953, and returned to work on July 27, 1953. In view of the fact there was no urgency indicated in the review of the interrogation report, it was not believed necessary to re-schedule this annual leave.

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ASSISTANT DIRECTOR A. H. JELMONT:

(U)

[ ] He had previously reviewed and taken action on information which he had recalled when interviewed by representatives of the Bureau in 1948.

(U)

[ ] It did have to be reviewed for items of interest to the Bureau. It was not of an urgent nature, since it was old information, and it should properly have been handled by Supervisor [ ] as he could fit it in with his other work on a "project" basis. In reviewing this situation, it has been noted that [ ] failed to list this material as a project on his weekly delinquency reports, which he should have done.

ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the failure of Supervisor [ ] to list as a project the [ ] which he was reviewing be called to his attention in connection with a letter of censure which has been recommended be sent to [ ] with regard to the [ ] case proper.

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DATE 09-22-2010

~~INTERNAL SECURITY - R~~

(Bufile 105-24170)

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TRAINING AND INSPECTION DIVISION

(U)

[redacted] was not furnished to Washington field office until August 7, 1953. (Supervisor [redacted] copy New York to check indices and INS records. You are instructed to advise why it took approximately two and one-half months before a field investigation was instituted in this matter. You are also requested to submit your recommendation for administrative action. 9-25-91 (S) 1565 SDP/LSO

SUPERVISOR [redacted]

(S)

[redacted] stamped into the Espionage Section on May 26, 1953. (S)

(U)

[redacted] was initiated by Supervisor [redacted]. It appeared from this initial review that the interrogation report was a restatement of information already in possession of the Bureau. There was no indication for the necessity of other than normal handling.

However, in order to be certain that the report did not contain any information not previously reported to the Bureau concerning intelligence operations in the United States and elsewhere in which the Bureau had an interest, a systematic, thorough, detailed and exhaustive review was undertaken.

(U)

In cross-checking the voluminous information appearing in the [redacted] against Bureau files, it was necessary to obtain search slips on numerous names mentioned, resulting in many files having to be called and reviewed. It was also necessary to Photostat pertinent pages of the report which were furnished to the field, all of which obviously took considerable time.

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JEE:jaw  
11/13/53

ENCLOSURE  
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SUPERVISOR [REDACTED] (continued):

- (U) It should be noted that instant case was not the only one to be opened or on which action had to be taken as a result of this review. Correspondence was had with [REDACTED] (S) and cases were opened in June and July as the review progressed.

Furthermore, during this period of time a normal flow of work on the desk of Supervisor [REDACTED] was being handled, as well as any special items that arose.

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It should be further noted that Supervisor [REDACTED] went on regularly-scheduled annual leave on July 6, 1953, and returned to work on July 27, 1953. In view of the fact there was no urgency indicated in the review of the interrogation report, it was not believed necessary to re-schedule this annual leave.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR A. H. BELMONT:

(U)

[REDACTED] We had previously reviewed and taken action on information which he had recalled when interviewed by representatives of the Bureau in 1948. (S)

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(U)

[REDACTED] It did have to be reviewed for items of interest to the Bureau. It was not of an urgent nature, since it was old information, and it should properly have been handled by Supervisor [REDACTED] as he could fit it in with his other work on a "project" basis. In reviewing this situation, it has been noted that [REDACTED] failed to list this material as a project on his weekly delinquency reports, which he should have done. (S)

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ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION:

(U)

In the case entitled, [REDACTED] Internal Security - R. It has been recommended that the failure of Supervisor [REDACTED] to list the [REDACTED] as a project be called to his attention in connection with a letter of censure which has been recommended be sent [REDACTED] in the [REDACTED] case proper. (S)

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DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)  
DATE 09-22-2010

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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~~SECRET~~  
[REDACTED]  
INTERNAL SECURITY - R  
(Bufile 105-24210)

(U) TRAINING AND INFORMATION DIVISION [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was not furnished (S)  
to WFO with instructions to investigate until August 11, 1953,  
(Supervisor [REDACTED]), go to New York to check indices and  
INS records. You are instructed to advise why it took approximately  
two and one-half months before instituting a field investigation  
in this matter. You are also requested to submit your recommen-  
dation for administrative action. (U) (S)

9-25-91 1565 SDP/MSD

SUPERVISOR [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED] It was  
stamped into the Espionage Section on May 26, 1953. (S)

(S) [REDACTED] was initiated  
by Supervisor [REDACTED]. It appeared from this initial review (S)  
that the interrogation report was a restatement of information  
already in possession of the Bureau. There was no indication  
for the necessity of other than normal handling.

However, in order to be certain that the report did not  
contain any information not previously reported to the Bureau con-  
cerning intelligence operations in the United States and elsewhere  
in which the Bureau had an interest, a systematic, thorough,  
detailed and exhaustive review was undertaken.

(U) In cross-checking the voluminous information appearing  
in the [REDACTED] against Bureau files, it was necessary to (S)  
obtain search slips on numerous names mentioned, resulting in many  
files having to be called and reviewed. It was also necessary  
to Photostat pertinent pages of the report which were furnished  
to the field, all of which obviously took considerable time.

JEE:jaw  
11/13/53

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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SUPERVISOR [REDACTED] (continued):

- (U) It should be noted that instant case was not the only one to be opened or on which action had to be taken as a result of this review. Correspondence was had with [REDACTED] and cases were opened in June and July as the review progressed. (S)

Furthermore, during this period of time a normal flow of work on the desk of Supervisor [REDACTED] was being handled, as well as any special items that arose.

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It should be further noted that Supervisor [REDACTED] went on regularly-scheduled annual leave on July 6, 1953, and returned to work on July 27, 1953. In view of the fact there was no urgency indicated in the review of the interrogation report, it was not believed necessary to re-schedule this annual leave.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR A. H. BELMONT:

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- (U) [REDACTED] We had previously reviewed and taken action on information which he had recalled when interviewed by representatives of the Bureau in 1948. (S)

- (U) [REDACTED] It did have to be reviewed for items of interest to the Bureau. It was not of an urgent nature, since it was old information, and it should properly have been handled by Supervisor [REDACTED] as he could fit it in with his other work on a "project" basis. In reviewing this situation, it has been noted that [REDACTED] failed to list this material as a project on his weekly delinquency reports, which he should have done. (S)

ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION:

- (U) In the case entitled, [REDACTED] Internal Security - R, it has been recommended that the failure of Supervisor [REDACTED] to list the [REDACTED] as a project be called to his attention in connection with a letter of censure which has been recommended be sent to [REDACTED] in the [REDACTED] case proper. (S)

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AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE Z5X(1)  
DATE 09-22-2010

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UNKNOWN SUBJECT, wa: [redacted]  
ESPIONAGE - R (Information  
furnished by [redacted]  
Bufile 65-57862  
NY 65-14741

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Inspector Brown:

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This is a pending case, assigned to SA [redacted]  
who is supervised by SA T. G. McAndrews under ASAC A. J. Marchessault. New  
York is origin.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE

Delays

The case was ordered opened in the New York Office on 2/16/48,  
on the basis of a letter dated 12/31/47, received from the Bureau 1/7/48.  
A delay of over a month in opening the case is apparent. The first report  
from the New York Office was dated 3/15/49, by SA [redacted]. The  
case write-up prepared on 6/2/49, during the self-inspection by former SAC  
Schmidt, called attention to delays in this case. Former Supervisor R. R.  
Granville, who supervised the case until his resignation on 4/14/52, stated  
the case would receive preferred and expeditious attention. It was necessary,  
however, for the Bureau to follow the New York Office on the case on  
10/28/49.

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On 6/9/50, the Bureau furnished New York with information obtained  
[redacted] which supplemented information previously  
obtained by that organization concerning the subject. This was  
incorporated in New York report by SA [redacted] dated 10/16/50. An explanation  
for this delayed reporting is requested of SA [redacted].

(S) (U)

Background of Case

This case is based upon information furnished by [redacted]

[redacted] while acting as an undercover agent for the  
[redacted]. The first information from [redacted] furnished  
New York Office by Bufile 12/31/47 stated that [redacted]

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[redacted] Both the  
word "planned" and the date "1941" may be of significance, in view of the  
lack of success to date in identifying [redacted]

New York Inspection  
11/24/53  
RCB:AMF  
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Classified by 1565 SDP/1152  
Declassify on: OADR

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67-94637-336  
ENCLOSURE



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Upon reinterview by the Intelligence Division of the United States Army in February, 1948, [ ] is reported to have stated that [ ] by profession, and had been [ ] for dispatch to [ ] but went to the United States first, instead. [ ] obtained a visa at the [ ] arriving in [ ]. Once in the United States [ ] contacted [ ] (code name), a naturalized United States citizen living in New York City, who was [ ] [ ] stated he would be able to identify a photograph of [ ].

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Through an interview of [ ] apparently also in 1948, the Bureau was advised that [ ] was recruited early in 1941; that he went to [ ] to get his United States visa; and that he then left for the [ ]

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(S) (U)

Discrepancies in Dates and  
Wording of Interviews

By letter 5/16/48 Los Angeles called to the attention of the Bureau, New York, San Francisco and Washington Field Offices the discrepancy between the reported dates of [ ] recruitment, i.e. 1941 or 1942, and suggested that San Francisco examine all entries into the [ ] during the period February to June, 1942 and that Washington Field Office consider examining [ ] during the same period.

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In determining future action in this case, careful attention should be afforded the results of the various interviews with [ ]. The first interview apparently merely indicated that a residency known as [ ] was planned. Two subsequent interviews indicated that the plans were executed, at least to the point of putting [ ] in the United States and in touch with [ ]. As a result of still another interview by a Bureau representative in October and November, 1948, however, (Bulet to New York 8/11/49) [ ] evidently was not so specific and insisted that he had no knowledge whatsoever as to the manner [ ] would be contacted in America or the identity of the individual who would make the contact. This apparently contradicts information previously furnished by [ ] concerning [ ] rendezvous in the United States with [ ].

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Investigation to date has been guided by the earlier interviews in which [ ] reportedly used the past tense as to [ ] whereas it appears likely that [ ] was recalling plans only, and may have no definite knowledge of execution of the [ ]

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departure from [redacted], prior to [redacted]. If [redacted] actually was not recruited until early [redacted] would not have been in [redacted] to know what happened [redacted]. From all information available, it appears that [redacted] probably was recruited early in [redacted].

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Lead Number 1

New York should request a further detailed interview with [redacted] to clarify the discrepancies noted above, particularly as to the dates and as to whether [redacted] ever had any personal knowledge of [redacted] left [redacted].

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Checking of Ships' Manifests

San Francisco on 7/19/48 advised that manifests of all ships arriving in San Francisco from ports of China, Japan, Russia and the Philippines were reviewed for the period October, 1940 to August, 1942, resulting in locating the name of one individual who might be identical with [redacted] and of three individuals, one of whom might be [redacted] was unable to identify photographs of any of these.

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Washington Field Office obtained a list of persons obtaining visas [redacted] although the State Department advised the list was incomplete due to partial destruction of records. Leads from this source have been negative.

San Diego, Los Angeles, Portland and San Francisco also have furnished lists of possible suspects from ship manifests covering varying periods in 1941, looking toward the identification of both [redacted] and [redacted] who recruited [redacted] and who was supposed to have come to the United States sometime between February 1941 and June, 1942. Results have been negative.

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It appears that as to [redacted], efforts of all west coast offices to identify [redacted] from ships' manifests have been concentrated on ships arriving at west coast ports between April and July, 1941, although Seattle, San Diego, Los Angeles and San Francisco offices have covered the period through December, 1941. It appears from the New York file (Serial 57), that the Portland Office considered the arrivals only between April and July, 1941, leaving the balance of 1941 unchecked. In connection with the [redacted] case, each office has indicated that it attempted to identify both [redacted].

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Lead Number 2

New York should determine whether Portland Office has examined the manifests of Trans-Pacific ships arriving at Portland from February through December, 1941. Consideration should be given to having west coast ports other than San Francisco extend the period of their coverage of manifests to include at least the first eight months of 1942, on the theory that travelers such as [ ] and [ ], whose exact departure date, travel route and schedules are unknown to [ ], may have been delayed indefinitely enroute to the United States. -

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(U) In other words, it appears that entirely too much reliance has been placed upon the estimate of [ ]

[ ] Based upon information of [ ] that [ ] left [ ] efforts have been concentrated on identifying entries into the west coast ports particularly during the period May 1 to June 15, 1941. This may be entirely too narrow a period since there are many unknowns involved in the calculation. It is noted that [ ] and apparently did not return there before defecting. Hence, he may not have been in a position to follow the movements of [ ] or others after that date from reports or otherwise.

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Lead Number 3

Dependent upon the results of the subsequent interviews with [ ] New York should consider the advisability of following through on the project of identifying employees of [ ] thought possibly to be identical with [ ] Albany Office, in November and December, 1949, furnished New York the names of employees in companies controlled by [ ] in 1946, but apparently no investigation has been conducted to determine if any of these employees might have information to indicate that [ ] is [ ] or to obtain from present employees the names of former employees who might be identical with [ ] or who might have information concerning [ ].

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Lead Number 4

In the event [ ], who may be identical with [ ], is not eliminated definitely, employees of [ ] companies should be checked to develop suspects who may be identical with [ ] or who may have information leading to his identification.

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Lead Number 5

Names of individuals most closely resembling descriptions of [ ] and [ ] who arrived at San Francisco between February and December, 1941 were furnished Washington Field Office, which office obtained photographs on all except: [ ]

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[ ] The file does not reflect that any effort has been made to locate these individuals or to obtain photographs to exhibit to [ ]. Consideration should be given to following through on this matter.

Lack of Thorough, Vigorous Investigation and Supervision

The Bureau instructed New York by letter 6/25/52 to completely and thoroughly review the file and advise the Bureau what investigation remains to bring the case to a logical conclusion at an early date and to include recommendations as to advisability of closing the investigation based upon the findings after review.

By letter 9/10/52, the New York Office advised the Bureau that all logical leads to identify [ ] had been exhausted. It is apparent from the foregoing analysis, however, that numerous leads were and are outstanding. The foregoing letter, and a closing report in this case dated at New York 12/9/52, reflecting one day, 10/29/52, in the period for which made, were written by SA John E. Foley.

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The Bureau by letter 12/16/52 called attention to a suspect, [ ], whose photograph [ ] was unable to identify as [ ] but who appeared to be a good suspect because of his contact with a known double agent; and other points resembling [ ] activities. The New York file was reopened on 12/31/52 and investigation since that date has been directed toward an interview with [ ] which was finally conducted on 6/4/53 and the following of a lead on one [ ], mentioned by [ ] as assisting him in [ ]

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It is apparent that investigation has been based largely upon indefinite and contradictory information from [ ] which has not yet been resolved although [ ] has been available for reinterview. Investigation has been confined principally to two avenues: (1) identifying [ ] from photographs of passengers entering west coast ports; and (2) identifying [ ] from among employees of [ ]. In neither of these avenues, have the possibilities been exhausted or the investigation completed. Following the reinterview with [ ] to clarify specific points raised, the case should be pushed vigorously to a logical conclusion.

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Correlation with Collateral Cases

In the future handling of this case, the attention of all personnel concerned should be directed to the inter-relationship of the following cases originating with [redacted] information: Unsub, wa: [redacted], Bufile 65-57862, New York 65-14741; Unsub, wa: [redacted] Bufile 65-57876, New York 65-14742; Unsubs, [redacted] Bufile 65-60953, New York 65-16059; and Unsub, wa: [redacted] Bufile 65-57859, New York 65-14743. The subjects of the first three cases were allegedly instructed to make contact with [redacted] after their arrival in the United States, and the identification of any one of these subjects, or of Faraday, will have an important bearing on the course of any future investigation in each of these cases. The closest correlation will be necessary.

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Responsibility For Delinquencies

Explanations are requested from the personnel still on the Bureau's rolls for the handling of this case for the periods noted after their names:

Agents

H. V. Kennedy

[redacted]

[redacted]

John E. Foley

[redacted]

Period of Responsibility For This Case

1/9/48 - 5/10/48 (resigned)

5/10/48-6/25/51

6/25/51 - 4/22/52

4/22/51 - 3/9/53

3/9/53 - date

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Supervisors

R. R. Granville

T. J. McAndrews

1/5/48 - 4/14/52 (resigned)

4/14/52 - date

ASAC

A. H. Belmont

Wm. M. Whelan

1/5/48 - 2/24/50 (Asst. Director)

2/27/50 - 7/7/53 (now SAC, San Francisco)

A. J. Marchessault

7/9/53 - date

SAC

Edward Scheidt

L. V. Boardman

1/5/48 - 8/25/52 (retired)

8/25/52 - date

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EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)  
DATE 09-22-2010

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UNKNOWN SUBJECT, was:

[REDACTED]

ESPIONAGE - R

New York File 65-14742

Bureau File 65-57876

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INSPECTOR BROWN: This case was opened in the New York Office January 8, 1948, and was closed September 23, 1952. It was placed in a pending inactive status April 2, 1951, and may have remained in that status until closed, although the case was posted several times thereafter. Agents to whom the case was assigned during the period it was pending are identified later herein. New York was origin throughout the investigation.

#### Background of Case

(S) This case is based upon information furnished to the Intelligence Division of the Army [REDACTED] and the Bureau by [REDACTED], named by himself as [REDACTED]

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while acting as [REDACTED]

The information furnished by [REDACTED] follows.

[REDACTED] decided that inasmuch as the illegal resident agent [REDACTED] was then an old man, it would be necessary to arrange for a new man to take over his responsibilities in the United States. For this purpose, [REDACTED] (true name) was sent to [REDACTED] where he was

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New York Inspection  
November 30, 1953  
FGJ:CC  
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE

Classified by 1565 SDP/KCS  
Declassify on: OADR

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12/18/50 with recommendation/jm  
12/18/50 with recommendation/jm

ENCLOSURE

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residing in [ ] for the purpose of studying the [ ] languages and preparing his cover biography.

In [ ] in February of 1941, [ ] recruited the agent subsequently known by the code name of [ ], who presumably entered the [ ] in 1941 for the purpose of setting up a network in the United States and Canada. Also in [ ] in the very early part of 1941, [ ] enrolled in the [ ] [ ] who, with but the slightest of training, were dispatched to [ ] in New York in March of 1941. It was contemplated that in his cover identity [ ] would assume a distant relationship to these [ ] upon his arrival in New York.

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According to [ ] had been instructed to wait for [ ] and upon the latter's arrival to establish him as a distant relative and train him as [ ] for the ultimate purpose of establishing him as the [ ] (technological) [ ], in the New York area. It was contemplated that in the United States [ ] would be associated with [ ] in the [ ] business in New York City.

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Although it was planned that [ ] would leave for the United States in the summer of 1941, he was still in [ ] when [ ] in May of that year. In [ ] met him personally and came to know [ ] well. [ ] feels quite certain the [ ] would [ ] and is quite certain he can recognize a photograph of him.

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[ ] stated that [ ] had graduated from [ ] and was a [ ]. He described him as being clever and cunning, adventurous, quick in making decisions and as having a good imagination and a love for

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[redacted] He said that [redacted] was fond of good living and that he would assume a cover as a [redacted] choosing [redacted] cover name for his entry into the United States. (

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Unsuccessful investigation has been conducted to date for the purpose of identifying and locating the Unknown Subject. Most of this investigation has been conducted outside the territory of the New York Office, and has involved checking arrival manifests on the West Coast to develop logical suspects. The case was closed in September, 1952 on the theory that all logical leads had been covered, it being noted also that [redacted] could not state definitely that Unsub [redacted] ever actually came to the United States.

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#### Delinquencies

This case was opened January 8, 1948. Thereafter, pending reports were submitted by the New York Office on April 26, 1949, October 5, 1949, December 30, 1949, March 13, 1950, July 27, 1950, and October 25, 1950, all by SA [redacted]. On April 2, 1951, the case was made pending inactive. The next report was a pending report by SA [redacted] dated February 4, 1952, and the last New York report was dated September 23, 1952, a closing report by SA Edmund Flanagan. Explanations are requested for these reporting delays.

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Close supervision of this case by the New York Office appears to have been lacking throughout. In addition to reporting delays, the Bureau frequently had to remind the New York Office by O-1 form that the case was delinquent; other offices were not followed within a reasonable period to require coverage of outstanding leads; and the Bureau on at least one occasion found it necessary to request the New York Office to review the file for coverage of leads and to determine if other leads were available so the case could be brought to a logical conclusion. There is no indication in the New York file that a lead for San

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See  
65-5786-39  
is covered!!  
from

Diego to check arrival manifests for logical suspects, set out in New York report dated October 25, 1950, has ever been covered. Closer supervision of these matters by the office of origin could probably have brought this case to a logical conclusion in a much shorter period of time. Explanations are requested.

Suggested Leads

In connection with the inspection review of this case some leads were discovered involving the re-opening and further investigation of the case. These leads have been submitted to the SAC for his consideration by memo to the case file.

Agent and Supervisory Responsibility

During the period this case was under investigation in the New York Office, January 8, 1948, to September 23, 1952, responsibility for the investigation and supervision thereof was allocated as follows. Explanations for the handling of this case are requested from the personnel still on the Bureau's rolls.

Agents

H.V. Kennedy	January 8, 1948 - April, 1948 (resigned)
F.X. Plant	April, 1948 - August, 1948 (resigned)
<div data-bbox="334 1288 671 1331" style="border: 1px solid black; width: 219px; height: 22px;"></div>	August, 1948 - August, 1951
<div data-bbox="334 1381 585 1425" style="border: 1px solid black; width: 163px; height: 22px;"></div>	August, 1951 - April 22, 1952
Edmund Flanagan	April 22, 1952 - September 23, 1952

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Supervisors (Section 6)

Robert R. Granville	January 8, 1948 - April 14, 1952 (resigned)
Thomas J. McAndrews	April 14, 1952 - September 23, 1952

ASACs

A.H. Belmont	January 8, 1948 - February 24, 1950 (Assistant Director)
William M. Whelan	February 27, 1950 - September 23, 1952 (SAC, S.F.)

SACs

Edward Scheidt	January 8, 1948 - August 25, 1952 (retired)
L.V. Boardman	August 25, 1952 - September 23, 1952

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SAC, NY (65-14742)

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11/30/53

Inspector B.C. BROWN

UNSUB: was: [REDACTED]

ESPIONAGE - R

In connection with the inspection review of the captioned case, the following leads are suggested for your consideration:

[REDACTED]

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Now that he is available in the US, it is suggested

[REDACTED]

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Available information furnished by [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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FGJ:CC

5/18/54

Memo, SAC  
NY 65-14742

Japan through a West Coast port. To date only West Coast arrival manifests have been checked for [ ] suspects. Consideration might be given to checking East Coast arrival manifests, both ship and plane, for logical suspects. Exact specifications for suspects could be furnished to East Coast offices so actual suspects for [ ] could be spotted on the manifests, eliminating the necessity for obtaining a large list of persons for screening by the NYO, as was done in checking West Coast manifests.

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Much of the screening of arrival manifests on the West Coast was concentrated on the early part of 1941, extending through December, 1941. This would appear to have been wasteful as [ ] could not, if [ ] is to be believed, have left [ ] until after [ ]. Therefore, from May, 1941 through December, 1942, allowing for delays and changes in [ ] would seem to be a reasonable pertinent period for this case. Consideration might be given to using such a period in the more accurate method suggested of checking for actual suspects on arrival manifests for the East Coast. Also, consideration might be given to extending the check of West Coast arrival manifests into 1942.

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Lists of arrivals through West Coast ports, already furnished by West Coast offices, should be thoroughly re-reviewed by the NYO for additional logical suspects for [ ]. WFO should then be requested to endeavor to obtain photographs of such suspects and to exhibit any found to [ ] for identification.

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Further, it is suggested that all logical Bureau-wide confidential informants and confidential sources on espionage matters be interviewed to develop any information which might be helpful in identifying [ ]. In this category, only [ ], contacted by the Charlotte Office in 1950, has been interviewed to date.

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After completion of the additional investigation recommended, it is suggested that an investigative summary report be prepared for the guidance of any future investigation to identify and locate [ ].

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Best Copy Available

these documents are substantially the same as submitted by Assistant Director Tolson for the Domestic Intelligence Division in the memorandum of October 10, 1953.

In addition, the defectors, it should be noted that he is a former member of the Bureau to represent the and has additional file of information, as indicated previously furnished to G-2.

FOURTH

It is recommended that "Crisis", Agent Hull be censured for his failure to make arrangements to have the document copy furnished to a local representative. A copy of Special Agent Hull is attached.

14-00000

OK 17-12-12

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION

AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:

TO : Mr. Glavin

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE

EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)

DATE 09-22-2010

FROM : H. L. Edwards

SUBJECT: ALAN H. BELMONT  
Assistant Director  
Domestic Intelligence Division  
Not on Probation

DATE: December 29, 1953

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Gearty \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

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Classified by 6088  
Declassify on: OADR  
BRACKET ON PG 2 RP 1  
REMAINS CLASS PER ANOTHER  
9017 RGE  
9-7-93  
200/KSP  
9-24-93

OTHERWISE

There is attached a memorandum from Mr. Clegg to Mr. Tolson dated 12/18/53 which points out that an analysis of files at the Seat of Government relating to information received from [redacted] and an analysis of New York files by Inspector B. C. Brown developed several delinquencies chargeable to Mr. Belmont during his period of duty as ASAC at New York (7/8/44 - 2/27/50), and since his assuming charge of the Domestic Intelligence Division on 2/27/50. As ASAC at New York Mr. Belmont was charged with the over-all responsibility of supervision of Internal Security and Espionage cases.

In connection with his assignment as ASAC at New York Mr. Belmont was charged with the over-all responsibility for delays of 5 months and more than one month in opening investigations in 2 Espionage-R cases and for delay in submission of initial and subsequent reports for periods ranging from 3 1/2 months to more than 4 months. Another Espionage-R case was closed with only minimum investigation, there was a delay of over 2 weeks in reopening the case and a delay of almost 1 year in submitting a report. In another instance a case was opened in January, 1948, and reports were not submitted until April, 1949.

Mr. Belmont explained that he had no personal recollection of these cases and cited a shortage of personnel and numerous specials during the pertinent period at New York.

67-94622-337

While Mr. Belmont has been in charge of the Domestic Intelligence Division at the Seat of Government in 1 instance an Espionage-R case was closed without [redacted] who might have information pertaining to the investigation. In an Internal Security-R case there was a delay in opening investigation from 8/30/50 to 10/4/50. In an Espionage-R case original information came to the Bureau's attention in March, 1948, and an individual case was not opened until 8/13/53. In another Espionage-R case there was a delay from 5/3/51 to 6/18/51 in transmitting to the [redacted] by New York to have that agency reinterview [redacted] regarding an individual suspected of espionage. In 4 other cases there were delays of more than two months in opening the investigations after information had been received pertaining

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Attachment

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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to interviews with [redacted] (S)(u)

(U) Mr. Belmont explained that although it was not logical to expect positive results from the interviews of [redacted] referred to above he feels they should be interviewed now to "clear the record." In connection with the delay in opening a case 8/30/50 to 10/4/50 Mr. Belmont stated that the information did not indicate urgent handling and did not take precedence over many others being handled by the supervisor at the time. Regarding the case wherein an individual case was not opened until 8/13/53 after original information was received in March, 1948, Mr. Belmont stated this matter was followed in another main file and realizes better procedure would have been to open a case on the information originally received in 1948. Regarding the delay from 5/3/51 to 6/18/51 in transmitting a request [to Central Intelligence Agency] to reinterview [redacted] Mr. Belmont stated this occurred during a crisis in the [redacted] and the former case being a less urgent matter was not handled on a priority basis. Concerning the delay in opening the remaining four cases Mr. Belmont commented that the information [redacted] required an intensive review for items of interest to the Bureau. This was not of an urgent nature and should properly have been handled by the supervisor as he could fit it into his other work on a "project" basis. (S)(u)

Training and Inspection Division recommended a letter be directed to Mr. Belmont calling to his attention the delinquencies set out above and reminding him of the necessity for prompt and thorough handling of all espionage cases.

Separate memoranda are being submitted with respect to the SOG supervisors involved in these cases.

RECOMMENDATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION:

The Administrative Division recommends that a letter be directed to Mr. Belmont calling his attention to the delinquencies set out above and pointing out to him the necessity that all espionage cases be promptly and thoroughly handled.

*See 1/17/30*  
*See 1/17/30*  
*9 agrees 1/3*  
*[Signature]*  
*[Signature]*

~~SECRET~~



TO: Mr. Tolson

12-22-53

FROM: H. H. Clegg

b6  
b7C  
b7D

SUBJECT: DELINQUENCIES OBSERVED IN THE HANDLING  
AND SUPERVISION OF INVESTIGATION GROWING  
OUT OF INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM [REDACTED]

*(H. H. Belmont)*

There are attached memoranda setting forth the delinquencies of each Seat of Government Supervisor; the delinquencies found by Inspector Brown in New York chargeable to SAC Whelan and Mr. Belmont while ASACs in New York. Seat of Government Divisional delinquencies chargeable to Mr. Belmont are also set forth.

Explanations of present New York employees have been set forth by Inspector Brown in the inspection report of the New York Office.

Attachments

JEM:db

9-25-91

ORIGINAL FILED IN 67-72-6332

106  
JAN 15 1954

January 20, 1954

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Alan H. Belmont  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED BY 1565 SDR/KSR

ON 9-25-91

Dear Mr. Belmont:

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b7C

I have carefully considered the facts relating to the undue delay in handling of the Security Matter - Communist case involving [redacted] and it is apparent that the personnel under your supervision have not been thoroughly apprised of the necessity for promptly and efficiently completing all correspondence. This particular piece of mail was received in the Domestic Intelligence Division on December 22, 1953, and did not clear the Internal Security Section until January 6, 1954. Although the Christmas and New Year's holidays and two week ends intervened a total of eight working days lapsed before this matter was completed in your division which is certainly an unnecessary delay.

As Assistant Director of the Domestic Intelligence Division it is your responsibility to see to it that all matters are handled with dispatch and I shall expect you to take immediate corrective measures to prevent the repetition of such dilatoriness on the part of supervisors in the Domestic Intelligence Division.

RECORDED-EX

67-1-338
Very truly yours,.....
Numbered.....
J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Gearty \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

NEMCD: 9987  
HOO  
JAN 20 1954  
COMM - FBI  
JAN 27 1954  
MAILED 31

## Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson

DATE: 1/15/54

FROM : H. H. Clegg

SUBJECT:

[REDACTED] SECURITY MATTER - C

was.

b6  
b7C

Director has inquired as to reason for delay in handling attached letter from New York dated 12/18/53. This inquiry was handled by Inspector J. S. Rogers. Received at Bureau 12/21/53 and Training Division 2:27 p.m. 12/21/53. There was no indication that [REDACTED] and

no reply was requested by New York, and since it involved Security Matter - C case, letter forwarded to Domestic Intelligence Division. Received there 5:18 p.m. 12/22/53. Forwarded to Internal Security Section where received 9:07 a.m. 12/23/53 and routed to Supervisor O. T. Mansfield whose clerk called for file same date. Mansfield returned from 2 1/2 days Christmas leave on 12/29/53. File not located. On 1/6/54, 4 1/2 working days later, Mansfield, upon recalling case involving [REDACTED] was closed and since letter of no further interest to Internal Security Section, discussed matter with Section Chief Baumgardner, who after conferring with Sizoo returned the letter to Training Division where received 2:47 p.m. 1/6/54. Decided in Training Division that New York should furnish information in letter to Buffalo and Albany Offices since [REDACTED] who was charged in letter with [REDACTED] at [REDACTED]

Memorandum prepared by Clerical Supervisor [REDACTED] 1/7/54 summarizing incoming. Letter to New York dated Friday, 1/8/54; re-dated to Monday, 1/11/54. Mr. Mohr suggested that two persons be interviewed since they had told New York source of information that [REDACTED]. Director agreed. Letter re-written and sent through 1/13/54.

Although letter in Domestic Intelligence Division from 5:18 p.m. 12/22/53 to 1/6/54, the three non-work days over Christmas and New Years plus two weekends intervened. Also Mansfield was on leave until Tuesday, 12/29/53. He was awaiting a locate of file for next 4 1/2 work days to 1/6/54. Records Section states file charged out to Crime Records 12/18/53. Called for by Mansfield's office 12/29/53. Called for by Training Division 12/30/53. Located in Internal Security Section, Wednesday, 12/30/53 and routed to Training Division. File, [REDACTED] routed to Internal Security Section Monday, 1/13/54.

JSR:GLC  
Attachment

RECORDED-92

Side Communication Records

have the file recharged  
to Int. Sec. Section

Tolson  
Ladd  
Nichols  
Belmont  
Clegg  
Glavin  
Harbo  
Rosen  
Tracy  
Gearty  
Mohr  
Winterrowd  
Tele. Room  
Holloman  
Sizoo  
Miss Gandy

b6  
b7C

Mr. Tolson

12/29/53

H. E. Clegg

PAUL P. STOUTENBURGH  
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING  
(ESPIONAGE)

(A. H. B. [signature])

SYNOPSIS:

By letter dated 11/3/53 the Washington Field Office advised the Bureau of the results of an interview on 10/23/53 with Frank Cotter of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy regarding information obtained by Cotter from Calvin Bertolotte of 255 West 108th Street, New York City, which Bertolotte thought indicated possible espionage in connection with the suicide in 1946 of Lt. Colonel Paul P. Stoutenburgh, U. S. Army. WFO letter of 11/3/53 was received at the Bureau 11/5/53 and on 12/11/53 the Bureau instructed WFO and the New York Division to conduct additional investigation. The Director inquired why it took from 11/5/53 to 12/11/53 to handle this matter.

CHRONOLOGY

Date

Status

11/5/53 Received Internal Security Section 1:53 PM.

11/6/53 Received Espionage Section 8:57 AM. Discussed by No. 1 Man, S. B. Donahoe, with Supervisor [redacted]

11/10/53 Indices checked and file reviews completed. Supervisor [redacted] dictated to Stenographer [redacted] a memorandum recommending the Department of Justice be advised and that no further action be taken in the matter.

11/10- [redacted] inquired three times as to status of dictation,  
11/25/53 which was delayed due to expedite work on Larry Dexter White case and other specials.

11/24/53 Stenographer [redacted] permitted by Stenographic Supervisor, Mrs. [redacted], to rough draft [redacted] dictation of 11/10/53 to facilitate [redacted] departure on leave at close of business this date. [redacted] granted 1 day compensatory leave for 11/25/53 and combination

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b7c

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Gearty \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

cc: Mr. Glavin

Mr. Belmont

Attachments

14 1953

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of compensatory leave and annual leave for 11-27-53, the Thanksgiving week-end, by No. 1 Ltn. S. L. Lonahoe, which was first annual leave, except for 1 hour, granted to [ ] since she reported to Espionage Section 7-2-53. Lonahoe has issued instructions prohibiting such rough drafts in the future to avoid double typing.

11-26-53 Supervisor [ ] entered hospital and on sick leave until 12-7-53.

11-27-53 Rough Draft given [ ], Secretary to Supervisor Liah Lutton, to complete in finished form.

11-29-53 [ ] returned to duty and was assigned to take dictation of a special. [ ] called Supervisor [ ] and stated she was unable to type in finished form the rough draft prepared by [ ] due to uncertainty as to its contents and spelling of names. [ ] instructed her to send the rough draft to him.

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12-1-53 Rough Draft received by [ ]. He called [ ] but she was unable to clarify the rough draft from her notes. [ ], who was handling expedite work on three desks, in addition to own work due to [ ] illness, absence of Supervisor in charge at Administrative School and confinement of Supervisor [ ] to the J. Robert Oppenheimer special, placed notation on the rough draft for Brennan to see him first thing 12-7-53. [ ] states he did not handle further, as to have done so would have required checking indices, reviewing files and dictating and he was already handling expedite work on three desks beside his own. [ ] did not report this piece of mail to his superiors, since the superiors were aware of the absence of supervisors in the unit.

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12-7-53 [ ] returned to duty from sick leave and handled rough draft.

12-9-53 Finished memorandum with outgoing letter to Department of Justice received by [ ] but redated 12-10-53 as not received in time for mail deadline.

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12-10-53 Inspector Lennrich instructed Brennan to change recommendation in memorandum, which was done, and the revision thereof placed on Lennrich's desk that evening but dated 12-11-53.

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Gearty \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

12-11-53 Letter forwarded to WFO, cc New York, requesting further investigation.

REMARKS:

The rough draft was returned to [ ] desk 12-1-53 and was not included in the weekly delinquency lists of 12-2-53 and 12-9-53. [ ] clerk, who made up weekly delinquency list for [ ] desk on 12-2-53, states she only recalls seeing rough draft which did not indicate to her it was delinquent. [ ] and [ ] cannot recall whether incoming communication was attached to rough draft. Stenographic Supervisor [ ] and [ ] state no recollection of the incoming letter being attached to the rough draft but state that the ordinary procedure of handling would require that the incoming communication accompany the rough draft. [ ] did not include this matter on weekly delinquency list of 12-9-53 giving as his reason therefor that he had dictated on it 12-7-53. The Domestic Intelligence Division does not include on the weekly delinquency list those delinquent matters which are in the stenographic pool, as the stenographic daily report is used for control over such delinquent matters. However, the stenographic daily report does not go to Mr. Tolson's office, and under this system a matter already delinquent when dictated by the supervisor will not show as delinquent on the stenographic report until five days after the dictation was received. Thus, it is possible under this system for a matter to be delinquent and yet not be carried as such under either the stenographic daily report or the weekly delinquency report. b6 b7C

W. A. Branigan, Chief, Espionage Section, states delay in transcription 11-10-53 to 11-24-53 due to specials, including Harry Dexter White case. To relieve stenographic congestion, 5 stenographers borrowed for 1 week and 3 stenographers and 1 typist borrowed for 1 day by Espionage Section. Due to unfamiliarity with work such borrowed stenographers are unable to make substantial immediate effect on backlog. Three permanent stenographers added to Espionage Section pool 11-17-53. During November, 1953, it was necessary to divert 390 man-days of supervisory time in Espionage Section to special work and supervisors contributed 278 man-days of voluntary overtime. On 12-8-53 Espionage Section requested three additional supervisors due to continuing nature of special work. On the Harry Dexter White case alone the clerical personnel, including the stenographers, worked over 59 workdays outside of regular hours, including nights, holidays and week-ends.

It is to be noted the primary cause of this delay was two-fold, in that Stenographer [ ] was permitted to rough draft the dictation and the rough draft was inaccurate.

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### RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That a letter of censure go forward to Assistant Director Belmont directing that proper steps be taken to insure the more expeditious handling of the work in the Domestic Intelligence Division. Mr. Ladd, Mr. Belmont, and Mr. Glavin agree.

2. Number 1 Man Sterling B. Donahoe, Espionage Section . . . censure. Mr. Belmont points out that during the pertinent period Section Chief Branigan was engaged in the Harry Dexter White special, and the handling of the stenographic pool and delinquency therein thus fell on the shoulders of Number 1 Man Donahoe. As Mr. Belmont points out, Donahoe was cognizant of this entire situation which did take too long to handle but was a result of an abnormal work situation in the Espionage Section. Mr. Belmont feels that Donahoe should be censured. Mr. Ladd does not agree, feeling that Branigan as Section Chief should be censured. On the other hand, Mr. Glavin agrees with Belmont and Clegg that Donahoe be censured.

3. No action is recommended as to Section Chief W. A. Branigan of the Espionage Section. Normally, we would recommend censure for him, however, during the entire pertinent period an unusual situation existed in that Branigan was practically divorced from the operations of the Espionage Section and was engaged personally in a special involving Harry Dexter White. Branigan's overtime on the special during November averaged nearly six hours per day. Meanwhile, Number 1 Man Donahoe was

running the Espionage Section. Mr. Ladd and Mr. Clegg feel that Branigan should be censured because he still occupied the position of head of the Espionage Section. On the other hand, Messrs. Belmont and Glavin feel that in view of the exceptional circumstances requiring Branigan's full time on other matters, he should not be censured.

4. That a letter of censure go forward to [redacted] for permitting Stenographer [redacted] to submit a rough draft of the dictation instead of a finished transcript. Mr. Ladd agrees. Mr. Belmont disagrees stating, [redacted] does not normally allow rough drafting. In this case, because [redacted] had work on her books that she could not get off in time to go on her scheduled leave, she permitted this item to be rough drafted. This was proper, as otherwise [redacted] would have had to change her plans for the scheduled leave, and it would have worked an undue hardship. Under normal conditions, it is possible to regulate the stenographers' work so that this does not happen, but these were not normal conditions. The action of [redacted] had the sanction of Mr. Donahoe, who was responsible for the stenographic pool. A letter to [redacted], in my opinion, is not warranted." Mr. Glavin agrees to censure.

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b6  
b7C

5. That a letter of censure go forward to Stenographer [redacted] for her failure to properly transcribe the dictation of Supervisor [redacted]. Messrs. Ladd and Belmont agree. Mr. Glavin agrees.



6. Heretofore, the Domestic Intelligence Division has not been reporting on its weekly delinquency list matters which have been on hand in the Division more than the deadline period (deadline two days on outside communications, five days for investigative reports, and communications from the field). The Domestic Intelligence Division has been reporting as delinquent on the stenographic delinquency report those documents which have been in the hands of typists or stenographers more than five days, however, this separate report does not go to the Associate Director. Thus, a loophole exists in that the weekly delinquency report from the Domestic Intelligence Division has listed only those matters delinquent which are in the hands of the supervisors and does not list those matters which are delinquent in the Division but may be in the hands of stenographers or typists. Mr. Belmont has agreed to revise the procedure and list all delinquent matters starting immediately. Mr. Ladd agrees to this. Gavin agrees.

7. That the attached memorandum go forward to all Bureau officials and supervisors emphasizing the importance of listing delinquencies and pointing out that the delinquent matters are to be considered as such until they have cleared the Division, regardless of the fact they may be in dictation.

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PERMANENT BRIEFS OF W. A. BRANIGAN, S. D. DONAHOE,  
[REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] ATTACHED.

DETAILS: Details included in the synopsis.

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED BY 1565 SDP/11SR  
ON 9-25-91

I have reviewed the findings of an inquiry recently made in order to determine the causes for the unwarranted delay before a communication was transmitted to the White House pursuant to a request received by the Liaison Section of your division in the Jay Lovestone case and I note that the Liaison agent who received the request delayed overnight before advising the Espionage Section of the matter and his confirmatory memorandum did not reach your office until the morning of the second day following receipt of the White House call.

Very truly yours,

**J. Edgar Hoover**

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

JIC:ggs *gr*

CC: Mr. Ladd (Personal Attention)

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Gearty \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

**MAR 4 1954**

8

MAR 1 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Tolson

2/18/54

R. T. Harbo

JAY LOVESTONE, was.  
ESPIONAGE - IS & R

A. H. E. Mount

Memorandum dated 2/12/54 from W. A. Branigan to Mr. Belmont attached a letter to the Honorable Sherman Adams confirming oral information furnished him on 2/8/54 to the effect the name of Philip Sullivan appearing in a communication to Mr. Adams under date of 1/27/54 was to be changed to Samuel Berger. Administrative action as to the error in the communication of 1/27/54 has been handled separately. Mr. Holloman inquired as to the reason for the delay from 2/8/54 - 2/12/54 in preparing the confirmation for Mr. Adams.

Chronology

2/8/54

R. R. Roach, Liaison Section, received request for confirmation from Sherman Adams at approximately 5:30 or 6 PM.

2/9/54

Roach orally advised W. A. Branigan, Chief, Espionage Section, between 9 and 10 AM that Mr. Adams desired a written confirmation of the information orally furnished by Roach on 2/8/54. Branigan requested Roach to submit a memorandum on Mr. Adams' request so that the appropriate Bureau officials could note thereon any comments regarding furnishing the written confirmation to Mr. Adams. Roach dictated a memorandum from Mr. Keay to Mr. Belmont at approximately 3 PM.

2/10/54

The memorandum from Mr. Keay to Mr. Belmont bearing the date of 2/10/54, which was dictated by Roach on 2/9/54, was placed on Roach's desk at about 9:30 AM and Roach states it left his desk immediately thereafter. V. P. Keay, Chief, Liaison Section, recalls the memorandum but not the time of day it was handled by him. Mr. Keay states normally the memorandum would have reached his desk within 20 minutes after being forwarded by Roach, and that he would have cleared it within another 30 minutes or less. Thus, the memorandum should have cleared Mr. Keay's desk no later than 10:30 AM.

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Gearty \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment

cc: Mr. Belmont  
Mr. Glavin

ORIGINAL FILED IN 69-1380-11

2/11/54

The memorandum from Mr. Keay to Mr. Belmont, prepared by Mr. Roach, was date stamped in Mr. Belmont's office at 10:01 AM. Copy of this memorandum was referred by W. A. Branigan to Supervisor [ ] shortly after 2:10 PM for preparation of the letter of confirmation to Mr. Adams.

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2/12/54

Letter of confirmation to Mr. Adams placed on W. A. Branigan's desk by [ ] in the morning and sent to Mr. Belmont's office. Mr. Branigan states the letter was returned by Mr. Belmont or Mr. Ladd with the request that a separate cover memorandum also be prepared, which was done. Cover memorandum dated 2/12/54 from W. A. Branigan to Mr. Belmont with confirmation letter to Mr. Adams attached was thereafter received as follows: Mr. Belmont - 2:54 PM; Mr. Ladd - 3:37 PM; Mr. Tolson's office - 4:42 PM; Director's office - 5:34 PM.

Conclusion:

There was a delay of approximately 24 hours from the time the memorandum left Mr. Roach's desk at approximately 9:30 AM, 2/10/54 until date stamped in Mr. Belmont's office at 10:01 AM, 2/11/54. Mr. Keay recalls handling the memorandum but not the time or date. Since there is no date stamp prior to 10:01 AM, 2/11/54 at Mr. Belmont's office, it is not possible to ascertain the cause of the delay from the time the memorandum left Mr. Keay's office on 2/10/54 until it was date stamped into Mr. Belmont's office at 10:01 AM, 2/11/54. Too much time, however, elapsed in handling this matter.

Recommendation:

(1) Supervisor Ralph R. Roach, is the primary offender in that he did not communicate the request for the confirmation from Sherman Adams to W. A. Branigan until between 9 and 10 AM of the following day and did not have a finished memorandum of Adams' request prepared as instructed by Branigan until 9:30 AM, 2/10/54, the second day after he received the request for the confirmation from Sherman Adams. Therefore, a letter of censure is recommended for Supervisor Roach.

(2) Inspector V. P. Keay, as chief of the Liaison Section, is responsible for not having his section properly organized to more expeditiously process such matters. Censure is recommended for Inspector Keay.

(3) It is further recommended that a letter go forth to Assistant Director A. H. Delmont instructing him to immediately examine the administrative procedures in the Domestic Intelligence Division to insure that such matters are handled properly in the future.

PERMANENT BRIEFS OF SUPERVISOR RALPH R. ROACH AND INSPECTOR V. P. KEAY ARE ATTACHED.

## OFFICE MEMORANDUM

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Glavin

FROM : H. L. Edwards

DATE: February 25, 1954

SUBJECT : SA [REDACTED]  
 Albany Division  
 (Senior Resident Agent - Schenectady)  
 EOD 10-5-42  
 GS-13, \$8360  
 Non-Veteran  
 Not on Probation

b6  
 b7C

W. H. Belmont

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-346076-130

The attached memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Ladd, 2-24-54, reflects on 2-15-54, John B. Briggs, attorney for Felix August Inslerman, subject of an Internal Security case, told the Albany Office that Inslerman desired to talk to the FBI in the presence of his attorney. On the same date, Albany advised the Bureau that scheduled meeting was set for 2-16-54, to accept such information as Inslerman had to offer in attorney's presence, and further detailed interviews with Inslerman would be scheduled without his attorney being present. Interview was conducted 2-16-54 in presence of attorney. Albany teletype 2-17-54, advised detailed interviews with Inslerman would begin 2-18-54, but attorney insisted on being present and unless advised to the contrary by the Bureau interview would be conducted with attorney present. The Domestic Intelligence Division took no action to eliminate the attorney from the interviews beginning on 2-18-54, until instructed to do so by the Director on the morning of 2-18-54. Interviews were conducted on 2-18 and 19-54 without attorney.

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On 2-16-54, Inslerman's attorney turned over to SA [REDACTED], a letter reportedly written by Whittaker Chambers in 1938, mentioning the Attorney General, the President, State Department, and others. The Bureau was not advised of the existence of this letter until 2-19-54. SA [REDACTED] has explained that Inslerman's espionage activities covered a period of 15 to 18 years, and were being developed in orderly fashion and chronological order, and as instant letter related, to his defection it would be covered near the end of his story, therefore, [REDACTED] did not include it in his earlier correspondence with the Bureau.

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 b7C

You will recall that on 2-19-54 Roy Cohn, Chief Counsel for the McCarthy Committee, reported to Mr. Nichols that Bureau Agents had promised a copy of instant letter to Inslerman or his attorney, and that SA [REDACTED] made a statement to the attorney to the effect, "Take it easy, you'll get a copy of the letter." SAs [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], who interviewed Inslerman, state that no promises were made to the effect that a copy of the letter would be made available to the subject or his attorney. SA [REDACTED] denied that he told Briggs, the attorney, or anyone else to, "Take it easy, you'll get a copy of the letter." Attorney Briggs also denied that SA [REDACTED] had promised him a copy.

Attachement 167

CC: Mr. Belmont - Mr. Harbo  
 4 SOG Albany Field Office file

NEMc:inp

Whittaker Chambers was interviewed on 2-20-54, regarding Inslerman's letter which was turned over to the Albany Office and the Domestic Intelligence Division is preparing a detailed memorandum setting forth the results of this interview. The Domestic Intelligence Division has recommended that SA [ ] be censured for his failure to promptly advise the Bureau of the existence of the Inslerman letter. Mr. Belmont and Mr. Boardman concurred

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION:

b6  
b7C

(1) That SA [ ] of the Albany Division be censured for his delay from 2-16-54 to 2-19-54, in advising the Bureau of his receipt of the Inslerman letter.

GLAVIN'S NOTATION, "I AGREE." G. 2-26-54

MOHR'S NOTATION, "I AGREE." M. 2-26-54

TOLSON'S NOTATION, "I AGREE." T. 2-28-54

HOLLOMAN'S NOTATION, "I AGREE." H. 3-1-54

DIRIS NOTATION, "YES." H.

(2) That Assistant Director Belmont be censured for the failure of the Domestic Intelligence Division to immediately take steps, upon receipt of the Albany teletype dated 2-17-54, to see to it that Inslerman's attorney would not be present during any subsequent interviews.

GLAVIN'S NOTATION, "I AGREE." G. 2-26-54

MOHR'S NOTATION, "I AGREE." M. 2-26-54

TOLSON'S NOTATION, "I SEE NO NEED TO DO THIS." T. 2-28-54

DIR'S NOTATION, "I CONCUR." H.

b6  
b7C

HOLLOMAN'S NOTATION, "I AGREE." H. 3-1-54

A PERMANENT BRIEF OF THE PERSONNEL FILE OF SA [ ] IS ATTACHED.

March 9, 1954

Personal and Confidential

Mr. Alan H. Belmont  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED BY

1565 SDP/HLSR

ON

9-25-91

Dear Belmont:

I certainly want to tell you of my pleasure with the highly commendable, over-all handling of the matter involving the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico and with your noteworthy supervision of the project.

You discharged your numerous and heavy responsibilities with remarkable competence, particularly in view of your return to duty from an illness. I am truly appreciative of your services, which were in accordance with the Bureau's highest traditions.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

LRH:rk

RECORDED - 97

Salutation per Reading Room

Tolson  
Ladd  
Nichols  
Belmont  
Clegg  
Glavin  
Harbo  
Rosen  
Tracy  
Gearty  
Mohr  
Winterrowd  
Tele. Room  
Holloman  
Gandy

MAILED 8

MAR 9 - 1954

MAR 15 1954

RECEIVED READING ROOM

MAR 9 2 34

FBI

946-1-344

71-946-1-344  
MAR 11 1954  
107



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. BOARDMAN

Boardman  
DATE: March 8, 1954

FROM : A. H. BEAMONT

SUBJECT: NATIONALIST PARTY OF PUERTO RICO (NPPR)  
INTERNAL SECURITY - N

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
 Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

I feel that the New York and Chicago Offices did an excellent job in carrying out the program of serving subpoenas on members of the NPPR on the morning of March 8.

In New York, I know for a fact that not only SAC Kelly, but all of the ASACs, partook in the planning, organization and conferences leading up to the successful handling of this matter and due to the number of subjects involved and their nature, the matter did require most careful planning. This matter received attention at New York late into the night, last week particularly, and the last few days and also on Saturday and Sunday. On Sunday afternoon the office held a conference with the Agents who were to be assigned to this matter. The smoothness with which this went off is the best gauge of the careful planning and attention given to the entire matter by New York. New York is still attempting to locate certain individuals who they knew would be unavailable today for service and will continue their efforts, but this in no way detracts from the splendid efforts they put forth and the results achieved.

While the Chicago Office had a lesser problem, there too the same degree of attention was afforded this matter by SAC Banister personally and it is apparent that a great deal of time and effort was devoted to the matter in order that the proper results would be achieved.

So many Agents took part in this maneuver that it is simply impossible to congratulate them all, except through the SAC.

RECOMMENDATION:

I recommend that these offices be congratulated by letters to the SACs, which letters should also express the appreciation of the Director for the devotion to duty and splendid effort put forth on the part of all personnel in those offices.

MAR 19 1954

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CC - Administrative Division

AHB:tlo

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BOARDMAN

The same situation is true here at the Seat of Government. There were a considerable number of Supervisors involved who gave unstintingly of their time and effort. In addition, the entire Front Office of the Division took a personal interest in the matter. We have previously sent up a memorandum calling attention to the fact that a number of Supervisors worked all night and recommending letters of commendation to them, together with a letter of commendation for Section Chief Baumgardner, who not only worked all night on occasion but gave his attention to this matter until the late hours of the night practically every night last week. I think our previous recommendation will suffice here at the Seat of Government.

*being handled  
separately  
E.D. Wood*

*GMV*

*Addendum: I was very much impressed  
with the competent manner in which Belmont  
engineered this whole procedure and recommend  
commendation for him.*

*LRS.*

*✓*

*Sargent  
2/9*

*I concur in all of the above.  
Belmont did an outstanding  
job particularly returning the  
kid from an ill case.*

*Letter to Ladd Kelly*

*H. & Panister and*

*ass Des. Belmont*

*3/9/54 LRS. mms*

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: 3/15/54

FROM : J. P. MOHR

SUBJECT:

A H. BELMONT

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
 Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
 Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gearty \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

The Director has inquired as to whether a letter of commendation was sent to Mr. Belmont for his work on the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico case.

There is attached a memorandum dated March 8, 1954, wherein Mr. Boardman recommended Mr. Belmont for this letter of commendation and the Director stated, "I concur in all of the above. Belmont did an outstanding job particularly returning as he did from an illness."

A letter of commendation went to Mr. Belmont under date of March 9, 1954 and a tickler copy is attached.

*JPM*

JPM:DW

RECORDED-50

MAR 22 1954

67- 94639-349
Searched <u>171</u>
Numbered _____
11 MAR 17 1954
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

THREE

FROM :

SUBJECT:

Stukenbroeker

Leopard

In connection with the possibility of Messrs. Kroger, Stukenbroeker, Leonard, and Belmont being given territorial increases, I wish to advise that it will be possible to give each increase to Mr. Kroger, Stukenbroeker, and Leonard. It will not be possible to give Mr. Belmont a territorial increase inasmuch as he received one in July 1, 1955, and he will not be eligible for another increase until October 28, 1956.

J. S. Kroger  
H. H. Belmont

I recommend  
as done

8-8

Letter of Justifications  
prepared by Mr. Mohr  
& Mr. Clogston 3-12-54  
sent out for Mr. Stukenbroeker  
& Mr. Leonard will follow.  
Copies of this memo prepared  
for Ackerman & other Terr  
actions. [unclear]

129391-159  
48

55 SEP 12 1954  
890322

May 11, 1954

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Alan H. Belmont  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED BY 1565 SDR/KSR  
ON 9-25-91

Dear Mr. Belmont:

I have given careful consideration to the explanations furnished regarding the unwarranted delay in submitting to me a memorandum recommending action with respect to three security informants of the Detroit Division who were in danger of being exposed by a Congressional Committee hearing and there appears to be no justification for this delinquency. In the first place the teletype of the Detroit Office, on which I had made certain notations, was received in your office at 2:12 PM on May 8, 1954, and did not reach the Internal Security Section of your Division, where it was to be handled, until 8:59 AM the following day. This delay was grossly excessive.

Furthermore, I note that a copy of the incoming teletype was received in the Internal Security Section at 9:10 AM on May 8, 1954, but the memorandum in final form did not reach me until two days later. There appears to be no satisfactory reason why this question could not have been resolved and the memorandum completed and forwarded the same day it was received in the Internal Security Section. Delays of this nature are intolerable and I shall expect you to see to it that they do not recur.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover


John Edgar Hoover  
Director

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

CC: Mr. Boardman (PERSONAL ATTENTION)

BIC:mmm

18 MAY 17 1954



RECEIVED  
MAY 11 3 16 PM '54  
ROOM

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Best Copy Available

DATE: . . .

TO : . . .

FROM : . . .

SUBJECT: . . .

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. Boardman  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Belmont  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Winterrowd  
Tele. Room  
Mr. Holloman  
Miss Gandy

*J. Edgar Hoover*

There is attached a memorandum dated May 4, 1954, regarding the handling of the Detroit teletype dated April 29, 1954. This teletype was received in the Director's Office at 2:07 p.m. on May 1, 1954. The teletype stated that the Detroit office was asking for instructions in connection with a possible commitment of the Detroit office to the House Un-American Activities Committee hearings, to determine what action should be taken with respect to the Detroit office. The teletype also stated that the Detroit office was exposed during these hearings. As a result of the fact the last sentence of the Detroit teletype stated that expedient handling was requested as early testimony by one of the informants existed. On the original of this teletype the Director made the notation, "Just what is this? I don't like the idea of asking UCUA for favors. How did our informants come to be involved in this?"

The memorandum was received in the Director's Office on May 4 at 11:00 a.m. On May 4, 1954, you will recall that the Director left early that day because of a commitment that evening. He also left early that day because of the same commitment.

In order to point out the handling of this matter in your office, I wish to advise that the memorandum in question was received in Mr. Clayton's Office at 1:00 p.m. on May 5, 1954. Clayton read the memorandum and thought it was lacking in detail since it did not furnish sufficient background for the paragraph to furnish a basis for the Director's questions and he felt the opening paragraph should contain sufficient information that the Director would not have to refer to the original teletype to find out why he asked the questions he did. He discussed this with Mr. Boardman and Mr. Clayton advised me that Mr. Boardman sent the memorandum to Mr. Belmont on a "see-me." The memorandum was discussed by Messrs. Belmont and Boardman and Mr. Clayton again received it at 5:00 p.m. on May 5, 1954. He realized that the memorandum was urgent, initialed it for you and he discussed it with

Mr. Holloman, indicating there was urgency in getting the wire out. Mr. Clayton said he was of the opinion that it would be satisfactory for the Director's Office to clear the wire even though you had not seen it.

Mr. Holloman routed the wire over to you for your information and it was received here at 5:47 p.m. on May 5. I discussed the matter with Mr. Clayton thereafter to determine whether we should hold it overnight for you or take some action to get it cleared and Mr. Clayton reminded me of his conversation with Mr. Holloman at the time he sent the wire through. In view of the fact that Mr. Holloman was reluctant to clear the memorandum without you and the Director seeing it, I told Mr. Clayton we would hold it for you.

You will recall that on Thursday morning, May 6, you were engaged in a number of expedite matters and you were unable to reach this particular mail. Immediately upon your departure, Mr. Clayton was sent all the material he had sent up, including this, and he sent it to Mr. Holloman who returned it to Mr. Boardman. This explains the fact that the memorandum in question contains a time-stamp for Mr. Clayton at 11:49 a.m. May 6, 1954.

I think that the whole matter revolves around the fact that there was an initial delay in handling this memorandum. It most certainly should have been prepared no later than Monday, May 3, 1954 and it should have been in the Director's Office on that date. Mr. Belmont's Office had a copy of the incoming teletype as early as Saturday morning, May 1, 1954, and there was no reason why the information necessary could not have been collected and ready to dictate a memorandum immediately upon receipt of the Director's inquiry on Monday, May 3, 1954. It appears that the original of the teletype was received in Mr. Boardman's Office on May 3 at 10:35 a.m. and was not received in Mr. Belmont's Office until 2:12 p.m. on May 3. It was not received in the Internal Security Section until Thursday, May 4, 1954 at 8:59 a.m. There seems to have been delay in pushing this thing down the line to where action was going to be taken. There was of course delay in getting the memorandum prepared and finally getting it to the Director's Office.

Under the circumstances, I recommend that letters of censure go forward to Messrs. Boardman, Belmont and [redacted]. I think Messrs. Boardman and Belmont should be censured for the delay in not promptly seeing that this matter was handled and a memorandum in the Director's Office no later than the evening of Monday, May 3, 1954. Mr. [redacted] should be censured because of the fact that he prepared the initial memorandum which was not satisfactory and it was necessary to have him do it over.

b6  
b7C

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that Messrs. Boardman, Belmont and  
[redacted] receive letters of censure in accordance with the  
above.

*[Handwritten signature]*

*Ex agree  
5/11*

I did not send the  
teletype out to Detroit  
on 11/14/54 in  
view of your objection  
and policy involved.



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: May 7, 1954

FROM : L. V. Boardman

SUBJECT: HOUSE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES  
DETROIT HEARINGS BEGINNING  
MAY 3, 1954

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Pursuant to your instructions, I am submitting a memorandum of explanation concerning the delay in handling an urgent teletype from the Detroit Office dated April 30, 1954. Attached are separate memoranda prepared by Mr. Baumgardner and Mr. Mohr dated May 7, 1954, concerning this matter.

An examination of the original teletype reflects that it was received by me from Mr. Tolson's Office on May 3, Monday, at 10:35 A.M., and did not reach Mr. Belmont's Office until 2:12 P.M., May 3, 1954. I have discussed this matter with Mr. Scatterday, who points out that his practice at that time was, on observing a notation of the Director, to immediately notify the Division required to take action on the Director's notation and instruct expedite handling. A 3 x 5 slip of paper is normally placed on said communication to the effect that the Division in question was advised. Mr. Sizoo does not specifically recall that Belmont's Division was called on this particular item of mail, but feels that it was. It is my recollection that when I observed this teletype, there was a notation, "Sizoo advised," in the handprinting of Mr. Scatterday.

This is not a desirable administrative procedure in my opinion, and has since been discontinued with the instruction that during the time of my attendance at the Executives Conference, absence at lunch, or absence for any reason, these matters are to be immediately sent out of my office. Mr. Scatterday is to make appropriate notations and subsequently advise me concerning the movement of said mail. I feel that this communication, and others, have been permitted to remain in my office for too long a period of time and I am taking drastic steps to eliminate any such bottlenecks.

After the teletype was received at 2:12 P.M., May 3, 1954, in Mr. Belmont's Office, it apparently did not leave his office until it was stamped into the Internal Security Section at 8:59 P.M., May 4, 1954. I have instructed Belmont to insure that matters obviously requiring special attention move through his office during his absence to preclude the same type of bottleneck.

Attachment

LVB:AMJ

SENT DIRECTOR  
5-7-54

39 JUN 21 1954

It will be observed that the duplicate copy of the teletype was received in the Internal Security Section at 9:10 A.M., Monday, May 3, 1954, and in view of the urgency of the matter, it is difficult for me to understand why it should not have been handled and left the Internal Security Section before the close of business May 3, 1954.

I have carefully reviewed the memoranda of Messrs. Baumgardner and Mohr and concur in the observations of Mr. Mohr that Belmont, [redacted] and myself should be censured for the delay in the handling of this matter.

RECOMMENDATION:

b6  
b7c

It is recommended that Messrs. Belmont, [redacted], and Boardman receive letters of censure in accordance with the above.

Jayne  
KPMW  
5/7/54

2 over  
57

1. Yes, all was  
at once handled  
by Boardman & me  
2. I want Harbo  
immediately check pro-  
cedures in Belmont's office as they  
are creating  
some with the  
"executives"

Mr Harbo  
advised &  
leaving  
5/10/54  
PC

H

RECEIPT FOR GOVERNMENT PROPERTY  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

4/14/54

I certify that I have <sup>returned</sup> ~~received~~ the following

Government property for official use:

Manual # 16 -- Handbook for Personnel Assistants  
and Counselors.

READ

The Government property which you hereby acknowledge is charged to you and you are responsible for taking care of it and returning it when its use has been completed. DO NOT MARK OR WRITE ON IT OR MUTILATE IT IN ANY WAY.

57  
89 APR 16 1954

FILE  
WRG  
Jma  
67-NOT RECORDED-14

Very truly yours,

Alan H. Belmont  
Alan H. Belmont

March 29, 1954

ORGANIZATIONS DESIGNATED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE  
UNITED STATES PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 10450.

Abraham Lincoln Brigade  
Abraham Lincoln School, Chicago, Illinois  
Action Committee to Free Spain Now  
Alabama People's Educational Association. (See Communist  
Political Association)  
American Association for Reconstruction in Yugoslavia, Inc.  
American Branch of the Federation of Greek Maritime Unions  
American Christian Nationalist Party  
American Committee for European Workers' Relief (See Socialist  
American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born Workers Party)  
American Committee for the Settlement of Jews in Birobidjan, Ind.  
American Committee for Spanish Freedom  
American Committee to Survey Labor Conditions in Europe  
American Committee for Yugoslav Relief, Inc.  
American Council for a Democratic Greece, formerly known as  
the Greek American Council; Greek American Committee  
for National Unity  
American Council on Soviet Relations  
American Croatian Congress  
American Jewish Labor Council  
American League Against War and Fascism  
American League for Peace and Democracy  
American Lithuanian Workers Literary Association (also known  
as Amerikos Lietuviu Darbininku Literaturos Draugija)  
American National Labor Party  
American National Socialist League  
American National Socialist Party  
American Nationalist Party  
American Patriots, Inc.  
American Peace Crusade  
American Peace Mobilization  
American Poles for Peace  
American Polish League  
American Polish Labor Council  
American Rescue Ship Mission (a project of the United  
American Spanish Aid Committee)  
American-Russian Fraternal Society  
American Russian Institute, New York, also known as the  
American Russian Institute for Cultural Relations with  
the Soviet Union  
American Russian Institute, Philadelphia  
American Russian Institute of San Francisco  
American Russian Institute of Southern California, Los Angeles

American Slav Congress  
 American Women for Peace  
 American Youth Congress  
 American Youth for Democracy  
 Armenian Progressive League of America  
 Associated Klans of America  
 Association of Georgia Klans  
 Association of German Nationals (Reichsdeutsche Vereinigung)  
 Association of Lithuanian Workers  
 (also known as Lietuviu Darbininku Susivienijimas)  
 Ausland-Organization der NSDAP, Overseas Branch of Nazi Party  
 Baltimore Forum  
 Black Dragon Society  
 Boston School for Marxist Studies, Boston, Massachusetts  
 Bulgarian American People's League of the United States of America  
 Bridges-Robertson-Schmidt Defense Committee  
 California Emergency Defense Committee  
 California Labor School, Inc., 321 Divisadero Street,  
 San Francisco, California  
 Carpatho-Russian People's Society  
 Central Council of American Women of Croatian Descent,  
 Also known as Central Council of American Croatian Women,  
 National Council of Croatian Women  
 Central Japanese Association (Beikoku Chuo Nipponjin Kai)  
 Central Japanese Association of Southern California  
 Central Organization of the German-American National  
 Alliance (Deutsche-Amerikanische Einheitsfront)  
 Cervantes Fraternal Society  
 China Welfare Appeal, Inc.  
 Chopin Cultural Center  
 Citizens Committee to Free Earl Browder  
 Citizens Committee for Harry Bridges  
 Citizens Committee of the Upper West Side (New York City)  
 Citizens Emergency Defense Conference  
 Citizens Protective League  
 Civil Rights Congress and its affiliated organizations,  
 including:  
 Civil Rights Congress for Texas  
 Veterans Against Discrimination of Civil Rights  
 Congress of New York  
 Columbians  
 Comité Coordinador Pro Republica Espanola  
 Committee to Aid the Fighting South  
 Committee for Constitutional and Political Freedom  
 Committee to Defend Marie Richardson  
 Committee for the Defense of the Pittsburgh Six  
 Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy  
 Committee for Nationalist Action  
 Committee for the Negro in the Arts  
 Committee for Peace and Brotherhood Festival in Philadelphia  
 Committee for the Protection of the Bill of Rights  
 Committee to Uphold the Bill of Rights

Committee for World Youth Friendship and Cultural Exchange  
 Commonwealth College, Mena, Arkansas  
 Communist Party, U. S. A., its subdivisions, subsidiaries  
 and affiliates.  
 Communist Political Association, its subdivisions, subsidiaries  
 and affiliates, including:  
     Alabama People's Educational Association  
     Florida Press and Educational League  
     Oklahoma League for Political Education  
     People's Educational and Press Association of Texas  
     Virginia League for People's Education  
 Congress of American Revolutionary Writers  
 Congress of American Women  
 Connecticut Committee to Aid Victims of the Smith Act  
 Connecticut State Youth Conference  
 Council on African Affairs  
 Council of Greek Americans  
 Council for Jobs, Relief and Housing  
 Council for Pan-American Democracy  
 Croatian Benevolent Fraternity  
 Dai Nippon Butoku Kai (Military Virtue Society of Japan  
     or Military Art Society of Japan)  
 Daily Worker Press Club  
 Daniels Defense Committee  
 Dante Alighieri Society (between 1935 and 1940)  
 Dennis Defense Committee  
 Detroit Youth Assembly  
 Emergency Conference to Save Spanish Refugees (founding  
     body of the North American Spanish Aid Committee)  
 Families of the Baltimore Smith Act Victims  
 Families of the Smith Act Victims  
 Federation of Italian War Veterans in the U. S. A., Inc.  
     (Associazione Nazionale Combattenti Italiani,  
     Federazione degli Stati Uniti d'America)  
 Finnish-American Mutual Aid Society  
 Florida Press and Educational League (See Communist  
     Political Association)  
 Frederick Douglass Educational Center  
 Freedom Stage, Inc.  
 Friends of the New Germany (Freunde des Neuen Deutschlands)  
 Friends of the Soviet Union  
 Garibaldi American Fraternal Society  
 George Washington Carver School, New York City  
 German-American Bund (Amerikadeutscher Volksbund)  
 German-American Republican League  
 German-American Vocational League (Deutsche-Amerikanische  
     Berufsgemeinschaft)  
 Harlem Trade Union Council  
 Hawaii Civil Liberties Committee

Heimuska Kai, also known as Nokubei Heieki Gimusha Kai,  
 Zaibel Nihonjin, Heiyaku Gimusha Kai, and Zaibel Heimusha  
 Kai (Japanese residing in America Military Conscripts  
 Association)  
 Hellenic-American Brotherhood  
 Hinode Kai (Imperial Japanese Reservists)  
 Hinomaru Kai (Rising Sun Flag Society -- a group of Japanese  
 War-Veterans)  
 Hokubei Zaigo Shoke Dan (North American Reserve Officers  
 Association)  
 Hollywood Writers Mobilization for Defense  
 Hungarian-American Council for Democracy  
 Hungarian Brotherhood  
 Independent Socialist League  
 Industrial Workers of the World  
 International Labor Defense  
 International Workers Order, its subdivisions, subsidiaries  
 and affiliates  
 Japanese Association of America  
 Japanese Overseas Central Society (Kaigai Dobo Chuo Kai)  
 Japanese Overseas Convention, Tokyo, Japan, 1940  
 Japanese Protective Association (Recruiting Organization)  
 Jefferson School of Social Science, New York City  
 Jewish Culture Society  
 Jewish People's Committee  
 Jewish People's Fraternal Order  
 Jikyoku Iinkai (The Committee for the Crisis)  
 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee  
 Joint Council of Progressive Italian-Americans, Inc.  
 Joseph Weydemeyer School of Social Science, St. Louis,  
 Missouri  
 Kibei Seinen Kai (Association of U. S. Citizens of Japanese  
 Ancestry who have returned to America after studying in Japan)  
 Knights of the White Camellia  
 Ku Klux Klan  
 Kyffhaeuser, also known as Kyffhaeuser League (Kyffhaeuser  
 Bund), Kyffhaeuser Fellowship (Kyffhaeuser Kameradschaft)  
 Kyffhaeuser War Relief (Kyffhaeuser Kriegshilfswerk)  
 Labor Council for Negro Rights  
 Labor Research Association, Inc.  
 Labor Youth League  
 League of American Writers  
 Lictor Society (Italian Black Shirts)  
 Macedonian-American People's League  
 Mario Morgantini Circle  
 Maritime Labor Committee to Defend Al Lannon  
 Massachusetts Minute Women for Peace  
 Maurice Braverman Defense Committee

Michigan Civil Rights Federation  
 Michigan School of Social Science  
 Nanka Teikoku Gunyudan (Imperial Military Friends Group  
 or Southern California War Veterans)  
 National Association of Mexican Americans (also known as  
 Asociacion Nacional Mexico-Americana)  
 National Blue Star Mothers of America (not to be confused with  
 the Blue Star Mothers of America organized in February 1942)  
 National Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners  
 National Committee for Freedom of the Press  
 National Committee to Win the Peace  
 National Conference on American Policy in China and the  
 Far East (a conference called by the Committee for a  
 Democratic Far Eastern Policy)  
 National Council of Americans of Croatian Descent  
 National Council of American-Soviet Friendship  
 National Federation for Constitutional Liberties  
 National Labor Conference for Peace  
 National Negro Congress  
 National Negro Labor Council  
 Nationalist Action League  
 Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico  
 Nature Friends of America (since 1935)  
 Negro Labor Victory Committee  
 New Committee for Publications  
 Nichibei Kogyo Kaisha (The Great Fujii Theatre)  
 North American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy  
 North American Spanish Aid Committee  
 North Philadelphia Forum  
 Northwest Japanese Association  
 Ohio School of Social Sciences  
 Oklahoma Committee to Defend Political Prisoners  
 Oklahoma League for Political Education (See Communist  
 Political Association)  
 Original Southern Klans, Incorporated  
 Pacific Northwest Labor School, Seattle, Washington  
 Palo Alto Peace Club  
 Partido del Pueblo of Panama (operating in the Canal Zone)  
 Peace Information Center  
 Peace Movement of Ethiopia  
 People's Drama, Inc.  
 People's Educational Association (Incorporated under name  
 Los Angeles Educational Association, Inc.), also known as  
 People's Educational Center, People's University,  
 People's School  
 People's Educational and Press Association of Texas  
 People's Institute of Applied Religion  
 People's Radio Foundation, Inc.  
 Philadelphia Labor Committee for Negro Rights  
 Philadelphia School of Social Science and Art  
 Photo League (New York City)  
 Political Prisoners' Welfare Committee



Polonia Society of the IWO  
 Progressive German-Americans, also known as Progressive  
 German-Americans of Chicago  
 Proletarian Party of America  
 Protestant War Veterans of the United States, Inc.  
 Provisional Committee of Citizens for Peace, Southwest Area  
 Puertorriquenos Unidos (Puerto Ricans United)  
 Quad City Committee for Peace  
 Revolutionary Workers League  
 Romanian-American Fraternal Society  
 Russian American Society, Inc.  
 Sakura Kai (Patriotic Society, or Cherry Association--  
 composed of veterans of Russo-Japanese War)  
 Samuel Adams School, Boston, Massachusetts  
 Santa Barbara Peace Forum  
 Schappes Defense Committee  
 Schneiderman-Darcy Defense Committee  
 School of Jewish Studies, New York City  
 Seattle Labor School, Seattle, Washington  
 Serbian-American Fraternal Society  
 Serbian Vidoudan Council  
 Shinto Temples  
 Silver Shirt Legion of America  
 Slavic Council of Southern California  
 Slovak Workers Society  
 Slovenian-American National Council  
 Socialist Workers Party, including American Committee  
 for European Workers' Relief  
 Socialist Youth League  
 Sokoku Kai (Fatherland Society)  
 Southern Negro Youth Congress  
 Suiko Sha (Reserve Officers Association, Los Angeles)  
 Tom Paine School of Social Science, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania  
 Tom Paine School of Westchester, New York  
 Tri-State Negro Trade Union Council  
 Ukrainian-American Fraternal Union  
 Union of American Croats  
 Union of New York Veterans  
 United American Spanish Aid Committee  
 United Committee of Jewish Societies and Landsmanschaft  
 Federations, also known as Coordination Committee of  
 Jewish Landsmanschaften and Fraternal Organizations  
 United Committee of South Slavic Americans  
 United Harlem Tenants and Consumers Organization  
 United May Day Committee  
 United Negro and Allied Veterans of America  
 Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade

Veterans Against Discrimination of Civil Rights Congress  
of New York (See Civil Rights Congress)  
Virginia League for People's Education (See Communist  
Political Association)  
Voice of Freedom Committee  
Walt Whitman School of Social Science, Newark, New Jersey  
Washington Bookshop Association  
Washington Committee to Defend the Bill of Rights  
Washington Committee for Democratic Action  
Washington Commonwealth Federation  
Washington Pension Union  
Wisconsin Conference on Social Legislation  
Workers Alliance (since April 1936)  
Workers Party, including Socialist Youth League  
Yiddisher Kultur Farband  
Young Communist League  
Yugoslav-American Cooperative Home, Inc.  
Yugoslav Seamen's Club, Inc.

CERTIFICATE

ALAN H. BELMONT

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE

Name (Please type or print)

Office or Division

1. Are you now or have you ever been a member of, contributed to, affiliated or associated with, any organization listed on the attachment to this certificate?

NO

Answer "Yes" or "No"

2. If your answer is "Yes" state the name of the organization, dates of membership and extent of participation. An explanation regarding membership in any of these organizations may be attached hereto on a separate sheet of paper, if you desire to explain the circumstances of your membership.

NameAddressFromToOffice HeldCERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that the above information is correct and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief. I make this statement with the understanding that it will be used by the Department of Justice in carrying out the provisions of Executive Order 10450 and with knowledge that any false statement or omission of material fact may be sufficient cause for my dismissal or rejection of my application, and, further, may be cause for punishment as a violation of law including Section 1001, Title 18, U. S. Code.

April 9, 1954

(Date)

Alan H. Belmont

(Usual Signature)

24 APR 27 1954

Attachment

RECORDED-12

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

## REPORT OF PERFORMANCE RATING

Name of Employee: Alan H. Belmont

Where Assigned: Domestic Intelligence Division  
(Division) (Section, Unit)

Payroll Title: Assistant Director

Rating Period: from 4-1-53 to 3-31-54

ADJECTIVE RATING: SATISFACTORY  
Outstanding, Satisfactory, Unsatisfactory

Employee's  
Initials

\* Rated by: Ceyde A. Tolson Associate 5/19/54  
Signature Title Date

Reviewed by: \_\_\_\_\_  
Signature Title Date

Rating approved by: W. R. Glavin Assistant Director, MAY 19 1954  
Signature Federal Bureau of Investigation Title Date

RECORDED - 55

### TYPE OF REPORT

(X) Official  
(X) Annual

( ) Searched  
( ) Administrative  
( ) Numbered  
( ) 60-day  
( ) Transfer  
( ) Separation from service  
( ) Special

4 MAY 21 1954

67-74639-347  
JUN 1 1954  
38

June 11, 1954

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Alan H. Belmont  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

RECORDED  
9-25-91

1565 S.D.P./KSL

Dear Mr. Belmont:

I have carefully reviewed and considered your memorandum of explanation with respect to the erroneous statement contained in a summary memorandum submitted by the Domestic Intelligence Division on May 11, 1954, regarding current problems in connection with cases of suspected espionage at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, and the Federal Telecommunications Laboratories, Nutley, New Jersey. As you know the summary in question stated that the Army had failed to furnish certain Photostats to the FBI whereas the true situation was that because the Army delayed in preparing the necessary Photostats our New York Office was instructed to assist in this project and did so.

While I realize that the summary memorandum in question was a condensation of a considerable amount of material, this factor is no excuse for the glaring error which occurred since conciseness in presentation cannot justify a failure to present the true facts. Accordingly, I shall expect you to issue the necessary instructions to your subordinates to take greater pains in preparing such memoranda so that in the future they will be entirely accurate as well as brief.


Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

CC: Mr. Boardman (Personal Attention)

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_



RECEIVED DIRECTOR  
JUN 11 1954  
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman *LB*

DATE: June 2, 1954

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont *AB*

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA - Brief  
 (Prosecution of Additional Communist  
 Functionaries Under the Smith Act - New Haven)  
 Internal Security - C  
 FBI File 100-3-74-32

Tolson  
 Ladd  
 Nichols  
 Belmont  
 Glavin  
 Harbo  
 Rosen  
 Tracy  
 Gearty  
 Mohr  
 Winterrowd  
 Tele. Room  
 Holloman  
 Nease  
 Gandy

On Saturday, May 29, 1954, seven functionaries of the Communist Party of Connecticut were arrested simultaneously on the basis of complaints and warrants charging conspiracy to violate the Smith Act of 1940. Seven of the subjects were arrested in Connecticut by New Haven Agents and three were arrested in New York by New York and New Haven Agents. The three arrested in New York were members of the Connecticut State Communist Party Board and two of them have been operating for sometime in the Party's underground apparatus. Thus, these arrests have dealt a smashing blow to the operation of the Communist Party in Connecticut.

The successful completion of this operation demanded the closest cooperation and teamwork between the New Haven and New York Offices and likewise necessitated long hours of planning and preparation by personnel of both offices. The entire Agent personnel and most of the clerical personnel of the New Haven Office as well as a large squad of New York Agents were used in this operation which took place over a long holiday week end. All personnel involved gave freely of their time to afford the meticulous attention essential to the excellent results achieved.

The Special Agents in Charge of the New Haven and New York Offices have recommended that a general letter of commendation be given by the Bureau to these offices for the success of this apprehension program. Both Special Agents in Charge point out that in view of the large number of employees involved and the excellent work done by all of them, it is not possible to single out any one employee for individual commendation.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

The Domestic Intelligence Division concurs in the recommendation of the Special Agents in Charge of the New Haven and New York Offices. It is recommended that this memorandum be forwarded to the Administrative Division in order that these letters of commendation may be prepared.

Attachments *sent*

RECORDED - 78

RECEIVED - WOHU

13 JUN 10 1954

FJB:nsb

PHYS FILE

ADDITION: (1/1/54)

[illegible]

1944

Let's see  
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7/10

June 8, 1954

Personal and Confidential

Mr. Alan H. Belmont  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED BY 1565 SDB/168  
ON 9-25-91

Dear Belmont:

I am taking this opportunity to commend you for the very splendid fashion in which you directed the recent arrests in the New Haven and New York Divisions of a number of Communist Party Functionaries under the Smith Act.


Your effective supervision and coordination of this operation in the two divisions are certainly noteworthy and I want you to know I am most appreciative.

Sincerely yours,  
J. Edgar Hoover

LRH:mk

RECORDED

Salutation per Reading Room



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Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
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Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

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JUN 9 11 54 '54

RECEIVED DIRECTOR  
U. S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE  
JUN 9 11 34 AM '54



June 14, 1954

Personal and Confidential

Mr. Alan H. Belmont  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

1565 SDP/158  
ON 9-25-91

Dear Belmont:

It is again my pleasure to commend you for the splendid work which has recently been performed in the Domestic Intelligence Division concerning the investigations and apprehensions of a number of members of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico.

I did not want the occasion to pass without telling you of my appreciation for your admirable direction of this operation.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

LRH:rk

RECORDED-33

Salutation per Reading Room.

JUN 15 1954  
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Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
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Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

136  
MAILED 8  
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JUN 22 1954

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JUN 15 12 29 PM '54  
U. S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

Handwritten signatures and initials.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: June 12, 1954

FROM :MR. A. H. BELMONT

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
 Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
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 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
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 Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: PINKERTON NATIONAL DETECTIVE AGENCY, INC.;  
 MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION CONCERNING;  
 POSSIBLE LEAK OF SECURITY INFORMATION  
 FROM FILES OF NEW YORK OFFICE  
 (62-New)

[A. H. BELMONT]

Reference is made to my memorandum to you of June 14, 1954, which reflected that information had probably been furnished from FBI files in New York to the Pinkerton National Detective Agency concerning Thamel P. Thamel, the subject of a security case. The Bureau was originally advised of this matter by letter from the Indianapolis Office dated June 2, 1954.

The Director asks to be advised (1) why the Indianapolis Office delayed in forwarding this information to the Bureau and (2) what was the cause of the delay in handling this matter in the Domestic Intelligence Division.

With respect to the Director's first question the Indianapolis Office advised by teletype dated June 12, as follows.

The Bureau was originally advised of this matter by letter from the Indianapolis Office dated June 2, 1954. SA Dudley S. Horth of the Fort Wayne Indianapolis Residence Agency received the information set forth in the Indianapolis letter to the Bureau of June 2, 1954, on the afternoon of Wednesday May 26, 1954. SA Horth reviewed the enclosures and could not determine the data therein actually came from a Bureau source since he did not have the Indianapolis file and had no specific knowledge of the content of the New York file. He felt the logical approach was to forward the information by letter to the Bureau with all the enclosures since it could not be resolved without comparison of the enclosures with the information contained in the files at the Bureau and at the New York Office. He did not feel that a phone call to the Indianapolis Office would resolve the matter since it would be necessary to send the enclosures to the Bureau in order that it could be determined whether the data actually came from the Bureau or from some other agency having access to Bureau reports. SA Horth prepared a rough draft letter in the Fort Wayne Resident Agency which was completed on the morning of May 27 and mailed this rough draft letter and the enclosures to the Indianapolis Office on May 27.

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 Memo to Mohr  
 DECEMBER 1954  
 2/15/54

67-441-1724  
 Searched \_\_\_\_\_  
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 17 JUL 1954  
 FBI

FJB:ej

The rough draft letter prepared by SA Horth together with the enclosures were first observed by Supervisor Howard A. King of the Indianapolis Office on the early morning of June 2, 1954. The rough draft letter was blocked stamped into the ~~Indianapolis~~ New York Office on June 1, 1954, to the best of Supervisor King's recollection. The legal holiday of May 31 intervened between the mailing of the rough draft letter from Fort Wayne and the receipt of that rough draft letter in the Indianapolis Office and the subsequent routing of the matter to Supervisor King for approval before final typing. Supervisor King noted the content of the rough draft letter and the enclosures and showed the rough draft and the enclosures to SAC Blaylock who was leaving the office with a squad of agents for Oldenburg, Indiana, where a bank robbery had occurred at 9:00 A.M. on Wednesday June 2, 1954. SAC Blaylock examined the content and initialed the rough draft thereby approving it for typing and forwarding to the Bureau. The letter and the enclosures were typed in final form and sent to the Bureau on June 2, 1954.

Supervisor King received the file on security subject Thamel and observed that there were no indications in the Indianapolis file that the New York Office had ever received copies of reports on Thamel. Supervisor King and SAC Blaylock both felt that only the Bureau could resolve the question concerning the source of the data in the enclosures and that the Bureau could not do so without having possession of the enclosures for comparison purposes; therefore it was felt a phone call to the Bureau would be of no assistance since the Bureau would need the enclosures before an analysis could be made. In view of this, a letter transmitting the enclosures to the Bureau appeared to be the most logical procedure.

SAC Blaylock indicated that the delay from May 26 the date SA Horth received the information to June 2 the date the letter and enclosures were forwarded to the Bureau was due primarily to the intervening weekend and holiday on May 31, the delay in postal service from Fort Wayne to Indianapolis which points have no direct train service and the congestion of mail received in the Indianapolis Office over the long weekend which had to be processed on Tuesday June 1, 1954.

SAC Blaylock stated that SA Horth acted in a reasonably prompt manner in forwarding the enclosures to the Indianapolis Office and Supervisor King was prompt in advising him (SAC Blaylock) as soon as the matter came to King's attention. SAC Blaylock recommended no administrative action against SA Horth and Supervisor King of the Indianapolis Office.

SAC Blaylock stated that he saw the material and personally read and approved the letter and assumed responsibility for the matter.

I agree with SAC Blaylock that SA North and Supervisor King of the Indianapolis Office acted in a reasonably prompt manner. Since SAC Blaylock was aware that this matter was in his office and did not recognize that it should have been telephoned to the Bureau, I recommend that he be forward a letter of censure. He should be also instructed to immediately call to the attention of all the Agents in his office the absolute necessity of advising the Bureau immediately when information comes to their attention regarding a possible leak of information from the Bureau's files.

With respect to the Director's request to be advised of any delay in handling this matter in the Domestic Intelligence Division I wish to advise as follows.

The June 2 letter from the Indianapolis Office was stamped into the Internal Security Section at 12:33 P.M. June 4, 1954, and was routed to Supervisor [ ] by the Mail Clerk. Supervisor [ ] received the letter shortly thereafter. He did not make a note of the exact time it reached his office. Upon reading Indianapolis letter and the enclosures Supervisor [ ] could not tell whether the leak came from the FBI or from some other agency to which we might have disseminated reports on security subject Thamel. He did not feel he should call the matter to the attention of Bureau officials until he had checked the files and therefore be in a position to furnish more detailed information. He immediately called file on security subject Thamel on Friday June 4 and on the morning of Monday June 7 received Section 6. The information he was seeking did not appear in Section 6 of the file and he immediately sent for all sections of the file on Thamel. The remaining 5 sections were delivered to Supervisor [ ] Office on the late afternoon of June 7. It was necessary to make a detailed inspection of this 6 section file and it was not until the late afternoon of Thursday June 10 that Supervisor [ ] was able to locate the pertinent information in the file which strongly indicated the leak of information to the Pinkerton Detective Agency had come from the New York Office.

Upon determining this Supervisor [ ] discussed this matter with Joseph A. Sullivan Supervisor in Charge of the Administrative and Correlation Desk in the Internal Security Section. The discussion concerned the manner in which the matter should be handled.

Supervisor [ ] stated that he now realizes this matter should have been immediately called to the attention of Bureau officials and he sincerely regrets that he did not do so. He explained that until he had located the pertinent information in our files late on the afternoon of June 10 it was impossible to tell whether the leak of information from the Bureau's file had come from the Bureau or from other intelligence agencies to whom we normally submit reports. He realizes now that his judgment was faulty in not having immediately called the matter to Bureau officials.

Mr. Sullivan Supervisor in Charge of the Administrative and Correlation Desk in the Internal Security Section stated that when he discussed this matter with Supervisor [ ] it was ready for dictation and he instructed [ ] to prepare the memorandum and necessary instructions to the field on Friday June 11. He states he now realizes that he should have immediately brought the matter to the attention of Bureau officials when it was called to his attention by Supervisor [ ]. He sincerely regrets his failure to do so and will be careful to see there is no recurrence of a situation of this matter.

b6

Mr. Sullivan brought this matter to the attention of Section Chief F. J. Baumgardner on the late afternoon of Friday June 11, and he immediately brought it to my attention.

I promptly advised you of the facts and also immediately issued telephonic instructions to SAC Kelly of the New York Office.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That SAC Blaylock of the Indianapolis Office be censured for his failure to recognize the importance of this matter and telephonically furnish the facts to the Bureau. SAC Blaylock should also be instructed to immediately call to the attention of his office the absolute necessity for immediately advising the Bureau upon receipt of any information which indicated a possible leak of information from the Bureau's files.

(2) That a letter of censure be directed to [ ] of the Domestic Intelligence Division for his failure to promptly bring this matter to the attention of Bureau officials when he first received it on June 4, 1954.

(3) That Supervisor in Charge Joseph A. Sullivan of the Domestic Intelligence Division be censured for his failure to immediately call this matter to the attention of Bureau officials when he first learned of it on the late afternoon of June 10, 1954.

JAB

JAB

SEE ADDENDUM PAGE SIX

ADDENDUM: June 18, 1954 LVB:WMJ

The Pinkerton Report which was forwarded June 2 by the Indianapolis Office reflects contact (1) of a "member of a Governmental agency" on March 18, 19, and 22, 1954. The information contained in the Pinkerton Report <sup>was</sup> on Thamel P. Thamel, organizer for Local 916, United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America. Ex-Agent William B. Heckman brought this to the attention of the Resident Agent Dudley S. Horth at Fort Wayne, presumably because the ex-Agent felt there was an indication of a security leak from FBI files. He considered it of sufficient import to bring it to our attention.

(2) Further, the Pinkerton Report on page one reflects contact by Pinkerton employee E. J. A. with the Cincinnati Office of the FBI on March 15, 1954, where "Informant #2 stated he knew of no investigations on subject." E. J. A. comments that this FBI employee checked the record in the presence of "E. J. A." and found no record of subject but said he would check the files himself and telephone his findings to the Pinkerton Agency. This item indicated possible misconduct on the part of an FBI employee in the Cincinnati Office and a minimum of extreme bad judgement on the part of such FBI employee, in the event the Pinkerton Report was factually correct. Therefore, Resident Agent Horth, upon receipt of this information, was bound to have the above knowledge. A Resident Agent should be thoroughly aware of the necessity for immediately alerting his official superior of situations indicating potential embarrassment to the Bureau. This Resident Agent instead sent in a rough draft communication to his office without any other notification to his SAC. I consider this extremely poor judgment and feel this Agent is not competent to remain in a Resident Agency, and, therefore, recommend his transfer from the Resident Agency at Fort Wayne.

Supervisor Howard A. King of the Indianapolis Office observed the rough draft letter and enclosures on the early morning of June 2, 1954, and brought it immediately to the attention

of SAC Blaylock. I recommend no action as to Supervisor King.

SAC Blaylock at the time the matter was brought to his attention was apparently getting ready to go to the scene of a bank robbery. I still feel that he exercised extremely bad judgment in the matter in his failure to recognize the necessity for immediately notifying the Bureau. I recommend censure and probation. telephonically

b6

Supervisor [ ] was cognizant of this situation from shortly after 12:33 P.M., June 4, 1954, and made no notification to his superior until the late afternoon of Thursday, June 10, 1954. His failure to recognize the dangerousness of the material in his possession indicates a complete lack of administrative ability. I, therefore, recommend his removal from supervisory duties.



Joseph A. Sullivan, Supervisor in Charge of the Administrative and Correlation Desk in the Internal Security Section, was advised of the information developed by Supervisor [redacted] up to Thursday, June 10, 1954. By this time the seriousness of the problem involved should have been completely apparent to Supervisor Sullivan. Instead of immediately reporting it to his superior, F. J. Baumgardner, he merely "instructed [redacted] to prepare the memorandum and necessary instructions to the field on Friday, June 11." If a Supervisor in Charge is unable to recognize the necessity for immediate notification, I feel that that Agent does not have sufficient maturity or experience to warrant his continued assignment as Supervisor in Charge. I recommend he be relieved of this duty.

A. H. ~~X~~ BELMONT

According to Belmont's memorandum, Baumgardner immediately upon being cognizant of the situation in the late afternoon of Friday, June 11, 1954, brought it to Belmont's attention. Belmont in turn telephoned me and briefly advised me of the situation and I instructed Belmont to immediately advise the Director of the situation. I do not recommend that administrative action as to Mr. Baumgardner or Mr. Belmont be taken in so far as their handling of this matter is concerned. However, I recommend letters of censure to Messrs. Baumgardner, Belmont, and Boardman for the laxity in the administration of this Division which permits a situation of this kind to develop.

L. V. ~~X~~ Boardman *LB*

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED BY  
ON 9-2

I have recently observed an instance of lax handling of a most important matter in the Domestic Intelligence Division. Specifically, an agent under your supervision received a memorandum from the Indianapolis Field Division on June 4, 1954, setting forth information indicating a possible leak of security information from FBI files. Although this supervisor should have noted from the content of the Indianapolis memorandum that it should have been brought immediately to the attention of his official superior he did not do so until June 10, 1954. After he had discussed this matter with the supervisor in charge of the Administrative and Correlation Desk in the Internal Security Section of the Domestic Intelligence Division on June 10, 1954, the supervisor in charge did not report this information to his section chief until the late afternoon of June 11, 1954.

I have continually stressed the necessity for bringing such matters of importance immediately to the attention of the appropriate Bureau officials and I shall expect you to take immediate steps to insure that there is no recurrence of such a situation among the personnel of the Domestic Intelligence Division.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
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Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

DCM' ggs 94

CC: Mr. Boardman (Personal Attention)

**COMM - FBI**

JUN 17 1954

**MAILED 31**

June 14, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON  
MR. BOARDMAN  
MR. BELMONT  
MR. NICHOLS

A.H. Belmont

I have just learned today that Mr. Belmont failed to confirm in writing the understanding which he had with representatives of the Criminal Division a few days ago in discussing the Major Irving Peress case that the Bureau did not believe that the informant whom the Department indicated it might desire to use in this case should be disclosed and made available for testimony.

(Mr. Belmont, as I understand it, expressed this view orally but failed to confirm it by memorandum to the Department.) I have on numerous occasions, both in writing and orally, specifically instructed that any discussions or understandings had with the Department, particularly the Criminal Division, should be confirmed in writing. We have on too many occasions been embarrassed by the Criminal Division, particularly claiming one thing and representatives of the Bureau claiming another and it was because of this that I instructed that there must be written memoranda confirming any oral understanding. I again reiterate these instructions and I don't want any exceptions made to them or any deviations from them.

RECORDED-65

67-94639-349

(In connection with the above matter, the Attorney General today informed me that he had been advised by the Criminal Division that they had discussed this matter with representatives of the Bureau and the Criminal Division was awaiting further word from the Bureau as to its position in regard to the informant in the Peress case.) This again proves the point that I have endeavored to get over for sometime, namely, that the Bureau's only protection is to put its position down in black and white. Obviously the Criminal Division did not understand Mr. Belmont's position given to them orally, or if they did they are now misrepresenting it to the Attorney General.

(I have taken the position this morning in conference with the Attorney General that I understood the Bureau had already advised the Department that it was opposed to the disclosure of this informant and that the Bureau considered the informant indispensable.)

(I have since talked with Mr. Belmont who informs me that I am wrong in that the informant is not indispensable but merely valuable.)

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Boardman  
Nichols  
Belmont  
Glavin  
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Tele. Room  
Holloman  
Gandy

SECTION D. O.

TIME 10:06 PM

DATE 6-15-54

BY

JUL 1 1954

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

The definition of the word "indispensable" as found in the Winston Dictionary is "absolutely necessary or requisite, or essential." Since this informant is not essential or absolutely requisite I do not see how I can adhere to the position which I have taken, namely, that the informant should not be made available in the Peress case. (All informants are valuable, otherwise we would not be paying them, but I have construed that informants who are absolutely essential to our coverage in security matters were indispensable and I had assumed that this was the case on the informant in the Peress matter. However, since this is not the fact, memoranda should be addressed to the Attorney General advising him that upon reevaluation of this matter, the Bureau's informant will be made available in the Peress case.)

Hereafter, I desire that Messrs. Boardman and Belmont make up their minds before they recommend something to me and then later I ascertain that the facts as I assumed them to be are not as represented in memoranda to me. (It is embarrassing to take a position with the Department, particularly in a very important matter, and then have to reverse oneself.)

Very truly yours,

1st JEH.

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

JEH:mpd

Tolson	
Boardman	
Nichols	
Belmont	
Evans	
Boyd	
Glavin	
Ladd	
Malone	
McGuire	
Rowd	
Tracy	
Harbo	
Quinn	
Nease	

June 22, 1954

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Alan H. Belmont  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

b6  
b7C

1565 SDP/165R  
OM 9-25-91

Dear Mr. Belmont:

In connection with the delay in disseminating to another governmental agency certain information of a security nature developed concerning [redacted] a midshipman at the United States Naval Academy, I have noted that you failed to initially analyze this matter completely. In a memorandum submitted regarding this delay in dissemination, which memorandum was approved by you, it was stated that information previously developed indicating that Midshipman [redacted] had been in contact with the subject of a Bureau security investigation should have been disseminated at the time some subversive derogatory information was developed in February, 1954, concerning the subject of the Bureau investigation. This analysis was wrong as the information should have been disseminated at the time it was first learned that these individuals were in contact during May, 1953.

b6  
b7C

I have also noted in connection with this same matter that it was necessary for a memorandum prepared by you to be returned because you had failed to thoroughly explore the reason why the Kansas City Office did not make appropriate dissemination concerning the contact between Midshipman [redacted] and the subject of the Bureau investigation. Here again there was a failure on your part to completely analyze the situation.

I must insist that you afford such matters more careful thought and consideration in the future so that there will be no repetition of such delinquencies on your part.

Very truly yours,

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
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Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

COMM - FBI

JUN 23 1954

MAILED 31

RECORDED - 54

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

FDH 998 99  
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JUN 29 1954

JPM  
ST

Mr. Mohr

June 15, 1954

H. L. Edwards

A H B L T

Information Concerning

DELAY AT SEAT OF GOVERNMENT IN  
DISSEMINATING INFORMATION TO ONI

b6  
b7C

You will recall that [ ] is one of the 3 midshipmen whose commissions were recently held up by the United States Naval Academy because of their allegedly being security risks. As a result of inquiry into the question of whether pertinent information in Bureau files concerning [ ] was properly and promptly disseminated, the following delinquencies have been revealed on the part of supervisory personnel at the Seat of Government. (Separate memoranda are being submitted regarding derelictions on the part of field personnel in this matter).

b6  
b7C

The Kansas City Office submitted a report dated July 13, 1953, (received in Internal Security Section at Bureau July 21, 1953) which reflected that [ ] had written a letter to [ ] subject of a Security Matter-C investigation. This information was developed as a result of a mail cover maintained on [ ] by the Kansas City Office. The Kansas City report set out a lead for Baltimore to identify [ ] at the United States Naval Academy and determine the extent of his association with [ ]. Baltimore verified that [ ] was a midshipman at the Naval Academy and that he is the [ ]. This information was reported in Baltimore report dated August 27, 1953, (received in Internal Security Section September 2, 1953). The information regarding contact between Midshipman [ ] and security subject [ ] was not disseminated to ONI (Office of Naval Intelligence) until April 1, 1954.

b6  
b7C

The [ ] case was supervised at the Seat of Government prior to September 4, 1953, by SA Supervisor [ ], who was responsible for disseminating the information when it was first received. Supervisor [ ] does not recall this case among the hundreds which came over his desk. He expressed sincere regret that he had not disseminated the [ ] information to ONI.

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

On September 4, 1953, the [ ] case was reassigned to Supervisor [ ] due to a change in office of origin. Supervisor Short does not recall specifically reviewing the [ ] file.

Personnel files of SAs [ ], Short, Baumgardner and Assistant Director/Beumont. Attachments (5)

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but states he must have done so as it is his custom to review a case assigned to him as a result of a change of office of origin. His attention was flagged to the information concerning [redacted] by Minneapolis letter dated March 18, 1954, requesting authority to interview [redacted]. This letter mentioned correspondence between [redacted] and [redacted]. He thereupon disseminated the information to ONI on April 1, 1954, with copies of 3 investigative reports. He expressed regret that this information was not disseminated previously.

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In a memorandum submitted by Mr. Belmont on June 9, 1954, regarding the failure to disseminate information regarding [redacted] to ONI, the statement was made that ONI should have been advised concerning [redacted] upon receipt of a New York report dated February 3, 1954, which reflected some subversive derogatory information regarding [redacted]. It was pointed out that ONI was not advised when it was first determined the [redacted] had been in contact with [redacted] during May, 1953, because at that time information that [redacted] was possibly a Communist Party member had not been verified. The Director commented, "This was wrong. We should have advised ONI in May, 1953, not as you state in February, 1954."

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It is further noted that the initial memorandum prepared by Mr. Belmont in connection with the failure to properly disseminate the information in this instance failed to thoroughly explore the reason why the Kansas City Office did not make appropriate dissemination to ONI concerning contact between [redacted] and [redacted]. It was therefore necessary for Mr. Boardman to return the memorandum to Mr. Belmont for inclusion of this information.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS:

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SA Supervisor [redacted] Non-Veteran:

Mr. Belmont recommended that SA [redacted], who supervised the [redacted] case at the Seat of Government until September 4, 1953, be censured for his failure to disseminate to ONI information concerning the fact that [redacted] had written to [redacted] in May, 1953. Mr. Boardman recommended censure and probation, pointing out that SA [redacted] failed to observe the necessity for dissemination on receipt and review of Kansas City report dated July 19, 1953, and Baltimore report dated August 27, 1953.

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The Administrative Division recommends:

(1) That Supervisor [redacted] be censured and placed on

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

probation for his failure to see that this information was properly disseminated.

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(2) That his pending reallocation to Grade GS-14 be cancelled and that he be reconsidered for such reallocation in September, 1954. (It is noted that by memorandum dated June 8, 1954, it was recommended that [ ] be reallocated to Grade GS-14 and this recommendation was subsequently approved by the Director. However, action to effect the actual reallocation has been held in abeyance pending outcome of this matter and [ ] has not been advised of his reallocation).

SA Supervisor James G. Short, Non-Veteran:

Mr. Belmont recommended that SA Short, who assumed supervision of the Strassberg case on September 4, 1953, be censured for his failure to disseminate the information concerning Pollack until April 1, 1954. Mr. Boardman concurred.

The Administrative Division concurs in the above recommendation that SA Short be censured for his delay in disseminating this information after he assumed supervision of the Strassberg case. More Severe action is not being recommended in view of this agent's excellent prior record.



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as a supervisor at the Seat of Government (as reflected by the attached permanent brief) and the fact that the original responsibility for dissemination of this information rested with Supervisor [ ] who supervised this case prior to September 4, 1953.

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Section Chief Fred J. Daumgardner, Non-Veteran:

Mr. Belmont and Mr. Boardman recommended that Section Chief Daumgardner of the Internal Security Section be censured for his failure to completely analyze this case prior to presentation to the Director as reflected by the statement in the memorandum of June 9, 1954, that the information concerning [ ] should have been furnished CMI upon receipt of New York report dated February 3, 1954, when the information should have been disseminated at the time we first learned that [ ] had written [ ] in May, 1953.

The Administrative Division concurs.

(Over)

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: June 12, 1954

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

INFORMATION CONCERNING

Domestic Intelligence Div.

With reference to my memorandum to you dated June 10, 1954, the question has been raised as to why we did not carry our memorandum further on page 6 to reflect the dissemination on [REDACTED], to ONI on January 18, 1954, and to include report sent to ONI on January 20, 1954. The write-up in my memorandum of June 10, 1954, on [REDACTED] was prepared specifically to answer the Director's question as to why it took from November 11, 1953, to December 17, 1953, to effect the identification of [REDACTED]. Therefore, we restricted our comments up to the positive identification of the Unknown Subject as [REDACTED]. The further details were set forth in my memorandum of June 9, 1954, and were not repeated.

The facts concerning dissemination subsequent to December 17, 1953, to ONI are these. Baltimore Agents interviewed [REDACTED] on December 17, 1953, on the possibility that he might be the owner of the car in which Unknown Subject visited Soviet Embassy, and might in fact be the Unknown Subject. The interview was conducted with knowledge of Naval Academy officials and ONI because we had notified ONI of our intent on December 16, 1953. On December 17, [REDACTED] admitted to be owner of car in question and identified [REDACTED] as being identical with Unknown Subject. Following the interview, the Baltimore Agents on December 17, 1953, furnished the results to Commander [REDACTED] U. S. Naval Academy, and ONI Agent [REDACTED] of the Potomac River Naval Command and advised them that since Shimek was Navy personnel, no further investigation would be conducted.

The Baltimore Office first reported [REDACTED] identification to the Bureau by teletype at 6:03 P.M., January 7, 1954. This teletype stated that Naval Academy officials and ONI had been advised. (ONI's investigative report on [REDACTED] states that they were officially advised by the FBI of [REDACTED] identity on December 17, 1953.) This teletype was received in the Domestic Intelligence Division at 6:40 P.M. on January 7, 1954, and in

cc - 1 - Administrative Division

AHB:rmw

RECEIVED - WORK

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Tolson  
Ladd  
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FBI

3-JPM

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: June 10, 1954

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

Tolson  
Ladd  
Belmont  
Clegg  
Glavin  
Harbo  
Rosen  
Tracy  
Mohr  
Winterrowd  
Tele. Room  
Holloman  
Gandy

SUBJECT:

INFORMATION CONCERNING

67-46207-36

With reference to my memorandum to you of June 9, 1954, the Director inquired, "How did we come to interview [redacted] on May 27, 1954? We had a mail cover on him in May, 1953. A thirty-day mail cover was placed on [redacted] during May, 1953, as an investigative step. [redacted] was, at that time, in Columbia, Missouri, (Kansas City Division), and no subversive activity concerning his activities was developed there. In August, 1953, [redacted] moved to Grand Forks, North Dakota, and origin of the case was transferred to Minneapolis Office on August 31, 1953. From that time until interview authorized on May 13, 1954, our Minneapolis Office conducted investigation to determine whether [redacted] was engaged in subversive activities in Grand Forks, and our New York Office was also conducting investigation at New York to determine whether the allegations set out on the anonymous postcard, which was the basis of this investigation, could be substantiated. Since we were unable to establish definitely whether [redacted] had ever been a Communist Party member, the next logical lead was to interview him. Our Minneapolis Office was authorized to do this on May 13, 1954. He was interviewed on May 27, 1954, at Grand Forks, North Dakota. Minneapolis furnished a summary of this interview on June 9, 1954, which reflected [redacted] was evasive, but reluctantly admitted he had something to do with the Communist Party from the time he was sixteen years old (1943) until about 1948. He admitted International Workers Order membership in 1949 but would not furnish information concerning other individuals. He was partially cooperative during the interview, but terminated it by saying he had another appointment. Minneapolis advised a complete report on the results of the interview was being submitted on June 9, 1954. When this is received, it will be immediately disseminated to ONI. Up to this time we have no definite information of subversive activity by [redacted]. He wrote [redacted] in 1953. In order to pin this down as far as we can Minneapolis has been instructed to reinterview [redacted] at the earliest feasible date and develop all information including the degree of association with [redacted]. The Director asked why it took nearly four weeks to interview the subject. In this regard the Minneapolis Office advised Bureau authority for interview was received May 14, 1954. The case was assigned to SA [redacted] who left Minneapolis on road trip for North Dakota on May 18, 1954, driving. He covered Fargo, Grand Forks, Minot, Williston, and Bismarck, North Dakota. SA [redacted] was instructed to have the Grand Forks, North Dakota Resident Agent, SA Kenneth Wheeler Brown, present during the interview of [redacted].

cc - Administrative Division

Attachment

13 JUL 10 1954

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MAISON

Assistant Director Alan W. Belmont:

Mr. Belmont recommended that he also be censured for the failure to completely analyze the [ ] case prior to presentation to the Director in his memorandum of June 9, 1954, as set out above. Mr. Boardman concurred and also recommended that Mr. Belmont be censured because it was necessary for Mr. Boardman to return an initial memorandum prepared by Mr. Belmont because of the latter's failure to explore the reason why Kansas City Office had not made appropriate dissemination concerning the contact between [ ] and [ ].

The Administrative Division concurs.

Additional Recommendation:

Mr. Belmont and Mr. Boardman further recommended that the attached SAC Letter be sent to the field setting forth the Bureau's responsibilities to disseminate derogatory information concerning members of the armed forces. Appropriate manual editions are also being prepared by the Domestic Intelligence Division.

The Administrative Division concurs.

Separate memoranda are being submitted regarding failure on the part of personnel in the field to carry out their responsibilities in this matter.

PERMANENT BRIEFS OF THE PERSONNEL FILES OF SAs LAMINGTON, SECRET, PATMGARDNER AND ASSISTANT DIRECTOR BELMONT ARE ATTACHED.

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the Espionage Section on Friday, January 8, 1954. It reached the Supervisor on Monday, January 11, 1954. Since the teletype revealed that the Navy had been advised, it was felt desirable to furnish the data in the Bureau's files to ONI when confirming the identification of [ ] accordingly, the Bureau's indices were checked and a letter to ONI was dictated by Supervisor Otho A. Ezell on Wednesday, January 13, 1954. It was typed Thursday, January 14, 1954, on Friday's date of the 15th. It was returned for additional data necessitating redating of the letter to Monday, January 18, when it was transmitted. In view of the fact that Naval Academy officials and ONI were aware of [ ] identity, it was felt that no faster method of notification was necessary under then existing circumstances. The Baltimore report covering the interview with [ ], dated January 8, 1954, was received in the Espionage Section on January 18, 1954. A copy was furnished to the Records Administration Branch in the Department on January 18, 1954, and the letter of transmittal to ONI was dictated on January 18, 1954, being sent from the Bureau on Wednesday, January 20, 1954.

RECOMMENDATION:

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The Baltimore Office was derelict in that they took twenty days in which to notify the Bureau, by teletype dated January 7, 1954, following their interview with [ ] on December 17, 1953. The Baltimore Agent who participated in the interview and submitted the report was SA [ ] who I recommended be censured in my memorandum of June 10, 1954, for his failure to notify ONI promptly re Midshipman [ ] upon receipt of original information of correspondence between [ ] and [ ] in July, 1953. SA [ ] should also be criticized for his failure to promptly report the identification of [ ].

Since the Navy had been advised of the possible Navy interest in this matter on December 16, 1953, and of the identification of [ ] by Baltimore on December 17, 1953, I believe the handling of the final dissemination to ONI by the Domestic Intelligence Division was proper.

See addendum page three.

ADDENDUM: June 13, 1954 LVB:WMJ

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With reference to Special Agent [redacted] I have recommended in the attached memorandum dated June 10, 1954, that this Agent be censured, placed on probation and transferred, and his letter of censure should include this additional delinquency.

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I recommend that Mr. Belmont be censured because the initial memorandum prepared by him was sent back to him by me because of his failure to thoroughly explore the reason why the Kansas City Office did not make appropriate dissemination to ONI concerning the contact between Midshipman [redacted] and security subject [redacted].

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I recommend that I be censured for having failed to insist that Belmont submit initially a sufficiently thorough explanation concerning the [redacted] phase of this matter. It was necessary for the Director at the time I discussed this matter with him telephonically to point out to me that I had failed to explain the situation existing as to the alleged two-month delay of notification to ONI as reflected in paragraph one, page two, memorandum dated June 10, 1954, of L. B. Nichols to Mr. Tolson. For this omission I recommend that I be given a letter of censure.

L. V. Boardman *LB*

Attachment

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It is necessary to have two Agents present when interviews are conducted with subjects of security cases. SA [ ] reached Grand Forks May 19, 1954, and attempted to contact Resident Agent Brown. Brown was away. SA [ ] subsequently arranged with SA Brown to conduct a joint interview with subject on May 27, 1954, on which date SA [ ] would be back in Grand Forks. [ ] was interviewed on May 27, 1954. SA [ ] returned to the Minneapolis Office at 7:10 p.m., May 28, 1954. He did not dictate the results of the interview until June 9, 1954. ASAC C. O. Lynum of the Minneapolis Office advised that SA [ ] did not immediately dictate the results of the interview with [ ] because he was handling other deadline cases and delinquent cases which had a greater priority than the [ ] case. ASAC Lynum advised he felt that in view of the circumstances and distance involved, the interview had been made as promptly and economically as possible, and that since SA [ ] was handling other more expeditious cases, he recommended no administrative action. While it would appear the interview was handled as promptly as possible under the circumstances, SA [ ] should have dictated the results of the interview shortly after his return to the Minneapolis Office, and he should be censured for his failure to do so.

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With respect to dissemination of information to ONI on [ ] the Director observed that ONI should have been advised in May, 1953 and not in February, 1954. The Director is correct. The Bureau has the responsibility of disseminating possible derogatory information, whether verified or not, on Government employees or members of the Armed Forces to the appropriate agencies at once. My memorandum of June 9, 1954, was in error in this respect and appropriate recommendations are set forth below.

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A complete analysis of the [ ] file reflects that up to September, 1953, the [ ] case was supervised by Supervisor [ ], who was responsible for disseminating the information when it was first received. The file shows that the Kansas City Office first reported the results of the mail cover by report dated July 13, 1953, received by the Internal Security Section of the Bureau on July 21, 1953, setting out a lead to Baltimore to identify [ ] at the Naval Academy and determine his association with [ ] Baltimore verified that [ ] was at the Academy and established that he

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was the brother of Mrs. [redacted], New York. Baltimore set out leads to New Haven and New York to check [redacted] background by report dated August 27, 1953, received in the Internal Security Section on September 2, 1953. Supervisor [redacted] states he does not recall this case among the hundreds which came over his desk. The Baltimore report verifying [redacted] attendance at Naval Academy was received two days before the case was assigned to Supervisor Short on September 4, 1953, due to change in office of origin; however, [redacted] initialed the Baltimore report. [redacted] sincerely regrets he did not disseminate the [redacted] information to ONI. [redacted] has been an above-average Supervisor.

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Supervisor James G. Short, who has handled this case since September, 1953, advises that it is his custom to review a case assigned to him as a result of change of office of origin. He states that while he does not recall specifically, he must have reviewed this file. He says his attention was flagged to the information concerning [redacted] by Minneapolis letter of March 18, 1954, requesting authority to interview [redacted]. This letter mentions correspondence between [redacted] and the subject. Short thereupon disseminated the information to ONI on April 1, with copies of three investigative reports. Short regrets it was not disseminated previously. Short has been one of the better Supervisors in the Division and his work has been above average.

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I talked to SAC Alden of Baltimore on the morning of June 11, 1954. He said Baltimore covered the lead in Kansas City report of July 13, 1953, at Annapolis and verified that a [redacted] who was the brother of Mrs. [redacted] of Jamaica, New York, was there. Baltimore set out leads to get further background on [redacted] by report dated August 27, 1953. Alden said no dissemination was made at Baltimore to ONI, as Baltimore did not have the complete facts or the extent of any proven derogatory information on [redacted]. He said on December 2, 1953, Baltimore wrote to Minneapolis, which was then office of origin, (no copy to the Bureau) referring to Baltimore report of August 27, 1953, and stating that Baltimore had not disseminated to ONI, as Baltimore did not have complete facts. In this letter Baltimore requested Minneapolis to make dissemination to ONI if the facts regarding [redacted] warranted dissemination.

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I called SAC Alden's attention to the fact that two questions immediately arose concerning the handling of this matter by Special Agent [redacted], who prepared Baltimore report on [redacted] dated August 27, 1953, and who sent the letter to the Minneapolis Office dated December 2, 1953: (1) that the Baltimore Office which handles contacts with the Naval Academy at Annapolis did not apparently recognize its responsibility to disseminate the information concerning [redacted] to ONI until December 2, 1953, several months after the lead was covered at the Academy; and, (2) that the Bureau was not furnished a copy of the letter to Minneapolis dated December 2, 1953, raising the issue of dissemination.

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After checking with Agent [redacted], SAC Alden advised that SA [redacted] thought that he had originally disseminated the information in the report from Kansas City dated July 13, 1953, to ONI. However, considerably later while he was at the Academy he made guarded inquiry of ONI as to whether they had received any information from the Bureau concerning [redacted]. Upon being advised they had not, he checked the file at Baltimore and noted no dissemination and thereupon wrote his letter of December 2, 1953, to Minneapolis, the office of origin, requesting that dissemination be made. [redacted] is at fault, first, in not disseminating the information originally, and second, in not advising the Bureau when he realized that the information had not been disseminated so that positive steps could have been taken to disseminate it at that time.

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The information from the mail cover in May, 1953, reflecting that [redacted] was in contact with [redacted] originated at Kansas City, and was reported by Special Agent [redacted] under date of July 13, 1953. Kansas City had a basic responsibility as office of origin to see that the contact between [redacted] a Midshipman, and [redacted] a security subject, was disseminated to ONI, even though the allegations against [redacted] had not been verified. I spoke to Supervisor Fetzner of the Kansas City Office on the morning of June 11. He said the Kansas City file on [redacted] does not reflect any dissemination to ONI, nor was any question raised by Kansas City as to dissemination other than the submission of the routine report to the Bureau on July 13, 1953. Mr. Fetzner said that SAC Robey, now SAC at Birmingham, handled the correspondence in the [redacted] case and initialed Agent [redacted] report. Agent [redacted] was transferred to Albuquerque on December 18, 1953. I see no point in calling SAC Robey and Agent [redacted], as the file speaks for itself. We recommend that their attention be called by letter to their failure to see that dissemination was made.

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I talked to ASAC Curt Lynum of the Minneapolis Office on June 11, 1954, regarding the handling of the case. I pointed out that when Minneapolis took over as office of origin in September, 1953, a review of the file would have disclosed that dissemination to ONI had not been made and Minneapolis had a responsibility to raise the question. He stated that inasmuch as the Bureau had received five copies of the Kansas City report dated July 13, 1953, it was a logical assumption by Minneapolis that the Bureau had disseminated copies of this report to ONI. I pointed out that Baltimore had written to Minneapolis on December 2, 1953, specifically raising the question of dissemination. He advised that it was apparent that Minneapolis should have raised the question at that time. He stated that the case is currently being handled by Special Agent [redacted] who also handled it in December, 1953. He advised that [redacted] is presently in North Dakota attempting to reinterview Strassberg. He stated that the security supervisor up to February, 1954, was [redacted], who has since resigned. Therefore, he is unable to determine what reason existed for the failure of Minneapolis to disseminate to ONI or raise the issue upon receipt of the Baltimore letter in December, 1953. The failure of Agent [redacted] in this respect should be included in the letter of censure previously recommended above.

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It seems apparent to me that there was a general failure, both in the field and the Seat of Government, to promptly recognize in this case that the Navy should be notified of the contact between [redacted] and [redacted] regardless of the fact that the allegations against [redacted] have not been proven and regardless of the fact that the exact relationship between [redacted] and [redacted] had not been determined. Bureau manuals specifically require the field to advise the Bureau promptly of any possible derogatory information concerning Government employees. The manuals are not as specific concerning members of the Armed Forces. There is a general requirement in the Manual of Rules and Regulations, Section 5, Page 2, that information wholly within the jurisdiction of another agency should be forwarded promptly to that agency and "in these instances it should be made clear to the agency having jurisdiction that the information being furnished by the Bureau is unsubstantiated and has not been verified in any way." Also, the Delimitations Agreement requires each member agency to exchange freely and directly with the other information in all matters of mutual

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interest. In order to crystallize our responsibility regarding dissemination of possible derogatory information concerning members of the Armed Services to the appropriate agency, there is attached an SAC Letter setting forth those responsibilities. In addition, we are preparing additional instructions to be included in the manuals to specifically cover dissemination in security cases.

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The Washington Field Office advises that an unknown subject in civilian clothes visited the Soviet Embassy on November 11, 1953, and proceeded to the Ambassador Hotel in (S) (U) an automobile bearing California registration where he later picked up four other unidentified individuals and departed from Washington. Unknown subject case was opened by the Washington Field Office on November 13, 1953. On November 18, 1953, the Washington Field Office wrote to the California Department of Motor Vehicles and they advised by letter dated November 25, 1953, received by WFO on November 30, 1953, that the car in question was registered to [redacted] California. Records at the Ambassador Hotel checked December 12, 1953, disclose that one [redacted] had registered during October, 1953, listing address as U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis. On the possibility that this [redacted] was the owner of the car, even though not registered at the Hotel on November 11, 1953, the date in question, WFO advised the Bureau and Baltimore by airtel on December 12, 1953, which was received in the Espionage Section, December 14, 1953. Bureau indices were checked and ONI was advised by letter dated December 16, 1953, [concerning the Embassy contact and] that (S) (U) the Bureau contemplated an interview with [redacted] was interviewed December 17, 1953, at Annapolis with the knowledge of the Navy. [He identified [redacted] as a visitor to the Soviet Embassy.] ONI and the Naval Academy were notified at Annapolis (S) (U) on December 17, and we stopped investigation as [redacted] was the Navy's responsibility.

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RECOMMENDATIONS:~~SECRET~~

1. Regarding the Shimek case, [we first learned that the unidentified visitor to the Soviet Embassy on November 11, 1953, had a (S) (U) possible Navy aspect when we found that [redacted], possibly identical with the owner of the car used by the subject, had registered at the Ambassador Hotel during October 1953. We learned this on December 12, 1953, notified ONI on December 16 and interviewed [redacted] at the Naval Academy on December 17. (He identified [redacted] as the visitor to the Embassy and we notified ONI and the Naval Academy at Annapolis of this on December 17 and ceased investigation. It appears we took prompt action once we had learned of a Navy aspect. The question is should we have handled this case as a special from its inception? We have a heavy volume of cases arising from contacts at the Russian Embassy flowing from telephone contacts, personal visitors and mail coverage (averaging 109 per month).] Most of these contacts wash out (S) as legitimate or of little consequence. Any contact appearing suspicious on its face or reflecting Government or military employment is handled as a special. The other cases are not. The [redacted] case was not, on its face, suspicious. We checked it out as we do all contact cases. (S) Any one of these cases can turn out to be important. To handle them all on a special basis will materially increase the investigative burden on the field. I recommend that we point out to the field by letter that any one of these cases can have important aspects until resolved; consequently, the cases should receive preferred handling, requiring immediate assignment and correspondence by airtel. In addition, as at present, any cases involving possible Government employment or military employment or where suspicious circumstances exist must be handled as specials. This will increase the speed of handling of these cases but will still limit those cases to be handled as specials to those instances which, on their face, warrant special handling. (U)

*This is but an average  
of but 5 a day - certainly  
not heavy. H.*

*The Intelligence Div.  
waits until we are seriously  
embarrassed & criticized by  
senators before evaluating  
procedures - that Div. needs rejuvenation.*

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2. Regarding the interview with [redacted], this was conducted by a road-trip Agent from Minneapolis in the State of North Dakota within thirteen days after Minneapolis got Bureau authority. I feel the interview itself was handled within a reasonable time. Agent [redacted] returned to Minneapolis on the night of May 28, but did not dictate until June 9, 1954. Despite the fact he had other expedite matters, this interview reflected at least partial admissions of Communist activity by Strassberg and, therefore, became of sufficient importance to report promptly to the Bureau. I, therefore, believe that Agent [redacted] should be censured for his failure to promptly report the results of the interview. He should also be censured for his failure to disseminate or see that dissemination had been made to ONI when Baltimore specifically raised the issue by letter dated December 2, 1953.

I agree JH  
6-11-54

A. H. X BELMONT

3. In my memorandum of June 9, 1954, we stated that ONI should have been advised concerning Pollack upon receipt of a report from New York dated February 3, 1954. This is incorrect. We should have disseminated this information when we first received an indication that Pollack, a Midshipman, had written to the subject of one of our security investigations regardless of how much proof we had developed against the subject. The recommendation in my memorandum of June 9 represented faulty thinking on my part and on the part of Section Chief Baumgardner. It is our policy to disseminate such information promptly and I am reiterating that policy to all Supervisors in the Division. I, therefore, recommend that letters of censure be directed to Baumgardner and myself for failure to completely analyze this case prior to presentation to the Director.

I agree JH  
6-11-54

F. J. X BAUMGARDNER

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4. A thorough review of the [ ] file reflects that Supervisor James G. Short took over supervision of the file in early September, 1953. I have previously recommended that he be censured for his failure to disseminate the information concerning [ ] to ONI prior to April 1, 1954. Prior to September, 1953, this case was supervised by Supervisor [ ]. It was [ ] responsibility to disseminate information concerning the fact that [ ] had written to [ ] in May, 1953. The Bureau was on notice concerning this as early as July 21, 1953, when we received a report from the Kansas City Office, setting out the results of the mail cover. I recommend that [ ] be censured for his failure to disseminate this information to ONI. It should be noted that Mr. [ ] has been a Special Agent since March 2, 1942. He has advised me that during his entire Bureau career he has never received a letter of censure. He has been performing in an above-average manner since his assignment to the Domestic Intelligence Division.

**ADDENDUM: (6/11/54)**

Supervisor [ ] failed to observe the necessity for dissemination on receipt and review of report of Kansas City dated 7/13/53, and Baltimore report dated 8/27/53. I recommend censure and probation.

I concur in a letter of censure for Supervisor Short.

*L.V. BOARDMAN*

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5. It is recommended that letters of censure be directed to SAC Robey, now at Birmingham, and Special Agent Sam E. Cain, now in Albuquerque, calling their attention to the failure of the Kansas City Office, as office of origin, to see that appropriate dissemination to ONI was made relative to the contact between Midshipman Pollack and security subject Strassberg.

**ADDENDUM: (6/11/54)**

It is the basic responsibility of the field to insure that proper dissemination is made. If Agent Cain had been alert to this responsibility, this entire situation would have been avoided. I recommend censure and probation for Agent Cain, and concur in censure for SAC Robey.

*L.V. BOARDMAN*

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: June 7, 1954

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: SUSPECTED ESPIONAGE,  
FORT MONMOUTH, NEW JERSEY, AND  
FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LABORATORIES,  
NUTLEY, NEW JERSEY

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

b6  
b7C

My memorandum to you dated 5-11-54 summarized Section VI of the brief prepared in this matter. Section VI was an analysis of possible current problems in connection with matters brought up during the current McCarthy-Army controversy. On page 4 of that memorandum it was pointed out that on 4-21-53 the Bureau advised the Army that our Newark Office would review First Army files at Fort Monmouth and the Federal Telecommunications Laboratories concerning possible espionage activities, and thereafter we requested the Army to furnish Photostats of the necessary material for review but the Army failed to furnish the necessary Photostats. The Director inquired if statement relative to failure of Army to furnish Photostats was accurate as he recalled that they finally did so after a great delay. The recollection of the Director is correct. We finally obtained the Photostats after Army could not handle them all and our New York Office had to assist them. What transpired is that on 7-8-53 Bureau instructed Newark to request Army to furnish Photostats of material for review. On 8-7-53 Newark advised that Army indicated it would take approximately 3 weeks to complete Photostats. On 8-18-53 Newark advised that Army Photostating had bogged down, was being delayed, and in order to expedite matters our New York Office was instructed to Photostat approximately 200 Army dossiers on the Federal Telecommunications Laboratories. 7-4639-351

The statement in my memorandum of 5-11-54 would have been more properly phrased had it read, "...but the Army failed to promptly furnish the necessary Photostats and our New York Office had to assist them." This memorandum was a 5-page 29 1954 condensation of 38 pages in the brief. It is regretted that in the interests of conciseness the phraseology used here did not give the full meaning intended.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.  
administrative action in connection with this.

I do not recommend

SBD:GAS

(SEE NEXT PAGE)

d

q

ADDENDUM: (LVB:wmj) 6-8-54

I recommend that Supervisor E. R. ~~Tully~~, author of referenced communication, be censured for his inaccurate reporting. (BRIEF ATTACHED)

*[Signature]*  
L. V. Boardman

I agree

per 5  
6/9

yes.

H.

I agree but  
also recommend  
Mr. Belmont be  
censured.

Wm

6/9

yes.  
H.

It is most discouraging  
that I can't get accurate  
memos.

H



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Total Deleted Page(s) ~ 36

Page 30 ~ Duplicate

Page 57 ~ b7D

Page 58 ~ b6, b7C, b7D

Page 59 ~ b6, b7C, b7D

Page 60 ~ b6, b7C, b7D

Page 61 ~ b6, b7C, b7D

Page 62 ~ b6, b7C, b7D

Page 63 ~ b6, b7C, b7D

Page 64 ~ b6, b7C, b7D

Page 65 ~ b6, b7C, b7D

Page 66 ~ b6, b7C, b7D

Page 67 ~ b6, b7C, b7D

Page 68 ~ b6, b7C, b7D

Page 69 ~ b6, b7C, b7D

Page 70 ~ b6, b7C, b7D

Page 71 ~ b6, b7C, b7D

Page 72 ~ b6, b7C, b7D

Page 73 ~ b6, b7C, b7D

Page 74 ~ b6, b7C, b7D

Page 75 ~ b6, b7C, b7D

Page 76 ~ b6, b7C, b7D

Page 77 ~ b6, b7C, b7D

Page 78 ~ b6, b7C, b7D

Page 79 ~ b6, b7C, b7D

Page 81 ~ b1, b7D

Page 82 ~ b1, b6, b7C

Page 83 ~ b7D

Page 84 ~ b7D

Page 85 ~ b1, b7D

Page 86 ~ b2, b6, b7C, b7D, b7E

Page 87 ~ b6, b7C, b7D

Page 88 ~ b6, b7C, b7D

Page 89 ~ b6, b7C, b7D

Page 90 ~ b6, b7C, b7D

Page 91 ~ b7D

Page 263 ~ Duplicate